Edmond, I just read your paper 'Sensing as Non-Epistemic', which was great. I'd wanted to hunt out your book, this was a substitute for that. I found the long section from "This point has been elaborated because it supports that vital characteristic of all sensed fields already indicated above, namely, that they contain no information whatsoever..."  very interesting and especially clear. I see your points about McDowell; I thought your Chuck Close (the artist) analogy was great too, although, of course, I'd want it registered that there was a type of aboutness in the work -- so actual 'focus' -- that was whatever Close chose in a way that was separately discussable; I liked the description, a bit earlier, of Millar's failed demonstration ... But, you mentioned Gareth Evans in passing, and I think of Evans (sorry about the potting) contributing something like constraints in connection with arguments about content and reference where there were or would be causal dependencies. Can I ask, is there anything to say which was just a bit historical about any correlative conceptions of object-dependency and singularity and connected more purely semantic issues? E.g., Evans' (incredible) 'generality-constraint'. I suppose I'm also asking, do you feel encumbered at all by a different kind of specificity in certain philosophy of language type arguments? Do statements like the following originate in something like the causal/referential nexus I just mentioned, and aren't they directed at establishing something like just content, with associated justificatory links, so that, in fact, the (otherwise operational) mechanics of some describable situation may as well be by-passed? (I'm quoting from John Campbell's 1993, 'Reality, Representation, and Projection')

"[it] seems evident that what has gone wrong is the supposition that one's experience of things have their contents, as experiences of those particular things, independently of the question of which things they are responses to. That is what makes it possible for the question to arise, whether the experiences really are brought about by the things they are experiences of. But this is a mistake: the experience's being an experience of that thing is made so by its being brought about by that thing. So even though particularity is mind-independent, there is no possibility of the experiences being in general brought about by things other than the things they are experiences of. The answer to the 'switching' point is not that particularity is mind-dependent, but that experience is particular-dependent."