Brendan Dill de Kenessey Massachusetts Institute of Technology

  • Graduate student, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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About me
I am a Ph. D student in philosophy at MIT. Before MIT, I studied Cognitive Science as an undergraduate at Yale. My research is about morality, psychology, and the intersection between the two. In moral philosophy, my project is to argue we can better understand a wide range of moral phenomena – blame, guilt, demands, promises, moral obligation, and moral reasons – by looking at the roles they play in interpersonal relationships. In psychology, my research focuses on interpreting empirical data about human motivation and action in order to derive lessons for philosophical questions about autonomy, freedom, belief, desire, intention, self-control, the will, and ‘the self.’ And at the intersection between these two fields, I am interested in merging empirical and philosophical approaches to understanding the psychology of morality, including moral judgment, moral motivation, and the moral emotions.
My works
2 found

  1. Moral Psychology as Accountability.Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  2. The Addict in Us All.Brendan Dill & Richard Holton - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 5 (139):01-20.
    In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2001; 2008) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, (...)
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