The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept: nominalism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept an intermediate view | Depends on what perspective we are talking about. From third person perspective (objective): No free will. The chain of causality rules that out. From first person perspective (subjective): Compatibilism. The whole life of subjects is causally determined and subjects might be aware of that but still subjects appear to feel, act and percieve their lifes as if they had a free will. Therefore from the subjects point of view, free will seems compatible with causal determination. | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept: further-fact view | Again, this depends on what the criteria for personal identity is in the context discussed. So if the further-fact consists of a criteria for personal identity then I hold a further-fact view. If further-fact view has some other meaning I accept an intermediate view. | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | The question is too unclear to answer | Depends on the criteria for survival. E.g. Numerical identity criteria, continuity of consiusness criteria, Property identity et.c.
If the only requirement for survival is that the new matter has identical properties as the old matter then the answer will be: survival. If numerical identity and continuity of consiousness is required for survival then the answer is: death. | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: inconceivable | | |