Greg Gandenberger University of Pittsburgh

  • Graduate student, University of Pittsburgh

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About me
I am a philosopher of scientific method. In particular, I work on the norms of statistical inference that guide scientific research. My primary current project concerns the Likelihood Principle and its significance for Bayesian, likelihoodist, and frequentist theories of statistical inference. I maintain a blog about my work at
My works
4 found

  1.  10
    Why I Am Not a Likelihoodist.Greg Gandenberger - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (7).
    Frequentist statistical methods continue to predominate in many areas of science despite prominent calls for "statistical reform." They do so in part because their main rivals, Bayesian methods, appeal to prior probability distributions that arguably lack an objective justification in typical cases. Some methodologists find a third approach called likelihoodism attractive because it avoids important objections to frequentism without appealing to prior probabilities. However, likelihoodist methods do not provide guidance for belief or action, but only assessments of data as evidence. (...)
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  2.  30
    A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle.Greg Gandenberger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):475-503.
    I present a new proof of the likelihood principle that avoids two responses to a well-known proof due to Birnbaum. I also respond to arguments that Birnbaum’s proof is fallacious, which if correct could be adapted to this new proof. On the other hand, I urge caution in interpreting proofs of the likelihood principle as arguments against the use of frequentist statistical methods. 1 Introduction2 The New Proof3 How the New Proof Addresses Proposals to Restrict Birnbaum’s Premises4 A Response to (...)
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  3. Producing a Robust Body of Data with a Single Technique.Gregory Gandenberger - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):381-399.
    When a technique purports to provide information that is not available to the unaided senses, it is natural to think that the only way to validate that technique is by appealing to a theory of the processes that lead from the object of study to the raw data. In fact, scientists have a variety of strategies for validating their techniques. Those strategies can yield multiple independent arguments that support the validity of the technique. Thus, it is possible to produce a (...)
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  4.  19
    Why I Am Not a Methodological Likelihoodist.Gregory Gandenberger - unknown
    Methodological likelihoodism is the view that it is possible to provide an adequate self-contained methodology for science on the basis of likelihood functions alone. I argue that methodological likelihoodism is false by arguing that an adequate self-contained methodology for science provides good norms of commitment vis-a-vis hypotheses, articulating minimal requirements for a norm of this kind, and proving that no purely likelihood-based norm satisfies those requirements.
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