Branden Fitelson University of California, Berkeley
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  • Faculty, University of California, Berkeley
  • PhD, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2001.

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133 found

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  1.  89
    Partial Belief, Full Belief, and Accuracy–Dominance.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - manuscript -
    Arguments for probabilism aim to undergird/motivate a synchronic probabilistic coherence norm for partial beliefs. Standard arguments for probabilism are all of the form: An agent S has a non-probabilistic partial belief function b iff (⇐⇒) S has some “bad” property B (in virtue of the fact that their p.b.f. b has a certain kind of formal property F). These arguments rest on Theorems (⇒) and Converse Theorems (⇐): b is non-Pr ⇐⇒ b has formal property F.
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  2.  99
    An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios.
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  3.  36
    Dempster-Shafer Functions as Metalinguistic Probability Functions.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Let Ln be a sentential language with n atomic sentences {A1, . . . , An}. Let Sn = {s1, . . . , s2n} be the set of 2n state descriptions of Ln, in the following, canonical lexicographical truth-table order: State Description A1 A2 · · · An−1 An T T T T T s1 = A1 & A2 & · · · &An−1 & An T T T T F s1 = A1 & A2 & · · · (...)
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  4.  46
    Epistemological Critiques of ‘Classical’ Logic: Two Case Studies.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
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  5.  70
    “Survey” of Formal Epistemology: Some Propaganda and an Example.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
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  6. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes From Klein.Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.) - forthcoming - Springer.
    This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
     
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  7. Declarations of Independence.Branden Fitelson & Alan Hájek - forthcoming - Synthese.
    According to orthodox (Kolmogorovian) probability theory, conditional probabilities are by definition certain ratios of unconditional probabilities. As a result, orthodox conditional probabilities are undefined whenever their antecedents have zero unconditional probability. This has important ramifications for the notion of probabilistic independence. Traditionally, independence is defined in terms of unconditional probabilities (the factorization of the relevant joint unconditional probabilities). Various “equivalent” formulations of independence can be given using conditional probabilities. But these “equivalences” break down if conditional probabilities are permitted to have (...)
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  8.  2
    The Philosophical Significance of Stein’s Paradox.Olav Vassend, Elliott Sober & Branden Fitelson - forthcoming - European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-23.
    Charles Stein discovered a paradox in 1955 that many statisticians think is of fundamental importance. Here we explore its philosophical implications. We outline the nature of Stein’s result and of subsequent work on shrinkage estimators; then we describe how these results are related to Bayesianism and to model selection criteria like AIC. We also discuss their bearing on scientific realism and instrumentalism. We argue that results concerning shrinkage estimators underwrite a surprising form of holistic pragmatism.
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  9. Solutions to Some Open Problems From Slaney.Branden Fitelson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (4).
    In response to a paper by Harris & Fitelson, Slaney states several open questions concerning possible strategies for proving distributivity in a wide class of positive sentential logics. In this note, I provide answers to all of Slaney's open questions. The result is a better understanding of the class of positive logics in which distributivity holds.
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  10.  43
    The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result.Branden Fitelson - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):69-74.
    The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven.
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  11.  7
    Remarks on "Random Sequences".Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (1).
    We show that standard statistical tests for randomness of finite sequences are language-dependent in an inductively pernicious way.
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  12.  14
    A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Stephan Hartmann & Branden Fitelson - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):712-717.
    In this discussion note, we explain how to relax some of the standard assumptions made in Garber-style solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence. The result is a more general and explanatory Bayesian approach.
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  13.  38
    Note of the Editors.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson, Ole Hjortland & Florian Steinberger - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-1.
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  14.  18
    3 Contrastive Bayesiansim.Branden Fitelson - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 39--64.
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  15. An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.
    To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear (...)
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  16.  1
    An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):425-433.
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  17.  45
    Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174.
