The fact that the truth criterion eludes practicality makes it almost impossible to formulate satisfactory model that can explain what counts as knowledge and what does not count as one.

Since knowledge differs from truth in the sense that it needs, in principle, a knower, its attainment must inevitably depend on how much information the potential knower can have in principle and in practice. So long as the information available in principle and in practice do not tally, it is impossible to prevent Gettier cases from denying some instances of knowledge acquisition.

Taking the same example of Barn façade case, one realizes that unless the driver actually verifies in practice whether the façade represents true barns or not, otherwise the driver most likely will conclude, according to all the information available through his observation and reasoning, that he sees nothing but true barns all along. Truth criterion spells out that there is only one true barn and the rest are mere façades - which in principle knowable only for a subject with perfect information - while in actuality the person involved in this particular case always have imperfect information.

According to the driver, he is justified in concluding that because that is all the information he has, unless in all knowledge formation, he strives to be a subject with perfect information, which is practically impossible. The 'J' in JTB presupposes the idea that one may not have sufficient ingredients to know something is true or not, while 'T' in JTB requires truth to be attained before we claim to have knowledge. J and T are, therefore, contradictory in their existence as a model of knowledge, because they both cannot be fulfilled at the same time: if J can ever be unquestionably fulfilled, that would make attainment of J no different from attaining T, and thus J would be equivalent to T.

If there is a satisfactory model of knowledge at all, it must necessarily NOT be JTB, nor can the model subsume it if it were to avoid the same problem at all.