Hi Glenn,

a.       Regarding the first response- the answer is ‘yes’. The experience of the scientist would be changing but he would fail to notice it.

b.      Regarding the second response—and this is important—I think that you miss something here (it seems that James of Seattle was making the same point). One of the assumptions of the thought experiment is that Mark-19 robots have qualitative states. Especially, when they get the stimulation 255, 0, 0 through that channel they have a certain qualia. After all they are analogues to humans, who get stimuli through the optic nerve. So, let say that such an ordinary Mark-19 robot is in a qualitative state of seeing red when it gets this stimulus 255, 0, 0. This is an assumption of the thought experiment.

Now, we have three robots which are exactly like every other Mark-19 robot, except for the connections of their cameras. RoboMARY, for example, is such a defective robot. The other two are the robots on the second and third rooms. The sophisticated (sub-personal) functionalist would say that the qualitative state of the robot in the third room is determined by the function of a certain unit in its brain (James calls it the inner mapping of colours). Since, the unit functions similarly in every Mark-19 robot (this is an assumption of the thought experiment), it follows that when it gets the stimulus 255,0,0 this robot is in a qualitative state of seeing red (BTW- this would also be the qualitative states of the two other robots in rooms 1 and 2). The functionalist does not need to say how she would identify the robot’s qualitative states. She does not need to ask the robot. We assume that the brain of the robot functions just like any other Mark-19 robot, and we assume that when such robots get this stimulus they see red. Her claim is that the experience is determined on the subpersonal level. Once you say that ordinary Mark-19 robots have the qualia of seeing red when the subpersonal level gets this stimulus, she would conclude that this is the qualia of the robot on room 3.

If you prefer, we can talk about humans instead of robots. Assume that a neurosurgeon plays with your optic nerve. He cuts and reconnects the nerve fibers, but in such a way that when blue light strikes your retina, the neural stimulus through the nerve, would be identical to the neural stimulus that you would get when red light strikes your eye at the moment (and vice versa). In such case, the functionalist would say that the qualitative state that you have now when you see red objects would be similar to the qualitative state that you’ll have after the surgery when you see blue objects.

c.       Notice that though the two types of fucntionalists provide different answers regarding the experiences of the robot, they both don’t need to accept the distinction between what-it-is-like-for the robot, and how the robot will react. The first functionalist says that the reactions of the robot on the personal level determine its experiences, and since on the personal level the reactions would be different, she would say that the qualia would be different. The second functionalist would say that the reactions on the subpersonal level determine the qualia. Hence, since the reactions are similar in the two cases (the two conditions of the switch), the qualia is not changing. They’re not forced to accept the distinction you make by this thought experiment.

d.      If you rather, we can discuss this over the email ([email protected])

Best,

Amit