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  18.  62
    Contrastive Bayesianism.Branden Fitelson - 2012 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
    Bayesianism provides a rich theoretical framework, which lends itself rather naturally to the explication of various “contrastive” and “non-contrastive” concepts. In this (brief) discussion, I will focus on issues involving “contrastivism”, as they arise in some of the recent philosophy of science, epistemology, and cognitive science literature surrounding Bayesian confirmation theory.
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  19. Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence.Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
    In this note, I consider various precisifications of the slogan ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. I provide counter-examples to each of these precisifications (assuming an epistemic probabilistic relevance notion of ‘evidential support’).
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  20.  77
    Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies.Jeanne Peijnenburg, Branden Fitelson & Igor Douven - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):1-1.
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  21.  9
    Updating: Learning Versus Supposing.Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):373-378.
  22.  66
    Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):666-672.
    This (brief) note is about the (evidential) “favoring” relation. Pre-theoretically, favoring is a three-place (epistemic) relation, between an evidential proposition E and two hypotheses H1 and H2. Favoring relations are expressed via locutions of the form: E favors H1 over H2. Strictly speaking, favoring should really be thought of as a four-place relation, between E, H1, H2, and a corpus of background evidence K. But, for present purposes (which won't address issues involving K), I will suppress the background corpus, so (...)
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  23. Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength.Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 600--627.
  24.  62
    FEW 2009 Special Issue: Preface. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):591-591.
  25. Pollock on Probability in Epistemology. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):455 - 465.
    In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account.
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  26.  91
    Strengthening the Case for Knowledge From Falsehood.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):666-669.
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  27.  89
    The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  28.  58
    Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on The Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on The Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, reexamining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  29. How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275.
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts (...)
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  30. What is the “Equal Weight View'?Branden Fitelson & David Jehle - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):280-293.
    In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to (...)
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  31. Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  32.  37
    A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):111-125.
    (new version: 10/30/07). Click here to download the companion Mathematica 6 notebook that goes along with this paper.
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  33. Goodman's "New Riddle".Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy (...)
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  34.  2
    Goodman’s “New Riddle”.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613-643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed. Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman's problem, and (...)
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  35.  89
    Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1103-1105.
  36.  42
    Bayesians Sometimes Cannot Ignore Even Very Implausible Theories (Even Ones That Have Not yet Been Thought Of).Branden Fitelson & Neil Thomason - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6 (7):25-36.
    In applying Bayes’s theorem to the history of science, Bayesians sometimes assume – often without argument – that they can safely ignore very implausible theories. This assumption is false, both in that it can seriously distort the history of science as well as the mathematics and the applicability of Bayes’s theorem. There are intuitively very plausible counter-examples. In fact, one can ignore very implausible or unknown theories only if at least one of two conditions is satisfied: one is certain that (...)
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  37. Bayesians Sometimes Cannot Ignore Even Very Implausible Theories.Branden Fitelson & Neil Thomason - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 6:25-36.
    In applying Bayes’s theorem to the history of science, Bayesians sometimes assume – often without argument – that they can safely ignore very implausible theories. This assumption is false, both in that it can seriously distort the history of science as well as the mathematics and the applicability of Bayes’s theorem. There are intuitively very plausible counter-examples. In fact, one can ignore very implausible or unknown theories only if at least one of two conditions is satisfied: one is certain that (...)
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  38. Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens.B. Fitelson & A. Waterman - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):333-338.
  39. Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.
    Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a "middle way" (...)
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  40.  40
    Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):332 - 338.
    By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine-Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
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  41.  61
    Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics.Branden Fitelson & Edward N. Zalta - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):227-247.
    In this paper, the authors describe their initial investigations in computational metaphysics. Our method is to implement axiomatic metaphysics in an automated reasoning system. In this paper, we describe what we have discovered when the theory of abstract objects is implemented in PROVER9 (a first-order automated reasoning system which is the successor to OTTER). After reviewing the second-order, axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we show (1) how to represent a fragment of that theory in PROVER9's first-order syntax, and (2) how (...)
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  42. The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  43. Probability.Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall - 2006 - In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  44. 10. Can Philosophy Offer Help in Resolving Contemporary Biological Controversies?Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Juha Saatsi, Stathis Psillos & Katherine Brading - 2006 - In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan.
