From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2016-12-07
RoboMary in free fall
Hi Jo, 
Regarding my question:

...what evidence there is that for all neurons of a certain type signals to certain synapse locations on them always have a certain meaning e.g. red. So could you just name a type of neuron, and give an example of a certain synapse location on it always having a certain meaning no matter where that neuron is found in the brain (preferably use a neuron that is found in multiple areas in the brain)? 


You responded:

The evidence for sites of synapses mattering to meaning is as far as I know sparse. This is an area just opening up. Paul Tiesinga has published relevant data. The best clue is perhaps David Marr’s analysis of Purkinje cells in the 1980s. These cells have different sorts of inputs from different sorts of cells with very different conformations. I think we can only make sense of meaning if the same applies to cortical cells but it is very hard to establish the microanatomy.


From wiki ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Marr_(neuroscientist) ) I read: 

The cerebellum theory[2] was motivated by two unique features of cerebellar anatomy: (1) the cerebellum contains vast numbers of tiny granule cells, each receiving only a few inputs from "mossy fibers"; (2) Purkinje cells in the cerebellar cortex each receive tens of thousands of inputs from "parallel fibers", but only one input from a single "climbing fiber", which however is extremely strong. Marr proposed that the granule cells encode combinations of mossy fibre inputs, and that the climbing fibres carry a "teaching" signal that instructs their Purkinje cell targets to modify the strength of synaptic connections from parallel fibres. Neither of those ideas is universally accepted, but both form essential elements of viable modern theories[citation needed].


Is this the kind of thing you meant (Marr proposing that the granule cells encode combinations of mossy fibre inputs and the the climbing fibres carry a teaching signal to the target cells)? Because I do not see there any mention that certain synaptic locations always have certain meanings. Could you perhaps paraphrase what David Marr wrote that you thought was evidence (or even just a clue) that certain synaptic locations always have certain meanings? Are you suggesting for example that if one were to investigate the location of parallel fibres on Purkinje cells that would reveal that there will be a correlation between the fibres location on the Purkinje cell and what the signal represents (across all Purkinje cells)?

Regarding your theory about how the individual neurons consciously experiencing is relevant to the report of an experience. I had mentioned earlier (back in post http://philpapers.org/post/24398):

The subjects for which it is like something in your theory are neurons, which do not individually control the human, nor communicate what it is like to be them to any other subject. 


Though you did not seem to understand the issue, and interpreted what I meant in what I regarded as a rather strange way. But since you brought information theory up, perhaps I could rephrase. You earlier, in the first post to me on this thread ( http://philpapers.org/post/21758 ), wrote:

We probably need 100-1000 degrees of freedom for the event to cover all the experiences we can describe. 


I am not totally sure what you meant by degrees of freedom, so instead I will relate it to information theory, that you had brought up. A 2 input 1 output NAND gate can receive 4 messages and output 2. The neuron can receive way more, but how many messages can it output, and how does this compare to how many messages it would require to be able to convey what its experiential content was? In case I have not expressed this clearly enough, consider the amount of bits of Shannon information to express its experiential state (which you suggests requires (100-1000 degrees of freedom) ).

Yours sincerely,

Glenn