First, I must apologize, JWK, I wasn't ignoring you, I just didn't see this post (http://philpapers.org/post/4649) until just now.

I completely fail to understand the purpose of your quote of what I wrote; I can't tell what the following paragraph says because it is filled with technical terms that appear to be strung together in what could be a completely arbitrary way, as far as I'm concerned. Worse, I can't even tell why you think what I said was funny. I do so hate to miss a joke.

You say you agree with Derrick. I take that to mean that you think his argument carries, and that representationalism is true. As I said, I am not convinced by Derrick's argument because I think there is something incoherent in his temporal requirement for whether the world is "directly" seen. Derrick argues that if we cannot see the world as it exists right now, then we see it only indirectly (presumably as a "representation"). I assume that the contrasting case would be seeing the world without the delays imposed by the bio-mechanics of our senses. In other words, perceiver and perceived would be separated by no time at all--they would exist synchronously in time. If representationalism were false.

My argument was essentially that we could not see the world the way Derrick's argument suggests would be required for "direct" seeing even if we were to disregard the bio-mechanical delay. This is a result of the nature of the universe, which--as we now know--does not exist as a unitary object or collection of objects traveling in lock-step along the time axis.

Derrick's model would be false if subjective time and space bore no relationship to physical time and space.

Of course, I can't speak for Derrick, but I don't think you're helping him. As far as I know, he doesn't care about the relationship of "subjective" to "physical" space-time--at least as far as his argument goes. The purpose of his argument is to show that representationalism is true. His argument turns on the lack of identity between what is perceived and the perception. This non-identity allegedly comes about because of the delay that Derrick says is involved in perception. If, and only if, his argument carries can we even speak of the difference between "subjective" and "objective" space-time.

What you're offering to fix up Derrick's argument is a petitio. You're assuming representationalism is true, and you are giving an explanation of how such a representational model could work. That's premature.