Jesse S. Summers Duke University
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  • Postdoc, Duke University
  • PhD, University of California, Los Angeles, 2011.

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5 items found.
  1.  24
    Jesse S. Summers (forthcoming). Rationalizing Our Way Into Moral Progress. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1-12.
    Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account (...)
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  2.  10
    Jesse S. Summers (2015). Addiction by Any Other Name. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (1):49-51.
    Why characterize addiction at all? George Graham reasonably points out that a good understanding of addiction should exchange “surface resemblances…[for] real facts about explanatory forces”. Understanding causes and cures of addiction will indeed help addicts’ lives more than the best characterization could. But we should beware the false dichotomy. Determining “real facts about explanatory forces” is valuable, and so is characterizing “surface resemblances.”Philosophers’ déformation professionnelle often inclines us to look for essential features of natural phenomena, leading to broad definitions that (...)
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  3.  12
    Jesse S. Summers (2015). What is Wrong with Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (1):25-40.
    The question ‘ What is addiction?’ seems to ask for a clinical or biological answer. The research on addiction has progressed much faster in biology and neuroscience than our philosophical understanding of that research.1 Therefore, it can be tempting to look to the relevant psychology or neuroscience to answer our philosophical questions, which ends up treating addiction entirely as a psychological or neurological matter. However, many of our questions about addiction are not fundamentally biological or neurological questions. Here, I suggest (...)
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  4.  27
    Jesse S. Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2014). Scrupulous Agents. Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):947-966.
    Scrupulosity raises fascinating issues about the nature of moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients: perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.
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  5.  59
    Jesse Summers (2012). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):941-944.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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