Alfred Mele Florida State University
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  1. Actions, Explanations, and Causes.Alfred Mele - forthcoming - In G. D'Oro (ed.), Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  2.  3
    The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy.Alfred Mele - forthcoming - In M. Vargas & G. Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
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  3.  2
    Vetoing and Consciousness.Alfred Mele - forthcoming - In T. Vierkant, J. Kiverstein & A. Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter’s topic is Benjamin Libet’s position on vetoing. To veto a conscious decision, intention, or urge is to decide not to act on it and to refrain, accordingly, from acting on it. Libet associates veto power with some fancy metaphysics. This chapter sets the metaphysical issues aside and concentrates on the empirical ones, focusing on neuroscientific research that bears on vetoing.
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  4.  34
    On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.
    This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent objection” to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. This objection is an important plank in Pereboom’s argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive.
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  5.  52
    Direct Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.
    This article’s aim is to shed light on direct control, especially as it pertains to free will. I sketch two ways of conceiving of such control. Both sketches extend to decision making. Issues addressed include the problem of present luck and the relationship between direct control and complete control.
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  6.  20
    Moral Responsibility: Radical Reversals and Original Designs.Alfred R. Mele - 2016 - Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):69-82.
    This article identifies and assesses a way of thinking that might help to explain why some compatibilists are attracted to what is variously called an internalist, structuralist, or anti-historicist view of moral responsibility—a view about the bearing of agents’ histories on their moral responsibility. Scenarios of two different kinds are considered. Several scenarios feature heavy-duty manipulation that radically changes an agent’s mature moral personality from admirable to despicable or vice versa. These “radical reversal” scenarios are contrasted with a scenario featuring (...)
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  7.  30
    Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.
    The “problem of present luck” targets a standard libertarian thesis about free will. It has been argued that there is an analogous problem about luck for compatibilists. This article explores similarities and differences between the alleged problems.
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  8.  25
    Luck, Control, and Free Will: Answering Berofsky.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (7):337-355.
    This article answers a question about luck, control, and free will that Bernard Berofsky raises in Nature’s Challenge to Free Will. The article focuses on a positive element of a typical libertarian view: namely, the thesis that there are indeterministic agents who sometimes act freely when their actions—and decisions in particular—are not deterministically caused by proximal causes. LFT is the target of what I call “the problem of present luck”—indeterministic luck at the time of decision. The bearing of such luck (...)
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  9.  12
    Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2014 - In W. Sinnot-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.
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  10.  62
    Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?Alfred Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.
    This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally responsible for anything sometimes act freely? Can agents who never act freely be morally responsible for some of their actions? Various compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to these questions are discussed, as is the control over their behavior that ordinary agents attribute to themselves.
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  11.  12
    Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook.There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of (...)
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  12.  28
    Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.
    This essay sketches a problem about luck for typical incompatibilist views of free will posed in Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck , and examines recent reactions to that problem. Reactions featuring appeals to agent causation receive special attention. Because the problem is focused on decision making, the control that agents have over what they decide is a central topic. Other topics discussed include the nature of lucky action and differences between directly and indirectly free actions.
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  13.  24
    Surrounding Free Will: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience.Alfred R. Mele (ed.) - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    This cutting-edge volume showcases work supported by a four-year, 4.4 million dollar project on free will and science. In fourteen new articles and an introduction, contributors explore the subject of free will from the perspectives of neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; and philosophy.
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  14.  59
    Self-Control, Motivational Strength, and Exposure Therapy.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):359-375.
    Do people sometimes exercise self-control in such a way as to bring it about that they do not act on present-directed motivation that continues to be motivationally strongest for a significant stretch of time (even though they are able to act on that motivation at the time) and intentionally act otherwise during that stretch of time? This paper explores the relative merits of two different theories about synchronic self-control that provide different answers to this question. One is due to Sripada (...)
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  15.  18
    A Dialogue on Free Will and Science.R. Mele Alfred - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    A Dialogue on Free Will and Science is a brief and intriguing book discussing the scientific challenges of free will. Presented through a dialogue, the format allows ideas to emerge and be clarified and then evaluated in a natural way. Engaging and accessible, it offers students a compelling look at free will and science.
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  16.  40
    Author Q & A.Alfred Mele - 2013 - The Philosophers' Magazine 2012 (60):125 - 126.
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  17. Author Q & A.Alfred Mele - 2013 - The Philosophers' Magazine 60:125-126.
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  18.  1
    Free Will and Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophic Exchange 43 (1).
    Has modern neuroscience shown that free will is an illusion? Those who give an affirmative answer often argue as follows. The overt actions that have been studied in some recent experiments do not have corresponding consciously made decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. Therefore no overt actions have corresponding consciously made decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. This paper challenges this inference, arguing that it is unwarranted.
