From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2016-10-24
RoboMary in free fall
Reply to Derek Allan

Thanks Derek,


I think that I understand your position now more properly (and I have lots of respect to this view). Consciousness is indeed a tough one. I’m not sure that I can give you a non-trivial/non-circular account of this phenomenon.

But, please let me ask you this. Think of a philosopher who says something like:  “Well, there’s this expression ‘consciousness’ that people use, and seem to describe a certain phenomenon. They also use many other expressions like ‘awareness’ and such to describe this phenomenon. I can’t say much about this phenomenon, though I can give you some examples for ‘conscious experiences’ (I can also provide some examples of things which are not called ‘conscious experiences’). If you ask me to explain what consciousness is, all I will be able to give you is just circular accounts using words like ‘awareness’ and such. I cannot analyze this phenomenon by using mere physical or biological expressions like ‘atoms’ and ‘neurons’.” 

Now, this person won’t stop here, and will also make the following claim: “But, it’s not just me who cannot explain this phenomenon. I think that it is impossible to explain this phenomenon by mere physical/biological expressions. Hence, I argue that every adequate account of what we mean by ‘consciousness’ would be trivial/circular/uninformative. In order to defend this claim, this person would make an argument like Jackson’s knowledge argument, or Nagel’s bat (or any other dualist argument).

If you say in reply, that this person ought to provide first a non-trivial explanation of consciousness, he will answer “but that’s exactly what I’m claiming we cannot do”. I get the impression that Glenn is such a philosopher (maybe I’m wrong).

Now, consider also another person who says in reply: “Well, I also can’t give you a non-trivial account of consciousness at the moment . However, I think there’s a lacuna in your dualist argument. Hence I’m not convinced that it is impossible to explain consciousness by reference to physical/biological expressions. (Maybe Dennett would like to make this claim).

Don’t you think that such a debate is worthy and makes lots of sense?


Best,

Amit