Hi Brent

RE: Yes, for the trivial case - but once you understand this, the general qualitative idea covers everything about the so called "hard problem".

First, I think the division of the question of human consciousness into a so-called easy and hard problem is sheer bunkum – a silly red herring.  There is no easy problem in this case, and Chalmers’ description of the so-called “hard problem” is, to my mind, hopelessly vague and quite useless. Care to tell me what you think the "hard problem" is. (I’ve seen several versions…)

Second what “general qualitative idea”?  How did this enter discussion of sight in a fly?

Re: “Yes, but, I wouldn't say "wrong" in most cases since the intelligent behavior is also inverted i.e. the intelligent behavior is indistinguishable etc”

What “intelligent behaviour”? Where did this notion suddenly come from? What does it mean in this context?  In any case, whether it’s wrong or right or whatever is of absolutely no consequence here. We are talking about the relevance of an instance of mere perception (eg sight in a fly) to the nature of human consciousness.  

RE: “Derek said; "Unless you think human consciousness is no more difficult to understand than the sight mechanisms of (e.g.) a fly". BRENT: ‘’Yes, that could very well be the case.”

Once you concede this (and I don’t really see another option) your whole argument falls to the ground. You are admitting that you may not be talking about human consciousness at all – which of course is highly likely. Unless, to make the point again, you think human consciousness is no more difficult to understand than the sight mechanisms of (e.g.) a fly.

DA