Mog Stapleton Universität Tübingen
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  • Postdoc, Universität Tübingen
  • PhD, University of Edinburgh, 2012.

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  • None specified

About me
Mog Stapleton is a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy of Neuroscience research group at the Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen.
My works
12 found

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  1.  12
    Enactivism Embraces Ecological Psychology.Mog Stapleton - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):325-327.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The authors of the target article seem on the one hand to want to reprimand enactivists for not embracing ecological psychology, and on the other, to criticise them for taking on board some - but not all - of the principles of ecological psychology. In this commentary, I argue that the claim that enactivists have not embraced ecological psychology is (...)
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  2.  40
    The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: From Biological Foundations of Agency to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity.Mog Stapleton & Froese Tom - 2016 - In Miguel García-Valdecasas, José Ignacio Murillo & Nathaniel Barrett (eds.), Biology and Subjectivity Philosophical Contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience. Springer Verlag. pp. 113-129.
    Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) (...)
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  3.  30
    A Dynamic Expedition Through the Affective Landscape. Review of The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind by Giovanna Colombetti. [REVIEW]Mog Stapleton - 2015 - Constructivist Foundations 10 (2):274-276.
    Upshot: Colombetti’s book is a contribution to the literature of at least three intellectual communities within philosophy and the cognitive sciences: affective science, embodiment, and enactivism. Despite the emphasis on embodiment over the past ten to fifteen years, and the resurgence of interest in emotion in the mid-to-late twentieth century, affect nevertheless remains underrepresented in the philosophy of mind and cognition, even in the embodiment and enactive communities. In her book, Colombetti helps to close this gap in the literature.
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  4.  96
    Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations From the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  5. Editorial Introduction: Socializing the Extended Mind.Michele Merritt, Somogy Varga & Mog Stapleton - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 25:1-3.
  6. Ethical Considerations Regarding the Use of Social Robots in the Fourth Age.Catrin Misselhorn, Ulrike Pompe & Mog Stapleton - 2013 - Geropsych 26 (2):121-133.
    The debate about the use of robots in the care of older adults has often been dominated by either overly optimistic visions (coming particularly from Japan), in which robots are seamlessly incorporated into society thereby enhancing quality of life for everyone; or by extremely pessimistic scenarios that paint such a future as horrifying. We reject this dichotomy and argue for a more differentiated ethical evaluation of the possibilities and risks involved with the use of social robots. In a critical discussion (...)
     
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  7. Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science.Mog Stapleton - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
    Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive (...)
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  8. Feeling the Strain: Predicting the Third Dimension of Core Affect.Mog Stapleton - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):166-167.
    This commentary (1) raises the question about the possible conflation of core affect with the neural representation of interoceptive changes in regard to whether biological value is subpersonal or must be experienced, and (2) proposes that Wundt’s third dimension of core affect – strain-relaxation – can be accounted for in the target model under a generalised predictive model of attention.
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  9.  64
    Proper Embodiment: The Role of the Body in Affect and Cognition.Mog Stapleton - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of grossmorphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostlyunnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasiseone of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to thedetriment of the (...)
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  10. Es Are Good. Cognition as Enacted, Embodied, Embedded, Affective and Extended.Dave Ward & Mog Stapleton - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness.
    We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that (...)
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  11.  25
    Review of Dupuy: On the Origins of Cognitive Science. [REVIEW]Mog Stapleton - 2010 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 14 (35).
  12. Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories.Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
    This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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