  45. 1. Preface Preface (Pp. I-Ii).Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Juha Saatsi, Stathis Psillos & Katherine Brading - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5).
     
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  46. Review: Bayesian Epistemology. [REVIEW]B. Fitelson - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):394-400.
  47.  10
    Review of Richard Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing[REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
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  48. Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.
    has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's argument (...)
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  49.  43
    Discussion: Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence.Branden Fitelson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X _ even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new-and-improved Bayesian account that overcomes the (...)
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  50.  37
    Discussion: Re‐Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence.James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of (...)
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  51. 10. Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution (Pp. 550-570).Paul Teller, Stefano Gattei, Kent W. Staley, Eric Winsberg, James Hawthorne, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Peter Achinstein & Mathias Frisch - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4).
  52. Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (277):23–31.
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
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  53.  53
    Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):23-31.
  54.  5
    A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence.B. Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194-199.
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  55. A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence.Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194–199.
    Let E be a set of n propositions E1, ..., En. We seek a probabilistic measure C(E) of the ‘degree of coherence’ of E. Intuitively, we want C to be a quantitative, probabilistic generalization of the (deductive) logical coherence of E. So, in particular, we require C to satisfy the following..
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  56. David Howie: Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (3):643-646.
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  57.  1
    Hacking Ian. An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge University Press, 2000, Xvii+ 302 Pp. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):506-508.
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  58.  7
    Review of Richard Swinburne (Ed.), Bayes's Theorem[REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11).
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  59. Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):545-551.
  60.  20
    Review of I. Hacking, An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic[REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):5006-5008.
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  61. REVIEWS-An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic.I. Hacking & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):506-507.
  62.  55
    Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson.Luc Bovens, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann & Josh Snyder - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539-563.
    Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of witness reports within a context of independent witnesses, whereas the witnesses in (...)
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  63.  63
    Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
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  64.  22
    Shortest Axiomatizations of Implicational S4 and S.Zachary Ernst, Branden Fitelson, Kenneth Harris & Larry Wos - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):169-179.
    Shortest possible axiomatizations for the implicational fragments of the modal logics S4 and S5 are reported. Among these axiomatizations is included a shortest single axiom for implicational S4—which to our knowledge is the first reported single axiom for that system—and several new shortest single axioms for implicational S5. A variety of automated reasoning strategies were essential to our discoveries.
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  65.  47
    Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction.Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.
    Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms (...)
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  66.  29
    Shortest Axiomatizations of Implicational S4 and S5.Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):169-179.
    Shortest possible axiomatizations for the strict implicational fragments of the modal logics S4 and S5 are reported. Among these axiomatizations is included a shortest single axiom for implicational S4—which to our knowledge is the first reported single axiom for that system—and several new shortest single axioms for implicational S5. A variety of automated reasoning strategies were essential to our discoveries.
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  67.  14
    Too Odd (Not) to Be True: A Reply to Olsson.Stephan Hartmann, Luc Bovens, Branden Fitelson & Josh Snyder - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539-563.
    In ‘Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of witness reports within a context of independent witnesses, whereas the witnesses (...)
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  68. 10. Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures (Pp. 637-644). [REVIEW]Noretta Koertge, Philip Kitcher, Helen E. Longino, Eva Jablonka, Sungsu Kim, Branden Fitelson & Gábor Hofer‐Szabó - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4).
  69.  58
    Arló-Costa, H., 479 Armour-Garb, B., 593 Azzouni, J., 329 Batens, D., 267.J. C. Beall, T. Bigaj, T. Fernando, B. Fitelson, N. Foo, W. Goldfarb, D. Gregory, T. Hailperin, H. Halvorson & K. Harris - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (619).
  70.  15
    A Concise Axiomatization of RM→.Zachary Ernst, Branden Fitelson, Kenneth Harris & Larry Wos - 2001 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 30 (4):191-194.
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  71.  41
    A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S123-.
    outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C.S. Peirce. When we want to consider how degree of confirmation varies with changing I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of con-.
