Simon Kittle University of Innsbruck

  • Postdoc, University of Innsbruck
  • PhD, University of Sheffield, 2015.

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About me
I finished a PhD at the University of Sheffield in 2015. My main research interests are free will, the philosophy of religion, and metaphysics. As of June 2016 I am a postdoc at the University of Innsbruck as part of the Analytic Theology project entitled 'The Nature of God'.
My works
7 items found.
  1.  14
    Simon Kittle (2016). Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, by John Martin Fischer. Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):235-239.
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  2.  61
    Simon Kittle (2015). Abilities to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
    In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of (...)
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  3. Simon Kittle (2015). Free Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis is an investigation into the nature of those abilities that are relevant to free will when the latter is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I assume from the outset the traditional and intuitive picture that being able to do otherwise bestows a significant kind of control on an agent and I ask what kinds of ability are implicated in such control. In chapter 1 I assess the simple conditional analysis of the sense of ‘can’ relevant (...)
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  4.  15
    Simon Kittle (2015). Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control. Journal of Analytic Theology 3:89-108.
    Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate grace and free will. By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject Timpe’s account – itself an extension of Stump’s account – to extended critique. I argue that the centrepiece of Timpe’s solution, his reliance on Dowe’s notion of quasi-causation, is misguided and irrelevant to the problem. As a result, Timpe’s account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism. I (...)
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  5.  31
    Simon Kittle (2015). Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):372-380.
    Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not.
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  6.  91
    Simon Kittle (2014). Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-Decisional’ Intervention. Philosophia 42 (4):987-997.
    Vihvelin argues that Frankfurt-style cases should be divided into two kinds, according to when the trigger for the intention takes place: either prior to the agent's choice or after it. Most agree that only the former, which I call pre-decisional intervention, stands a chance of removing all of an agent's alternatives. Vihvelin notes that both sides in the dispute over whether there is a successful case of pre-decisional intervention assume that if there is a successful case, then it will be (...)
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  7.  35
    Simon Kittle (2013). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis, by Ferenc Huoranszki. Disputatio (37):368-374.
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