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  19.  54
    Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
    Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
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  20.  63
    Unconscious Decisions and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):777-789.
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  21.  17
    Free Will, Science, and Punishment.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - In Thomas A. Nadelhoffer (ed.), The Future of Punishment. Oup Usa. pp. 177.
    Scientific arguments for the nonexistence of free will use data to support empirical propositions that are then conjoined with a proposition about the meaning of “free will” to yield the conclusion that free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions, the chapter argued that various empirical propositions put forward for this purpose are not warranted by the evidence offered to support them. It might be replied that the only empirical proposition needed in this connection is that substance dualism is false, (...)
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  22.  94
    Libertarianism and Human Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):72-92.
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  23.  68
    Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Journal of Ethics 17 (3):167-184.
    This article’s guiding question is about bullet biting: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility? Featured stories are vignettes in which agents’ systems of values are radically reversed by means of brainwashing and the story behind the zygote argument. The malady known as “intuition deficit disorder” is also discussed.
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  24.  55
    Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Minutelings.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Journal of Ethics 17 (3):153-166.
    This article explores the significance of agents’ histories for directly free actions and actions for which agents are directly morally responsible. Candidates for relevant compatibilist historical constraints discussed by Michael McKenna and Alfred Mele are assessed, as is the bearing of manipulation on free action and moral responsibility.
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  25. Situationism and Agency.Alfred Mele & Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):62-83.
    Research in psychology indicates that situations powerfully impact human behavior. Often, it seems, features of situations drive our behavior even when we remain unaware of these features or their influence. One response to this research is pessimism about human agency: human agents have little conscious control over their own behavior, and little insight into why they do what they do. In this paper we review classic and more recent studies indicating “the power of the situation,” and argue for a more (...)
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  26.  13
    Autonomy and Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2012 - In L. Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    I opened this chapter with the question whether neuroscientific experiments have shown that there are no autonomous human beings. In my opinion, the answer is no. I have not argued for that answer here, of course. Doing so is much too grand a project for a single chapter. Instead, I attacked one line of argument for the claim that neuroscientific experiments have shown that human autonomy is an illusion and I discussed an important difficulty in moving from an alleged finding (...)
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  27.  87
    Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):422-440.
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  28.  37
    Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice.Alfred Mele - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):369 - 379.
    There are intentional actions and unintentional actions. Do we ever perform actions that are neither intentional nor unintentional? Some philosophers have answered "yes" (Mele 1992; Mele and Moser 1994; Mele and Sverdlik 1996; Lowe 1978; Wasserman, forthcoming). That is, they have claimed that there is a middle ground between intentional and unintentional human actions.1 Motivation for this claim is generated by attention to a variety of issues, including two that are of special interest to experimental philosophers of action: the status (...)
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  29. When Are We Self-Deceived?Alfred Mele - 2012 - Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies (20).
    This article‘s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how selfdeception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.
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  30.  18
    Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do. Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable.
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  31.  37
    Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):387-398.
    In chapter 6 of Attempts , Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is “possible to attempt crimes of negligence” ( 2010 , p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that “attempt crimes of negligence” is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for “attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.” But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following thesis: Not only (...)
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  32.  25
    Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):281-297.
  33.  23
    Chance, Choice and Freedom.Alfred Mele - 2011 - The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55):61-65.
    What does the idea that you could have done something else at the time come to? According to some philosophers, it comes to this: in a hypothetical universe that has exactly the same past as our universe and exactly the same laws of nature, you do something else at this very time.
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  34. Chance, Choice and Freedom.Alfred Mele - 2011 - The Philosophers' Magazine 55:61-65.
    What does the idea that you could have done something else at the time come to? According to some philosophers, it comes to this: in a hypothetical universe that has exactly the same past as our universe and exactly the same laws of nature, you do something else at this very time.
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  35.  5
    Free Will and Science.Alfred Mele - 2011 - In R. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition. Oxford University Press.
    This article examines the work of two figures in fields whose work has had a significant impact on recent free-will debates, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and psychologist Daniel Wegner. Libet's groundbreaking experimental studies on human subjects relating brain activities to the appearance or production of conscious experience, volition, and willed action have been much discussed by philosophers and scientists over the past few decades and have influenced subsequent scientific research on these subjects. The second half of the article deals with the (...)
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  36. Moral Psychology.Alfred Mele - 2011 - In C. Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum. pp. 98.
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  37.  35
    Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (1):25-29.
    This contribution to a symposium on an article by Roy Baumeister, A. William Crescioni, and Jessica Alquist focuses on a tension between compatibilist and incompatibilist elements in that article. In their discussion of people’s beliefs about free will, Baumeister et al. sometimes sound like incompatibilists; but in their presentation of their work on psychological processes of free will, they sound more like compatibilists than like incompatibilists. It is suggested that Baumeister and coauthors are attempting to study free will in a (...)