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  72. A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S123-S140.
    A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian measures of confirmation can be ruled out. In closing, another application of (...)
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  73.  74
    Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  74.  21
    Finding Missing Proofs with Automated Reasoning.Branden Fitelson & Larry Wos - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (3):329-356.
    This article features long-sought proofs with intriguing properties (such as the absence of double negation and the avoidance of lemmas that appeared to be indispensable), and it features the automated methods for finding them. The theorems of concern are taken from various areas of logic that include two-valued sentential (or propositional) calculus and infinite-valued sentential calculus. Many of the proofs (in effect) answer questions that had remained open for decades, questions focusing on axiomatic proofs. The approaches we take are of (...)
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  75.  46
    Comments on Some Completeness Theorems of Urquhart and Méndez & Salto.Kenneth Harris & Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (1):51-55.
    Urquhart and Méndez and Salto claim to establish completeness theorems for the system C and two of its negation extensions. In this note, we do the following three things: (1) provide a counterexample to all of these alleged completeness theorems, (2) attempt to diagnose the mistakes in the reported completeness proofs, and (3) provide complete axiomatizations of the desired systems.
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  76.  55
    Comments and Criticism: Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
    Bayesian epistemology suggests various ways of measuring the support that a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. Such measures are defined in terms of a subjective probability assignment, pr, over propositions entertained by an agent. The most standard measure (where “H” stands for “hypothesis” and “E” stands for “evidence”) is: the difference measure: d(H,E) = pr(H/E) - pr(H).0 This may be called a “positive (probabilistic) relevance measure” of confirmation, since, according to it, a piece of evidence E qualitatively confirms a (...)
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  77.  97
    Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
  78.  99
    Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663 - 672.
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  79.  17
    Axiomatic Proofs Through Automated Reasoning.Branden Fitelson & Larry Wos - 2000 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 29 (3):125-36.
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  80.  94
    Review: Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract. [REVIEW]Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237 - 241.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
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  81. Models and Reality—A Review of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the Social Contract.Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237-241.
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  82.  63
    How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.
    As every philosopher knows, “the design argument” concludes that God exists from premisses that cite the adaptive complexity of organisms or the lawfulness and orderliness of the whole universe. Since 1859, it has formed the intellectual heart of creationist opposition to the Darwinian hypothesis that organisms evolved their adaptive features by the mindless process of natural selection. Although the design argument developed as a defense of theism, the logic of the argument in fact encompasses a larger set of issues. William (...)
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  83.  70
    The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...)
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  84. Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism.Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.
    In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N .The hypothesis E says that “human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention (p.220).”1 With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says “it isn’t easy to say precisely what naturalism is,” but then adds that “crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is (...)
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  85.  43
    Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity.Branden Fitelson - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):652-660.
    Wayne (1995) critiques the Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity (CSED) offered by Horwich (1982). Presently, I argue that Wayne’s reconstruction of Horwich’s account of CSED is uncharitable. As a result, Wayne’s criticisms ultimately present no real problem for Horwich. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich’s account of CSED. Unfortunately, even when Horwich’s approach is charitably reconstructed, it is still not completely satisfying.
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  86.  75
    Accuracy & Coherence.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    This talk is (mainly) about the relationship two types of epistemic norms: accuracy norms and coherence norms. A simple example that everyone will be familiar with.
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  87.  20
    Accuracy & Coherence II.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Comparative. Let C be the full set of S’s comparative judgments over B × B. The innaccuracy of C at a world w is given by the number of incorrect judgments in C at w.
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  88.  19
    Accuracy & Coherence III.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    In this talk, I will explain why only one of Miller’s two types of language-dependence-of-verisimilitude problems is a (potential) threat to the sorts of accuracy-dominance approaches to coherence that I’ve been discussing.
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  89.  97
    A Concise Analysis of Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Popper [3] offers a qualitative definition of the relation “p q” = “p is (strictly) closer to the truth than (i.e., strictly more verisimilar than) q”, using the notions of truth (in the actual world) and classical logical consequence ( ), as follows.
