John O'Dea University of Tokyo

  • Faculty, University of Tokyo
  • PhD, Monash University, 2002.

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7 items found.
  1. John O'Dea (forthcoming). Art and Ambiguity: A Gestalt-Shift Approach to Elusive Appearances. In Fabian Dorsch, Fiona Macpherson & Martine Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Phenomenal Presence.
    I defend a solution to a long-standing problem with perceptual appearances, brought about by the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. The problem is that in conditions which are non-ideal, yet within the range that perceptual constancy works, we see things veridically despite an “appearance” which is traditionally taken to be non-veridical. For example, a tilted coin is often taken to have an “elliptical appearance”, shadowed surfaces a “darker appearance”. These appearances are puzzling for a number of reasons. I defend and elaborate (...)
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  2. John O'Dea (2011). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent (...)
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  3.  28
    John O'Dea (2010). Frank Cameron Jackson. In Graham Oppy, Nick Trakakis, Steve Gardner, Fiona Leigh & Lynda Burns (eds.), Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
    Entry for the Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand.
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  4. John O'Dea (2008). Transparency and the Unity of Experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 299.
    If we assume that the operation of each sense modality constitutes a different experience – a visual experience, an auditory experience, etc – we are faced with the problem of how those distinct experiences come together to form a unified perceptual encounter with the world. Michael Tye has recently argued that the best way to get around this problem is to deny altogether that there are such things as purely visual (and so forth) experiences. Here I aim to show not (...)
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  5.  54
    John O'Dea (2007). The Value in Equal Opportunity: Reply to Kershnar. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):177–187.
    Stephen Kershnar (2004) recently argues that under its most plausible interpretation, equality of opportunity is simply not something worth pursuing; at least, not for itself. In this paper I try to show that even if we accept Kershnar's characterisation of equality of opportunity in terms of weighted aggregate chances, none of his objections succeed. Opportunities, not outcomes, are the appropriate focus of EO advocates; hedonic treadmills are irrelevant to the issue; we do not need to assume general equality in some (...)
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  6. John O'Dea (2006). Representationalism, Supervenience, and the Cross-Modal Problem. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.
    The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationalism is true centres on purported counter-examples – that is (...)
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  7.  74
    John O'Dea (2002). The Indexical Nature of Sensory Concepts. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181.
    This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first person indexical.
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