Hi Glenn

RE: “Yes the description would be of what the being was conscious of.”

So, it is not about consciousness per se. And if it isn’t, it is of no help to us.

RE: …I think that what Nagel was suggesting was that at any point of time, if the form is conscious, it will be like something (a description of the experience) to be conscious (because to be conscious implies having an experience).

Consciousness might “imply” having an experience? But so what?  We still don’t know what consciousness itself is (and if we go any distance down this track we will also need a definition of that elusive term “experience” – one that doesn’t smuggle in the notion of consciousness – which would just make us go around in a circle.* )

Re: Could you explain to me what part of the question you did not understand, or thought was ambiguous? 

I’ve answered that question now, haven’t I?

DA

* This by the way is one of the flaws in Chalmers’ definition of the so-called “hard” problem. He falls back on the term experience (even italicises it to stress its importance) but provides no definition of it. But quite clearly the notion of experience could imply consciousness (unless somehow it is excluded – and how?). So, in effect, he is potentially defining consciousness (or the “hard” part of it) in terms of itself. Not a good look…