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  90.  27
    A Historical Introduction to Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Here’s what Nicod [23] said about instantial confirmation: Consider the formula or the law: A entails B. How can a particular proposition, or more briefly, a fact, affect its probability? If this fact consists of the presence of B in a case of A, it is favourable to the law . . . on the contrary, if it consists of the absence of B in a case of A, it is unfavourable to this law.
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  91.  29
    Bayes's Theorem.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    This is a high quality, concise collection of articles on the foundations of probability and statistics. Its editor, Richard Swinburne, has collected five papers by contemporary leaders in the field, written a pretty thorough and even-handed introductory essay, and placed a very clean and accessible version of Reverend Thomas Bayes’s famous essay (“An Essay Towards the Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances”) at the end, as an Appendix (with a brief historical introduction by the noted statistician G.A. Barnard). (...)
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  92.  28
    Comments on Presting's “Computability and Newcomb's Problem”.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    • What’s essential to Newcomb’s problem? 1. You must choose between two particular acts: A1 = you take just the opaque box; A2 = you take both boxes, where the two states of nature are: S 1 = there’s $1M in the opaque box, S2 = there’s $0 in the opaque box.
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  93.  35
    Comparative Probability, Comparative Confirmation, and the “Conjunction Fallacy”.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    In the first edition of LFP, Carnap [2] undertakes a precise probabilistic explication of the concept of confirmation. This is where modern confirmation theory was born (in sin). Carnap was interested mainly in quantitative confirmation (which he took to be fundamental). But, he also gave (derivative) qualitative and comparative explications: • Qualitative. E inductively supports H. • Comparative. E supports H more strongly than E supports H . • Quantitative. E inductively supports H to degree r . Carnap begins by (...)
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  94.  6
    Decermber 30, 2005.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Slide #0 (Title). Before I get underway, I’d like to quickly thank a few people. First, Jonathan Vogel and John MacFarlane for working behind the scenes to make this thing happen. And, of course, David Christensen for chairing, and Patrick Maher and Jim Joyce for participating. I especially want to thank Patrick for his terrific feedback on my work this term, which has helped me to get much clearer on my project. Before we get started, does everyone have a handout? (...)
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  95.  62
    Goodman's “Grue” Argument in Historical Perspective.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    The talk is mainly defensive. I won’t offer positive accounts of the “paradoxical” cases I will discuss (but, see “Extras”). I’ll begin with Harman’s defense of classical deductive logic against certain (epistemological) “relevantist” arguments.
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  96.  24
    Judgment Under Uncertainty Revisited: Probability Vs Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Carnap [1] aims to provide a formal explication of an informal concept (relation) he calls “confirmation”. He clarifies “E confirms H” in various ways, including: (∗) E provides some positive evidential support for H. His formal explication of “E confirms H” (in [1]) is: (1) E confirms H iff Pr(H | E) > r, where Pr is a suitable (“logical”) probability function, and r is a threshold value.
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  97.  74
    Knowledge From Falsehood.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    It is useful to note how (CC) differs from closure: (C) If S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p and S knows that p, then S knows that q. I won’t be discussing (C) today, but here is a useful contrast.
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  98.  53
    Knowledge From Non-Knowledge.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    The Naive View (TNV) of Inferential Knowledge (slogan): (TNV) Inferential knowledge requires known relevant premises. One key aspect of (TNV) is “counter-closure” [9, 10].
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  99.  33
    Language Dependence in Philosophy of Science and Formal Epistemology.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Suppose we have two false hypotheses H1 and H2. Sometimes, we would like to be able to say that H1 is closer to the truth than H2 (e.g., Newton’s hypothesis vs. Ptolemy’s).
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  100.  23
    Overview of Finite Propositional Boolean Algebras I.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    of monadic or relational predicate calculus (Fa, Gb, Rab, Hcd, etc.). • The Boolean Algebra BL set-up by such a language will be such that: – BL will have 2 n states (corresponding to the state descriptions of L) – BL will contain 2 2n propositions, in total. ∗ This is because each proposition p in BL is equivalent to a disjunction of state descriptions. Thus, each subset of the set of..
