The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: nominalism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: subjective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: compatibilism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept another alternative | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept: contextualism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Lean toward: non-classical | One needs to do something about the sorites paradox, and it is hard to see how to address it without deviating from classical logic (except by embracing epistemicism, a view I find too incredible to believe). | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | I hold that the most fundamental kind of mental content is internalist (and phenomenally constituted), but that some thought-constituents also have a form of intentionality that constitutively depends in part on internal/external linkages. | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral anti-realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: physicalism | No extant treatments of the explanatory gap, aka the hard problem, seem even close to satisfactory to me. But I'm a wannabe physicalist anyway. | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept another alternative | I accept and advocate cognitivist expressivism, a position not on the standard menu of options. | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | My kind of internalism allows for the possibility of the occasional immoralist. | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Accept: one box | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Accept: representationalism | My kind of representationalism is internalist. The envatted brain has sense experience with the same representational content as my sense experience, by virtue of having the same phenomenology. | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Lean toward: psychological view | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: egalitarianism | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept: death | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Other | It seems to me that I'm morally permitted to go either way, and and not obligated one way or the other. | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept: correspondence | I hold that correspondence comes in many flavors, most of which do not require that the right ontology contains entities answering to singular terms and existential quantifiers of true statements. | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |