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Affiliations
  • PhD, Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS/EHESS/ENS, Paris, France, 2007.

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest
About me
I completed my doctorate degree in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science at the Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS/EHESS/ENS, Paris, France) under the supervision of Dr. Roberto Casati. I have been a part of ENACTIVE, the European Network of Excellence (IST-2002-002114 of the European Commission) since 2003 and in 2006 was awarded the Enactive Network Mobility Fellowship for collaborative research. At present I am a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bristol. I am working in the AHRC project(grant number AH/E511139/1) CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) which is a part of the ESF Eurocores Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context scheme. I orginally worked with Prof. Susan Hurley and after her death I am currently working with Dr. Finn Spicer. Some of my current research interests are: (A) The analysis of the relation between cognition and action in terms of attention and subsequent application of the analysis in an explanation of consciousness in a real-world situation. I am particularly interested in developing this line of thought by focusing on empirical studies in perception, as for example, the phenomenon of gaze redirection which presents a most interesting and challenging domain for the study of the interaction between cognition and action in the context of consciousness. (B) The analysis of consciousness as sense of "presence" in a context and associating it with the sense of agency, especially as the performer of perceptually guided actions, along with the role of conscious perception in action as the awareness of possible states of affairs. (C) Consideration of whether acceptance of "action" as a fundamental explanatory notion essentially implies a commitment to explain experience in terms of mechanisms of which the subject is aware and which are under the conscious control of the subject. Conversely, does the acceptance of the notion of "representation" essentially imply that conscious experience can be boiled down to sub-personal level phenomena? What could be an optimal choice for a theory that seeks to understand consciousness as a matter of dynamic interaction of a situated agent with the environment?
My works
14 found

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  1.  12
    The Future of Social Cognition: Paradigms, Concepts and Experiments.Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):655-672.
    Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory of mind’ :515–526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory–theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises (...)
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  2.  10
    Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Alois Pichler - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...)
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  3.  48
    Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds.Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...)
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  4.  49
    Introduction: Embodiment and Empathy, Current Debates in Social Cognition.Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):117-127.
    This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. But this special issue (...)
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  5.  34
    Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
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  6.  13
    Sensorimotor Intentionality.Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2013 - Developmental Review 33 (4):399-425.
    Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, (...)
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  7. The Dialogically Extended Mind: Language as Skilful Intersubjective Engagement.Riccardo Fusaroli, Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Kristian Tylén - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research.
    A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties (Clark, 2006a). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically (...)
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  8.  20
    Alvin I. Goldman * Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading.N. Gangopadhyay - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):437-441.
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  9.  64
    Seeing Minds: A Neurophilosophical Investigation of the Role of Perception-Action Coupling in Social Perception.N. Gangopadhyay & L. Schilbach - 2011 - Social Neuroscience.
    This paper proposes an empirical hypothesis that in some cases of social interaction we have an immediate perceptual access to others' minds in the perception of their embodied intentionality. Our point of departure is the phenomenological insight that there is an experiential difference in the perception of embodied intentionality and the perception of non-intentionality. The other's embodied intentionality is perceptually given in a way that is different from the givenness of non-intentionality. We claim that the phenomenological difference in the perception (...)
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  10. The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW]Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
    The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and (...)
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  11.  22
    Experiential Blindness Revisited: In Defense of a Case of Embodied Cognition.N. Gangopadhyay - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11:396-407.
    The sensorimotor theory (Noe¨, 2004, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noe¨ as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noe¨’s sensorimotor theory they do (...)
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  12.  12
    Perception, Action.N. Gangopadhyay, M. Madary & F. Spicer - 2010 - In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
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  13.  71
    Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems.Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
    Machine generated contents note: -- 1. Introduction -- Consciousness and Sensorimotor Dynamics: Methodological Issues -- 2. Computational consciousness, D. Ballard -- 3. Explaining what people say about sensory qualia, J. Kevin O'Regan -- 4. Perception, action, and experience: unraveling the golden braid, A. Clark -- The Two-Visual Systems Hypothesis -- 5. Cortical visual systems for perception and action, A.D. Milner and M.A. Goodale -- 6. Hermann Lotze's Theory of 'Local Sign': evidence from pointing responses in an illusory figure, (...)
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  14. Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):63-73.
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
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