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  101.  22
    Probabilistic Coherence From a Logical Point of View.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    – Foundation: Probabilistic Confirmation (c) from a Logical POV ∗ cph, eq as a “relevant” quantitative generalization of pe  hq ∗ cph, eq, so understood, is not Prpe  hq or Prph | eq, etc. ∗ cph, eq is something akin (ordinally) to the likelihood ratio..
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  102.  24
    Remarks on Probability and “Intelligent Design”.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    There are various non-contrastive questions that one can ask about a single hypothesis H and a body of evidence E: What is the probability of H, given E [Pr(H | E)]? What is the likelihood of H on E [Pr(E | H)]? Does E support/counter-support H? Should we accept/reject H in light of E? There are also contrastive questions concerning pairs of alternative hypotheses H1 vs H2 and a body of evidence E: Is H1 more probable than H2, given E? (...)
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  103.  31
    Some Recent Fallacies of Approximation in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    • Several recent Bayesian discussions make use of “approximation” – Earman on the Quantitative Old Evidence Problem – Vranas on Quantitative Approaches to the Ravens Paradox – Dorling’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – Strevens’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – rThere are also examples not involving confirmation: E.g.
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  104.  22
    Some Remarks on the Model Selection Problem.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    We’ll adopt a simple framework today. Our assumptions: A model (M) is a family of hypotheses. A hypothesis (H) is a curve plus an associated error term . For simplicity, we’ll assume a common N (0, 1) Gaussian.
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  105.  27
    The Central Thesis as Involving “Inference to the Best Explanation”.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    • Two competing explanations (independence of S i favors R over CB): (CB) there is a coherence bias in a’s S -formation process.
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  106.  22
    Two Technical Corrections to My Coherence Measure.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Note: This is not an ad hoc change at all. It’s simply the natural thing say here – if one thinks of F as a generalization of classical logical entailment. The extra complexity I had in my original (incorrect) definition of F was there because I was foolishly trying to encode some non-classical, or “relavant” logical structure in F. I now think this is a mistake, and that I should go with the above, classical account of F. Arguments about relevance (...)
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  107.  68
    Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - unknown -
    Taking Joyce’s (1998; 2009) recent argument(s) for probabilism as our point of departure, we propose a new way of grounding formal, synchronic, epistemic coherence requirements for (opinionated) full belief. Our approach yields principled alternatives to deductive consistency, sheds new light on the preface and lottery paradoxes, and reveals novel conceptual connections between alethic and evidential epistemic norms.
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  108.  25
    The Problem: First Pass.Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - unknown -
    Intuitively, it seems that S 1 is “more random” or “less regular” than S 2. In other words, it seems more plausible (in some sense) that S 1 (as opposed to S 2) was generated by a random process ( e.g. , by tossing a fair coin eight times, and recording an H for a heads outcome and a T for a tails outcome). We will use the notation x σ 1 ą σ 2y to express the claim that xstring (...)
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  109.  20
    A Rejoinder to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - unknown -
    By and large, we think Strevens’s [6] is a useful reply to our original critique [2] of his paper on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem [5]. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original paper). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens’s approach to QD.
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  110.  17
    Distributivity in Lℵ0 and Other Sentential Logics.Kenneth Harris & Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Certain distributivity results for Lukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic Lℵ0 are proved axiomatically (for the first time) with the help of the automated reasoning program Otter [16]. In addition, non -distributivity results are established for a wide variety of positive substructural logics by the use of logical matrices discovered with the automated model findingprograms Mace [15] and MaGIC [25].
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  111.  30
    G The Automation of Sound Reasoning and Successful Proof Findin.Larry Wos & Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    The consideration of careful reasoning can be traced to Aristotle and earlier authors. The possibility of rigorous rules for drawing conclusions can certainly be traced to the Middle Ages when types o f syllogism were studied. Shortly after the introduction of computers, the audacious scientist naturally envisioned the automation of sound reasoning—reasoning in which conclusions that are drawn follow l ogically and inevitably from the given hypotheses. Did the idea spring from the intent to emulate s Sherlock Holmes and Mr. (...)
