The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Other | the foundation of epistemology is recursive, neither a priori nor a posteriori; it is an esoteric performance, not a thought content; the a priori arrives as an act of becoming, the nature of the a priori qua a priori is NOT itself a priori. | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: Platonism | not in the usual sense; they have more reality than "mere convention", but that reality is spiritual in nature, and can have real effects despite being non-physical | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Other | both/and. | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Other | this distinction is possible to make, but it is also possible to make a different distinction; the question is more about whether and how each dance yields joy | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Other | both/and, and neither/nor.
epistemic justification rests on a recursion which can be made explicit to thinking as an activity in which thinking reveals itself to itself as such. The distinction of internal/external is secondary to the actual source of epistemology in thinking that reveals its unfolding to itself, not as an abstraction but as a lived activity. | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Other | external world is maya, but a REAL maya. the extent of its illusoriness depends upon esoteric development, and cannot be dealt with abstractly | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Other | Free will. But not in the 'normal' sense; rather, what is free in us has to be developed, it is not already 'given' for us to exercise; we must (continually) earn our capacity to be un-bound; this is an esoteric path | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: theism | not your usual God | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Other | both/and | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Other | depends: not all knowledge is of the same type, it depends on the particular epistemological process at work in a given circumstance | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | the laws of nature are the ideal corpse of non-physical realtions; they are to their ongoing source as a description of my physical body is to my whole being | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept both | logic is a result of thinking when it begins to take its own activity seriously; there are no limits to the possible logics | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept both | thoughts are real; they are also not fully reducible to purely physical causes, because there are no such things | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Other | the source of moral action is real, and has ontological effects, and is nevertheless subjective (until it becomes subjective-objective) | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept both | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Other | both/and; mind is physical, but the physical is not physical. | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Other | again, depends upon the moral development and actual situation; can be either or both | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Other | the answer depends on the moral development of the individual and the actual details of the situation; both/and. | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Other | have tea and laugh at the idea that either choice is better | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Other | consequentialism has some validity only when taken in a larger (karmic) context; virtue ethics is closer, but all three have some merit. | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Other | many of these views have merits, none are complete; not all perceptual experience is the same, and which parts of which theory help us toward understanding changes on this basis. | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Other | biological: yes, psychological: yes, spiritual: YES, it depends on the level at which you address the concept of identity | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Other | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Other | both/and | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Other | both/and | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Other | false premises; consciousness is not reducible to physical configuration, i.e. the situation is hypothetical only | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Other | both/and | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Other | to think that the question can be addressed by thinking alone is the error of this setup; a more appropriate view would be one that included a larger perspective inclusive of karma and spiritual realities; the problem must be considered in that type of larger context and cannot be reduced to a thought content | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Other | truth is constructed, real, and rests on an epistemological recursion; all knowing is ultimately a paradox, the function of which is to mediate our transformation | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |