Hi again Derek

Thanks for your reply, I found it very helpful. If you can spare the time, I have a few  more questions regarding 'reduced consciousness'

I did want to say that the zone phenomenon is a fair bit more than just trained human activity. In my essays, "The Philosophical Zombie versus the Tennis Playing Zombie" Parts 1 and 2, I made the claim that the research suggests the zone phenomenon is a universal experience. I will quickly add that everyone experiencing it in the same way is my interpretation of the findings.

However, for argument sake, let us assume that I am correct on the above account and that I am also correct in what I said in my previous post about humans and dogs. That is, all humans and some animals have the ability to 'share' in the same level of consciousness. I did say that humans and dogs share the same level of consciousness when it comes to being engrossed in a task.

You quite rightly point out in your post the problem of,the cut-off point for phenomenological consciousness. You also quite rightly point out the ridiculousness of this type of scenario, "I wonder if that worm digging in my garden is 'in the zone' ( even if he has an exceptionally high I.Q.). I think this highlights the problem of 'reduced consciousness' and how far someone is prepared to reduce it. But what exactly are we trying to reduce?

Some philosophers argue for the existence of qualia. One way to argue for its existence is the famous, or infamous Mary argument. The argument tries to demonstrate the existence of qualia by saying qualia is' something extra'. What if qualia were not something extra, but something we could subtract? I will return to this in a moment.

In my essays I have tried to argue that (assuming qualia exist) it is something that can be stripped away by human subjects. For example, it can be stripped away by seriously picking up a tennis racquet. I think this amounts to saying that qualia are usually the features of experience, but not all of the time especially if we can get rid of 'what it is like' experiences. Does this mean that qualia are features of mental states, but not actual experiences? Is experience reducible by taking something away?

The Mary argument is an argument for epiphenomenal qualia. As the the argument goes, when Mary is free from her room and sees colour for the first time, it is suggested that she gains 'something extra' from experiencing colour. In a similar sense philosophical zombies and tennis playing zombies are also epiphenomenal. Tennis players instead of gaining something extra from their zone experience actually lose something. By losing 'what it is like experiences' does this show the qualitative properties of experience are conceived independently of behaviour and disposition?


Dave Macintosh