The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: Platonism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Reject both | The origin of aesthetic value is anterior to the subject-object dichotomy | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | It depends on one's state of consciousness | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: idealism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | The question is too unclear to answer | If our conception of compatibilism were broader, I might accept compatibilism. | |
God: theism or atheism? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Lean toward: empiricism | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: contextualism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Lean toward: non-classical | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | There is a state of consciousness, yet to evolve, in which the distinction is transcended. | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | The question is too unclear to answer | If moral realism were more broadly defined, I might accept it. | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: non-naturalism | If our concept of nature were broader, I might accept naturalism. | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: non-physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Skip | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Skip | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Skip | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Reject all | Ultimately all knowledge is knowledge by identity; derivative forms of knowledge are direct knowledge and knowledge by representation. | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept more than one | In a sufficiently advanced state of consciousness, there is no difference between the three. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific anti-realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Accept both | There is a poise of consciousness experience where past present and future are equally real; there is a poise where past and future are involved in the present; the distinction between past present and future is real but not objectifiable. | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | The question is too unclear to answer | It depends on whether the one is or the five are more valuable, a question that only a higher state of consciousness can resolve. | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: epistemic | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |