Vlastimil Vohánka Palacky University, University of Ostrava
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  • Faculty, Palacky University
  • Faculty, University of Ostrava
  • PhD, Palacky University, 2012.

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About me
Interested mainly in applied ethical intuitionism and in probabilistic philosophy of religion.
My works
6 found

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  1.  8
    Necessary Laws? Seifert Vs. Oderberg.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2015 - Studia Neoaristotelica 12 (1):5-56.
    I discuss Josef Seifert, a realist phenomenologist, and David Oderberg, an Aristotelian. Both endorse essences, understood as objective quiddities. Both argue that no law of nature is strongly necessary: i.e. true in every possible world. But they disagree about weak necessity of laws: Seifert argues that no law is true in every possible world in which its referring expressions are non-empty, while Oderberg argues that some is. I restate, relate, and review reasons of both authors for each of those theses. (...)
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  2.  7
    Are Standard Lawlike Propositions Metaphysically Necessary? Hildebrand Vs. Groarke.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2014 - Studia Neoaristotelica 11 (1):89-133.
    I discuss Dietrich von Hildebrand, a realist phenomenologist, and Louis Groarke, an Aristotelian. They are close in epistemology and modal metaphysics, but divided about the metaphysical necessity of standard lawlike propositions – i.e., standard natural laws and standard truths about natural kinds. I extract and undermine the reasons of both authors. Hildebrand claims that no standard lawlike proposition is metaphysically necessary, since none is in principle knowable solely by considering essences. I undermine this when I argue that the explanation of (...)
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  3.  17
    Why Peter van Inwagen Does Not Help in Showing the Logical Possibility of the Trinity.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2013 - Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (2):196-214.
    I conceive the Trinity doctrine as the proposition that there are three persons each of whom is God but just one being which is God. In two papers by Peter van Inwagen I distinguish three potential candidates for a reason that the Trinity doctrine is logically possible. First, a particular conjunction entailing the Trinity doctrine is formally consistent in relative identity logic. Second, the conjunction is formally consistent in the standard logic. Third, the conjunction shares a form in relative identity (...)
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  4.  15
    Mezinárodní konference Formální metody v epistemologii náboženství (Formal Methods in the Epistemology of Religion).Vlastimil Vohánka - 2009 - Studia Neoaristotelica 6 (2):308-311.
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  5.  23
    Plantinga a princip slábnoucí pravděpodobnosti.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2009 - Studia Neoaristotelica 6 (1):50-78.
    De Plantingae circa “principium decrescentis probabilitatis” doctrinaAlvin Plantinga criticam rationum historicarum pro fidei Christianae medullam proposuit, quae calculo probabilitatis innititur. Principium, super quod critica eius fundatur, est, probabilitatem argumenti vel conciunctionis propositionum in proportione ad eius complexitatem decrescere: quo quidem magis complexum sit argumentum, eo improbabilior. Dissertatio nostra elementa epistomologicae doctrinae Plantingae atque “calculi probabilitatis” exponit, indicando quoque partem eius in epistemologia hodierna. Deinde notio “boni argumenti” introducitur et explicatur, quomodo et cur secundum Plantingam nullum datur argumentum bonum pro fide (...)
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  6. Plantinga a princip slábnoucí pravděpodobnosti: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism.Vlastimil Vohánka - 2009 - Studia Neoaristotelica 6 (1):50-78.
    Alvin Plantinga wrote a probabilistic critique of historical arguments for the kernel of Christianity. It is based on the fact that, generally, the more complex a conjunction, the lower its probability. The paper provides elementary insights into the epistemology of Plantinga, probability calculus, and the role of this calculus in contemporary epistemology. It introduces a concept of a good argument, explains in which sense and why, according to Plantinga, no good arguments for Christianity exist, and discusses the following replies. The (...)
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