Matthew Chrisman University of Edinburgh
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  • Faculty, University of Edinburgh
  • PhD, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2006.

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

My philosophical views

My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Accept bothThere are different epistemic norms operative in different inquiries and practices. I don't see why internalist norms couldn't be operative in some contexts while externalist norms are operative in other contexts, depending on the purpose for which we are evaluating the justifiedness of a belief.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Lean toward: idealism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: compatibilism
God: theism or atheism?Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Lean toward: contextualismPropositional content varies depending on context, but I reject the idea that the truth conditions explain the meaning of normative claims like knowledge attributions.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept bothProbably both kinds, but I reject the Myth of the Given.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral anti-realismImportant that issue of objectivity is orthogonal to issue of realism; different moral issues can be more or less objective.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Accept: naturalismThe stuff is all natural, but that doesn't mean that our ways of speaking have to be analyzable in purely natural terms (whatever that means).
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept another alternativeMoral judgments are truth-apt and express moral beliefs, but these beliefs are, in part, irreducibly practical, i.e. essentially caught up in something other than representing reality.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Lean toward: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Accept: two boxes
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Accept more than one
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Reject all
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?There is no fact of the matter
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Lean toward: deflationaryI don't think the concept of truth must be trivialized in order for there to be no substantive property of truth. Worried about the Liar.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Insufficiently familiar with the issue