David Ingram University of Milan

  • Postdoc, University of Milan
  • PhD, Nottingham University, 2014.

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

About me
I mostly work on metaphysics and the philosophy of time. I'm currently a postdoctoral research fellow in the Centre for Philosophy of Time (CPT) at the University of Milan. Before joining the CPT as a research fellow, I taught philosophy at the University of Nottingham for several years.
My works
6 items found.
  1.  69
    David Ingram (forthcoming). Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness ontology, since it can do considerable work in defence of presentism. In this paper, I propose a version of presentism that involves thisnesses of past and present entities and I argue this view solves important problems facing standard versions of presentism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  2.  30
    David Ingram (2016). Platonism, Alienation, and Negativity. Erkenntnis 81 (6):1273-1285.
    A platonic theory of possibility states that truths about what’s possible are determined by facts about properties not being instantiated. Recently, Matthew Tugby has argued in favour of this sort of theory, arguing that adopting a platonic theory of possibility allows us to solve a paradox concerning alien properties: properties that might have been instantiated, but aren’t actually. In this paper, I raise a worry for Tugby’s proposal—that it commits us to negative facts playing an important truth-making role—and offer a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  3.  40
    David Ingram (2016). The Virtues of Thisness Presentism. Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2867-2888.
    Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don’t exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent ‘common sense’ status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  4.  86
    Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2015). Nefarious Presentism. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
    Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  5. Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2012). Presentism and Distributional Properties. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 305-314.
    Ross Cameron proposes to reconcile presentism and truth-maker theory by invoking temporal distributional properties, instantiated by present entities, as the truth-makers for truths about the past. This chapter argues that Cameron's proposal fails because objects can change which temporal distributional properties they instantiate and this entails that the truth-values of truths about the past can change in an objectionable way.
      Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6. Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2012). Time for Distribution? Analysis 72 (2):264-270.
    Presentists face a familiar problem. If only present objects exist, then what 'makes true' our true claims about the past? According to Ross Cameron, the 'truth-makers' for past and future tensed propositions are presently instantiated Temporal Distributional Properties. We present an argument against Cameron's view. There are two ways that we might understand the term 'distribute' as it appears. On one reading, the resulting properties are not up to the task of playing the truth-maker role; on the other, the properties (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   6 citations  
Is this list right?