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  112.  19
    Vanquishing the XCB Question: The Methodological Discovery of the Last Shortest Single Axiom for the Equivalential Calculus.Larry Wos, Dolph Ulrich & Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    detail a question that, for a quarter of a century, remained open despite intense study by various researchers. Is the formula XC B = e(x e(e(e( ) e( )) z)) a single axiom for the classical equivalential calculus when the rules of inference consist..
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  113.  20
    Automated Reasoning in Modal Logics: A Framework with Applications.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    The principle that every truth is possibly necessary can now be shown to entail that every truth is necessary by a chain of elementary inferences in a perspicuous notation unavailable to Hegel. —Williamson [5, p.
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  114.  25
    Comments and Criticism Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Bayesian epistemology suggests various ways of measuring the support that a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. Such measures are defined in terms of a subjective probability assignment, pr, over propositions entertained by an agent. The most standard measure (where “H” stands for “hypothesis” and “E” stands for “evidence”) is.
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  115.  15
    Comments on Jill North's “Symmetry and Probability”.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Jill’s paper contains several distinct threads and arguments. I will focus only on what I see as the main theses of the paper, which involve the justification or grounding of the microcanonical probability distribution of classical statistical mechanics. I’ll begin by telling the “canonical” story of the MCD. Then I will discuss Jill’s proposal. I will describe one worry that I have regarding her proposal, and I will offer a friendly amendment which seems to allay my worry.
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  116.  21
    Comments on Jim Franklin's “the Representation of Context: Ideas From Artificial Intelligence”.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    To be honest, I have almost nothing critical to say about Jim’s presentation (and this is quite unusual for a cranky analytic philosopher like me!). What Jim has said is all very sensible, and his examples are very well chosen, etc. So, instead of making critical remarks, I will try to expand a little on one of the themes Jim briefly touched upon in his talk: the contextuality of probability.
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  117.  16
    Distributivity in Lℵ0 and Other Sentential Logics.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Certain distributivity results for Lukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic Lℵ0..
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  118.  48
    Earman on Old Evidence and Measures of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    In Bayes or Bust? John Earman quickly dismisses a possible resolution (or avoidance) of the problem of old evidence. In this note, I argue that his dismissal is premature, and that the proposed resolution (when charitably reconstructed) is reasonable.
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  119.  13
    G the Automation of Sound Reasoning and Successful Proof Findin.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    The consideration of careful reasoning can be traced to Aristotle and earlier authors. The possibility of rigorous rules for drawing conclusions can certainly be traced to the Middle Ages when types o f syllogism were studied. Shortly after the introduction of computers, the audacious scientist naturally envisioned the automation of sound reasoning—reasoning in which conclusions that are drawn follow l ogically and inevitably from the given hypotheses. Did the idea spring from the intent to emulate..
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  120.  42
    Likelihoods, Counterfactuals, and Tracking.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Overview Setting the Stage Consistency Redundancy Goodbye ? Conclusion & References Overview Setting the Stage Consistency Redundancy Goodbye ? Conclusion & References..
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  121.  7
    MaGIC: Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    The program MaGIC (Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives) is intended as a tool for logical research. It computes small algebras (normally with up to 14 elements) suitable for modelling certain non-classical logics. Along the way, it eliminates from the output any algebra isomorphic to one already generated, thus returning only one from each isomorphism class. Optionally, the user may specify a formula which is to be..
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  122.  24
    Notes on Gibbard's Theorem.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    Let L be a sentential (object) language containing atoms ‘A’, ‘B’, . . . , and two logical connectives ‘&’ and ‘→’. In addition to these two logical connectives, L will also contain another binary connective ‘ ’, which is intended to be interpreted as the English indicative. In the meta-language for L , we will have two meta-linguistic operations: ‘ ’ and ‘ ’. ‘ ’ is a binary relation between individual sentences in L . It will be interpreted (...)
