Matthew McGrath University of Missouri, Columbia
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  1.  45
    Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing in Advance.Matthew McGrath - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
  2. Perceptual Reasons.Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...)
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  3.  6
    Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:53-70.
    William Alston claimed that epistemic considerations are relevant to theorizing about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. There must be something about the intrinsic nature of a perceptual experience that explains why it is that it justifies one in believing what it does, rather than other propositions. A metaphysical theory of experience that provides the resources for such an explanation is to be preferred over ones that do not. Alston argued that the theory of appearing gains a leg up on its (...)
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  4.  33
    Cohen on ‘Epistemic’.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Inquiry 59 (7-8):889-905.
    Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficulty of explaining normativity. Overall, the message of this paper (...)
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  5.  36
    Defeating Pragmatic Encroachment?Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Synthese:1-14.
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways (...)
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  6.  64
    Hill on Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):841-849.
  7.  91
    Knowing What Things Look Like.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):1-41.
    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it’s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one’s knowledge of what the (...)
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  8. Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3).
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  9.  7
    Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2).
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  10.  76
    Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):897-905.
    According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we (...)
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  11. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory.Matthew McGrath - 2015 - Routledge.
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
     
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  12. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction.Alvin Goldman & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
     
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  13. Epistemology: An Introduction.Alvin Goldman & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
     
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  14. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory.Matthew McGrath - 2014 - Routledge.
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
     
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  15. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - Routledge.
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
     
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  16. Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.
  17. Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification.
  18. Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):723-732.
  19.  68
    Truth and Epistemology.Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 127--145.
    In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a clear enough (...)
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  20. Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity. [REVIEW]Fantl Jeremy & Mcgrath Matthew - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  21. Arguing for Shifty Epistemology.J. Fantl & M. McGrath - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--74.
    Shifty epistemologists allow that the truth value of “knowledge”-ascriptions can vary not merely because of such differences, but because of factors not traditionally deemed to matter to whether someone knows, like salience of error possibilities and practical stakes. Thus, contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists are both examples. This paper examines two strategies for arguing for shifty epistemology: the argument-from-instances strategy, which attempts to show that the truth-value of knowledge-ascriptions can vary by proposing cases in which they vary (e.g., the bank cases, (...)
     
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  22. Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
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  23.  98
    Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
  24. Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  25. Truth and Words, by Gary Ebbs.M. McGrath - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):520-527.
  26.  96
    Contextualism and Intellectualism.Matthew McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.
  27. Critical Study of John Hawthorne's Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley's Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  28. Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  29. Conciliatory Metaontology and the Vindication of Common Sense.Matthew McGrath - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):482-508.
  30.  85
    Propositions.Matthew McGrath - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  31. Epistemology: An Anthology.Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (eds.) - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  32.  71
    Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:143-76.
  33. Memory and Epistemic Conservatism.Matthew Mcgrath - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):1-24.
    Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in (...)
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  34. On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
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  35. Temporal Parts.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.
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  36. Energy Procurement and Planning in a New Era of Ratemaking.M. McGrath - 2005 - In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press. pp. 149--7.
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  37.  75
    Lynch on the Value of Truth.Matthew Mcgrath - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):302-310.
  38. Book Symposium: True to Life: Why Truth Matters by Michael P. Lynch: Lynch on the Value of Truth.Matthew McGrath - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):302-310.
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  39. No Objects, No Problem?Matthew McGrath - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):457 – 486.
    One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited survive the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of (...)
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  40.  68
    Truth Without Objectivity.Matthew McGrath - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):491-494.
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  41.  64
    Review of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries[REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8).
  42. Review: The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):379-383.
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  43.  1
    The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. [REVIEW]Matthew Mcgrath - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):379-383.
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  44. Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth.Matthew McGrath - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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  45. What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking.Matthew McGrath - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):666–688.
    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions.
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  46.  2
    What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking.Matthew Mcgrath - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):666-688.
    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions.
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  47.  39
    ``Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justifcation".J. Fantl & M. McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67--94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  48. Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  49.  13
    Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67.
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  50.  76
    Review: Scott Soames: Understanding Truth. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):410 - 417.
  51.  77
    Scott Soames: Understanding Truth. [REVIEW]Matthew Mcgrath - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):410–417.
  52. Scott Soames: Understanding Truth.Matthew Mcgrath - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):410-417.
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  53.  39
    Rea on Universalism.M. McGrath - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):69-76.
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  54.  78
    Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Matthew McGrath - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):239-242.
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  55. Rea on Universalism.Matthew McGrath - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):69–76.
  56. Epistemology.Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (eds.) - 2000 - Wiley.
     
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  57. Between Deflationism and Correspondence.M. McGrath - 2000 - Garland Publishing.
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  58.  70
    Between Deflationism & Correspondence Theory.Matthew McGrath - 2000 - Garland.
    McGrath argues for an original theory truth that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
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  59.  80
    Proportionality and Mental Causation: A Fit?M. McGrath - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):167-176.
  60. Van Inwagen's Critique of Universalism.M. McGrath - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):116-121.
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  61. Between Deflationism and the Correspondence Theory.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Dissertation, Brown University
    I offer an account of truth that combines elements of deflationism and traditional correspondence theories. We need such an intermediary account, I argue, in order to adequately answer two kinds of questions: "Why do we find it obvious that 'p' is true iff p?" and "Why is it contingent that 'p' is true iff p?" If what it is for 'p' to be true is explained by simply saying that p, as the deflationist claims, it is hard to see how (...)
     
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  62. Matthew McGrath.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Philosophy 74:587-610.
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  63.  38
    Proportionality and Mental Causation: A Fit?Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):167-176.
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  64. Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.
  65.  86
    The Concrete Modal Realist Challenge to Platonism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):587 – 610.
  66. Discussion. Reply to Kovach.M. McGrath - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):581-586.
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  67.  72
    Reply to Kovach.Matthew McGrath - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):581-586.
  68. Weak Deflationism.Matthew McGrath - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):69-98.
    Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of our firmest and most (...)
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