Hi
Alex
There
is a lot in your post but I’m going to talk about just the first two sentences
for now because it seems to me that we are on somewhat different wavelengths
and it might be best to address that issue first.
You
say: “What I mean by 'in a phenomenal sense' is that I'm aware of it, and of
its contents. I don't agree that if we really
knew we could say - there are lots of 'knowledge how' (e.g. of bicycle riding)
examples that don't conform to this.”
When
I think of the notion of consciousness – let’s say human consciousness for now
to keep it simple (!) – I mean the general state in which human beings think
and feel. That is, I mean the way we apprehend things – our state of being,
if you like, which we presume (though can’t prove) differs from the state of
being of, say, a stone or a worm or a cat or even a monkey.
Seen
in these terms, everything we do, think, feel, want, don’t want, etc is
impregnated by – conditioned by, if you like – our consciousness. We can’t even
do a “simple” thing like look out a window without looking and seeing the way a
human does (i.e. with a human consciousness). We can’t do anything – from
working out the most complex theory through to riding a bike - without that, in
some way, being done in this “human consciousness” way - even if, as in riding
a bike, we do part of it “mechanically”.
So,
from my point of view, I don’t think it helps to try to separate human actions
into those that involve different “degrees”, so to speak, of consciousness
(e.g. explaining a theorem as compared with riding a bike) because, to my mind,
that distracts attention from the fundamental issue which is: what is
human consciousness anyway?
Part
of the problem in all this springs, I often think, from the ambiguity of the
word “conscious” and the different ways we use the word. If I say “I was not
conscious of his presence”, the word has a different shade of meaning from “I
was not conscious because I was knocked out” and that again has a different
shade of meaning from “I am a conscious human being” (i.e. whether I like it or
not).
The
last sense is the one that, in my view, is – or at least should be - the focus
of the “philosophy of consciousness”. But it is clearly not an easy
matter because human consciousness is the milieu we inhabit, so to speak, and
we know no other. Describing it is, as I say, a bit like the fish trying
to imagine what life outside the aquarium might be like (so it would have
something to compare its present state with). I don’t mean to say that the issue
is therefore necessarily a closed book. There are probably useful things that can be said
– though I confess I don’t come across them very often.
Cheers
Derek