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  123.  16
    Overview of Presentation.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    • What are the ends of statistical experiment, analysis, and inference? • What are the most effective means for achieving these ends? • Several paradigms for statistics have been developed — each of these presupposes answers to these key “philosophical” questions about statistics.
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  124.  16
    Overview of Talk.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    The talk is mainly defensive. I won’t offer positive accounts of the “paradoxical” cases I will discuss (but, see “Extras”).
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  125.  38
    Probabilistic Coherence From a Logical Point of View From Confirmation to Coherence I.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    ∗ C pp, qq as a “mutual confirmation” generalization of pp & qq Prpe  hq won’t work Prpp & qq won’t work ∗ C pp, qq, so understood, is not Prpp & qq or Prpq | pq, etc.
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  126.  28
    Some Remarks on the “Intelligent Design” Controversy.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    There are various questions that arise in connection with the “intelligent design” (ID) controversy. This introductory section aims to distinguish five of these questions. Later sections are devoted to detailed discussions of each of these five questions. The first (and central) question is the one that has been discussed most frequently in the news lately: (Q1) Should ID be taught in our public schools? It is helpful to break this general “public school curriculum question” into the following two more specific (...)
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  127.  4
    The Jowett Society & the Philosophical Sociey.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    The Jowett Society and the Philosophical Society of the University of Oxford provide a forum for discussion of philosophical issues for all members of the Philosophy Faculty. The Jowett society dates back to the 19th century and was named in honour of Benjamin Jowett..
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  128.  57
    Using Mathematica to Understand the Computer Proof of the Robbins Conjecture.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    mathematicians for over 60 years. Amazingly, the Argonne team's automated theorem-proving program EQP took only 8 days to find a proof of it. Unfortunately, the proof found by EQP is quite complex and difficult to follow. Some of the steps of the EQP proof require highly complex and unintuitive substitution strategies. As a result, it is nearly impossible to reconstruct or verify the computer proof of the Robbins conjecture entirely by hand. This is where the unique symbolic capabilities of Mathematica (...)
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  129.  24
    Vanquishing the XCB Question: The Methodological Discovery of the Last Shortest Single Axiom for the Equivalential Calculus.Branden Fitelson - manuscript -
    With the inclusion of an e ective methodology, this article answers in detail a question that, for a quarter of a century, remained open despite intense study by various researchers. Is the formula XCB = e(x e(e(e(x y) e(z y)) z)) a single axiom for the classical equivalential calculus when the rules of inference consist of detachment (modus ponens) and substitution? Where the function e represents equivalence, this calculus can be axiomatized quite naturally with the formulas (x x), e(e(x y) (...)
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  130. Advice-Giving and Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak - unknown -
    Dutch Book Arguments. B is susceptibility to sure monetary loss (in a certain betting set-up), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the DBT and the Converse DBT. Representation Theorem Arguments. B is having preferences that violate some of Savage’s axioms (and/or being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the RT.
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  131.  98
    Separability Assumptions in Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak - unknown -
    - In decision theory, an agent is deciding how to value a gamble that results in different outcomes in different states. Each outcome gets a utility value for the agent.
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  132.  12
    The Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction — Revisited.Branden Fitelson & Jim Hawthorne - unknown -
    E confirmsi H1 more strongly than E confirmsi H2 iff c(H1, E) > c(H2, E). [where c is some relevance measure].
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  133.  24
    Here is a “Reductio” of Classical Deductive Logic.Branden Fitelson - unknown -
    Harman [8] would concede that (1)–(3) are inconsistent, and (as a result) that something is wrong with premises (1)–(3). But, he would reject the relevantists’ diagnosis that (1) must be rejected. I take it he’d say it’s (2) that is to blame here. (2) is a bridge principle [12] linking entailment and inference. (2) is correct only for consistent B’s. [Even if B is consistent, the correct response may rather be to reject some Bi’s in B.].
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