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  38.  2
    Self-Control in Action.Alfred Mele - 2011 - In S. Gallagher (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article describes a neo-Aristotelian conception of self-control, a concept that seems essential to what it means to be a mature human person. It discusses the moral condition known as akrasia and the conception of self that underpins it. While Aristotle regarded the human self to be primarily rational where reason is taken in a strong sense, this article suggests a more holistic conception of the self, where to act out of passion may not mean that one is acting without (...)
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  39.  9
    Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness.Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - In W. Sinnot-Armstrong & L. Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 23--33.
    Benjamin Libet contends both that “the brain ‘decides’ to initiate or, at least, prepare to initiate [certain actions] before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision has taken place” and that “if the ‘act now’ process is initiated unconsciously, then conscious free will is not doing it.” He also contends that once we become conscious of our proximal decisions, we can exercise free will in vetoing them. This chapter provides some conceptual and empirical background and then discusses (...)
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  40. Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions.Tyler F. Stillman, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):381 - 394.
    What does free will mean to laypersons? The present investigation sought to address this question by identifying how laypersons distinguish between free and unfree actions. We elicited autobiographical narratives in which participants described either free or unfree actions, and the narratives were subsequently subjected to impartial analysis. Results indicate that free actions were associated with reaching goals, high levels of conscious thought and deliberation, positive outcomes, and moral behavior (among other things). These findings suggest that lay conceptions of free will (...)
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  41. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work?Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.) - 2010 - University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
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  42.  10
    Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2010 - In R. Baumeister, A. Mele & K. Vohs (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press. pp. 43.
  43.  2
    Conscious Intentions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    This chapter discusses the nature of intentions and how it is discussed in a variety of fields, including neuroscience, philosophy, law, and several branches of psychology. It should be noted that the term is not understood in the same way in all fields; the chapter will focus on an account of intentions similar to that held by neuroscience, specifically the concept of occurrent intentions as commanding attitudes toward plans. A number of psychologists assume that intentions are conscious in nature—that an (...)
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  44.  49
    Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine (50):86-87.
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  45. Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 50:86-87.
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  46. Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.
    Two questions guide this article. First, according to Fischer and Ravizza (jointly and otherwise), what epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are not also requirements for freely performing A? Second, how much progress have they made on this front? The article's main moral is for philosophers who believe that there are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing that are not requirements for freely A-ing because they assume that Fischer (on his own or otherwise) (...)
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  47.  31
    Scientific Skepticism About Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2010 - In T. Nadelhoffer, E. Nahmias & S. Nichols (eds.), Moral Psychology: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Blackwell. pp. 295.
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  48. Teleological Explanations of Actions: Anticausalism Vs. Causalism.Alfred Mele - 2010 - In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. MIT Press.
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  49. Weakness of Will and Akrasia.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
    Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (1999, p. 262). One (...)
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  50.  33
    Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company.Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):745-750.
    This article explores fundamental differences between Robert Audi’s position on self-deception and mine. Although we both depart from a model of self-deception that is straightforwardly based on stereotypical interpersonal deception, we differ in how we do that. An important difference between us might be partly explained by a difference in how we understand the kind of deceiving that is most relevant to self-deception.
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  51. Testing Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):161-172.
    This article describes three experiments that would advance our understanding of the import of data already generated by scientific work on free will and related issues. All three can be conducted with existing technology. The first concerns how reliable a predictor of behavior a certain segment of type I and type II RPs is. The second focuses on the timing of conscious experiences in Libet-style studies. The third concerns the effectiveness of conscious implementation intentions. The discussion of first two experiments (...)
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  52.  1
    Free Will and Consciousness: An Introduction and Overview of Perspectives.Alfred Mele, Kathleen Vohs & Roy Baumeister - 2010 - In A. Mele, R. Baumeister & K. Vohs (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore such issues as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and (...)
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  53. Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.R. Mele Alfred - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered (...)
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  54. Action and Mind.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
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  55. Causation, Action, and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock & P. Menzies (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
  56.  4
    Delusional Confabulations and Self-Deception.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In W. Hirstein (ed.), Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 139.
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  57.  3
    Intention and Intentional Action.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Intention, intentional action, and the connections between them are central topics of the philosophy of action, a branch of the philosophy of mind. One who regards the subject matter of the philosophy of mind as having at its core some aspect of what lies between environmental input to beings with minds and behavioural output may be inclined to see the philosophy of action as concerned only with the output end of things. That would be a mistake. Many intentional actions depend (...)
