From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2010-07-03
The time-lag argument for the representational theory of perception
Dear Jo,

Isn't the aim of science to find the relations between phenomena?  Annette is saying that she has a phenomenon that is unexplained, I say the same.  This phenomenon has extension and content, our scientific task must surely be to relate this extension and content to measurable phenomena.  If this takes us through QM or other relations that's OK but I cannot find any attempt in your comments to explain any relations that might describe the phenomenon that Annette and I experience. In fact you seem to be on the verge of simply dismissing the phenomenon that I am sure I have on the weak basis of arguments that the world is really a bit complicated.  Let us start at the phenomenon, our experience, and attempt to find relations within it and between it and the physical brain, we will then be able, in the long run, to relate the phenomenon to the physical world of measurements.

I cannot find in any of your comments a clear argument why we should believe that our experience does not exist.  If it exists I cannot find a clear argument about why it does not have extent and content - the obvious features of its existence. You say experience might all be dispositions or computations but you miss the essential relation between its phenomenal character and these physical phenomena.  How exactly does a computation become an extension in experience, how exactly does a disposition become green?  Computations and dispositions do not even have the right units to be used in such relations!


John