Tristan Haze University of Sydney

  • Graduate student, University of Sydney

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

About me
I am currently working on a PhD on modality and the philosophy of language, the centrepiece of which is a new account of the conditions under which a proposition is necessarily true. Blog:
My works
6 items found.
  1. Tristan Haze (2016). A Counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor Account of Instantial Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Research 41:539-541.
    In a recent paper, Breckenridge and Magidor argue for an interesting and counterintuitive account of instantial reasoning. According to this account, in arguments such as one beginning with 'There is some x such that x is mortal. Let O be such an x. ...', the 'O' refers to a particular object, although we cannot know which. I give and defend a simple counterexample involving the notion of an unreferred-to object.
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    Tristan Haze (2016). Against the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. The Reasoner 10 (4):29-30.
    'It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals', write Brogaard and Salerno in (2008: Counterfactuals and context, Analysis 68.1, 39–46). In that article they argue that the putative counterexamples to these principles are actually no threat, on the grounds that they involve a certain kind of illicit contextual shift. -/- Here I argue that this particular kind of contextual shift, if it is properly so called, is not generally illicit, and that therefore (...)
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    Tristan Haze (2016). On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View. Disputatio 8 (43):269-293.
    This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement 'a is b' says that the names 'a' and 'b' codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a case for treating identity (...)
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    Tristan Haze (2016). Reply to Adams and Clarke. Logos and Episteme 7 (2):221-225.
    Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized theory, the method M in question in any given case must be generally reliable.
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  5. Tristan Haze (2015). A Problem for Hofweber’s Ontological Project. Philosophia 43 (3):843-846.
    Thomas Hofweber's well-known ontological project crucially involves inferring negative existential statements from statements of non-reference, i.e. statements that say that some term or terms do not refer. Here, after explaining the context of this move, I aim to show that it is fallacious, and that this vitiates Hofweber's ontological project.
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  6. Tristan Haze (2015). Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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