Alexander Morgan Rice University
About me
I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Rice University. Before joining Rice, I was a postdoc in Hong Yu Wong's Philosophy of Neuroscience Group at the University of Tübingen. I did my PhD in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University, and received BA (Hons) and BSc degrees from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. My research interests cluster at the intersection of the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of neuroscience, and action theory, and are ultimately motivated by the fundamental philosophical question: Why did the chicken cross the road? That is, I’m interested in questions about the origins, nature, and mechanisms of basic forms of intentional agency: What distinguishes genuine agents from merely 'reactive' systems? What are the conditions for something to be capable of acting for a reason? How can we best articulate the distinction between the intentional states of an agent and the information-processing states of its parts? Philosophy affords a synoptic perspective that allows me to weave together the best available evidence from the cognitive and neural sciences to address these and related questions.
My works
1 found

  1. Representations Gone Mental.Alex Morgan - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of (...)
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