From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2010-04-25
The time-lag argument for the representational theory of perception
Derrick,

I generally agree with what Anne Jacobson has said here, and I think a couple of the points I made in my first post were perhaps better expressed in hers.  One point I made is that perception does not involve a perfect replication of the objects we perceive.  So, even though my perception of event X may occur at some point after event X begins (a fact true of all perceptions of events except perhaps for those events which are constituted by direct interaction with our organism), event X may continue during my perception of it, and the information which constitutes my perception may not differ significantly from any present (here and now) facts about event X.  In other words, the time-lag does not necessarily create a disparity between the here and now and the content of the experience of the here and now, even if experience is a presentation of that reality.  The time-lag would only be significant for those events which occur at relatively high speeds.

More generally, part of the problem I see, and which I tried to point out earlier, is with the notion of experience.  There is a temptation to say that experience occurs some time after the brain has done some work.  Of course, the eyes do work, too, and can be considered functional parts of the brain.  (Where do you draw the line between the brain and nerves, if you draw one at all?) When the eyes interact with light, this is the beginning of the brain's (or neural system's) interaction with the world.  The question then is whether or not this first level of interaction constitutes some level of experience.  This is not an easy question, but it appears that the eye does have some functional characteristics which are capable of constituting some level of experience.  Consider that the eye has been likened to a sort of camera.  It has also been observed that the eye is not what we would consider a very good camera--but, then, the role of the eye in our perceptual system is not the same as the role of a camera in our daily life.  I do not think we should exaggerate the similarities between eyes and cameras, or judge one by standards we use to judge the other.  The point is only that the eye is capable of capturing or presenting images, and this can constitute one level of perceptual experience.

Thus, in my earlier post, I distinguished between two levels of experience:  There is a way of experiencing which is not the output of processing information about the world, but consists in the very processing of that information.

Here's a simple task which, though not conclusive, is suggestive.  Focus on something specific, such as the computer screen in front of you.  Now, close your eyes for a moment, and quickly open them again so that you are looking at the same object.  It will take you a moment to readjust your focus.  Why is that?  Why can't the brain just pick up right where it left off?  I think the reason is that our visual experience is complex, and it requires some regulatory feedback between the various parts of our neural system.  The eyes are part of that process.  The eyes have to latch on to an object, and our full visual perception cannot occur without that lower level perception.  If perception did not occur until after the eyes grasped an object, then why would we experience the process of focusing the eyes?  Part of what happens when we focus on an object is a synchronization between the eyes and higher-level neurological funcions.  The fact that we experience this synchronization suggests to me that what happens in the eyes is a part of our experience, and not merely a pre-experiential component of our information processing.  The lower level perception actually constitutes some aspect of the higher-level perception.

Of course, as you note, if all we had were eyes, we would not experience anything.  But this is no objection to my point.  I do not claim that eyes alone are sufficient for experience, just as I would not claim that the heart alone is sufficient for the pumping of blood.  But the heart does pump blood.

In sum, experience begins when information is presented, and this occurs as the eyes interact with light.  Thus, experience begins immediately upon our interaction with the world, and not at some later time.  We can thus reject your first premise.

If I am correct, then what can we conclude?  Perhaps we should be more sympathetic to the view that experience is not an object or state, but is rather an interactive process which occurs between ourselves and the world.  This may be why facts about experiences are not clearly facts about objects or properties of the world, and not clearly facts about dispositions or capacities, either.  See for example Ryle (1949, Chapter 7).  Perhaps this is something like what Anne Jacobson means when she says we should avoid the idea of perception as looking at a picture (or a film, I would add).

Regards,
Jason
April 21, 2010