My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Lean toward: internalismThere are two varieties of normative status with a claim to "justification": internalism is true of one of them, externalism of the other. While I think internalism's claim to the term is better, I don't think the externalist variety of "justification" is any less significant a phenomenon.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: libertarianism
God: theism or atheism?Agnostic/undecided
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?There is no fact of the matterIf, as I assume, the question is about how to interpret knowledge-ascribing *sentences*, then I suspect there is no fact of the matter. If it is about the nature of knowledge itself, then I accept invariantism.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept both
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivismThere are moral properties and sentences that ascribe them are truth-apt.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Accept: externalismIf intention is sufficient for "motivation" then I accept internalism. But I take it that motivation requires an affective element.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Accept bothThere are two varieties of practical rationality: one-boxing answers to one, two-boxing to the other.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Reject one, undecided between others
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Lean toward: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Accept more than oneThe "psychological view" is often used with physicalist presuppositions. Then I just accept the further-fact view. But I think the further fact is a non-supervening psychological fact. So I accept that personal identity goes beyond the psychological construed physicalistically; but it is a matter of the psychological, construed non-physicalistically.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?The question is too unclear to answer
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: MillianIt's a matter for convention; but it would appear our conventions with respect to the matter are Millian. Names in *thought* are a different matter.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Reject bothWhether you survive is a "further fact"—you might or might not die.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Agnostic/undecided
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Accept: metaphysically possible