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  58.  43
    Mental Action: A Case Study.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
    This chapter argues that a proper understanding of the difference between trying to do something and trying to bring it about that one does it sheds light on the nature of mental action. For example, even if one cannot, strictly speaking, try to think of seven animal names that begin with ‘g’, one can try to bring it about that one thinks of seven such names, and one can succeed. In some versions of this scenario, one's successful attempt involves no (...)
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  59.  12
    Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press. pp. 260.
    This chapter separates the problem of self-deception into two component questions: how it happens and what it is. The key to this chapter's account of self-deception is called “deflationary view”. Self-deception, it notes, does not entail “intentionally deceiving oneself; intending to deceive oneself; intending to make it easier for oneself to believe something; concurrently believing each of two explicitly contrary propositions”. The chapter also offers a discussion of the notion of “twisted self-deception”: the phenomenon of the self-deceived person believing something (...)
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  60. Moral Responsibility and History Revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
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  61.  49
    Intentional Action : Two-and-a-Half Folk Concepts?Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 171.
  62. A Libertarian View of Akratic Action.Alfred Mele - 2008 - In T. Hoffman (ed.), Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present. The Catholic University of America Press. pp. 252-275.
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  63.  4
    Moral Responsibility and Agents’ Histories.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.
    To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer.
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  64.  25
    Psychology and Free Will: A Commentary.Alfred Mele - 2008 - In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman & R. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 325.
    This chapter is a commentary on the others, concentrating on themes that link many of them. It provides conceptual background on free will, distinguishes among distinct philosophical positions on the topic (including compatibilist and incompatibilist positions), discusses determinism and laws of nature, connects free will to consciousness, critically examines Benjamin Libet's work on free will and consciousness, and considers the light that Daniel Wegner's contribution to the volume sheds on the “the illusion of conscious will” and free will.
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  65.  33
    Recent Work on Free Will and Science.Alfred Mele - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):107-129.
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  66.  20
    Agnostic Autonomism.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - In James Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy.
    Professor Mele uses the term `autonomy' where other philosophers have spoken of `freedom', `free will' and the like. His well-worked-out paper, which is individual in more than its usage, is not committed to either of the tired doctrines that determinism is inconsistent with autonomy and that it is consistent with it. He is agnostic about which choice to make. Some proponents of the first doctrine, those who believe determinism, draw the conclusion that there is no autonomy. Some proponents of the (...)
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  67. Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):263-286.
    This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus.
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  68.  93
    Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.
    To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer.
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  69.  78
    Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
    Proximal intentions are intentions to do something at once. Are they ever among the causes of actions? Can agents “veto” or retract proximal intentions and refrain from acting on them in certain experimental settings? When, in controlled studies, do proximal intentions to press a button, for example, arise? And when does the agent's consciousness of these intentions arise? This article explores these questions—and evaluates some answers that have been offered—in light of the results of some recent research in neuroscience. Methods (...)
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  70.  43
    Reasonology and False Beliefs.Alfred Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.
    Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false belief, an agent (...)
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  71. Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In F. Castellani & J. Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag.
  72.  6
    Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics.Alfred Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):195-210.
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  73.  6
    Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In C. Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate.
  74. Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In M. Marraffa, M. De Caro & F. Ferreti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  75. Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric Delusions: On Robert Audi's Transition From Self-Deception to Delusion.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In M. Timmons, J. Greco & A. Mele (eds.), Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
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  76.  43
    Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & D. Shier (eds.), Explanation and Causation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy. MIT Press. pp. 4--241.
  77. Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...)
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  78.  35
    Persisting Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):735–757.
    Al is nearly finished sweeping his kitchen floor when he notices, on a counter, a corkscrew that should be put in a drawer. He intends to put the corkscrew away as soon as he is finished with the floor; but by the time he returns the broom and dustpan to the closet, he has forgotten what he intended to do. Al knows (or has a true belief) that there is something he intended to do now in the kitchen. He gazes (...)
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  79.  32
    Review of John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power[REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
  80.  72
    Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out.Alfred R. Mele & Fiery Cushman - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):184–201.
    How are our actions sorted into those that are intentional and those that are not? The philosophical and psychological literature on this topic is livelier now than ever, and we seek to make a contribution to it here. Our guiding question in this article is easy to state and hard to answer: How do various factors— specifically, features of vignettes—that contribute to majority folk judgments that an action is or is not intentional interact in producing the judgment? In pursuing this (...)
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  81.  23
    Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi.Timmons Mark, Greco John & R. Mele Alfred (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    For over thirty years, Robert Audi has produced important work in ethics, epistemology, and the theory of action. This volume features thirteen new critical essays on Audi by a distinguished group of authors: Fred Adams, William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Roger Crisp, Elizabeth Fricker, Bernard Gert, Thomas Hurka, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Raimo Tuomela, Candace Vogler, and Timothy Williamson. Audi's introductory essay provides a thematic overview interconnecting his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of action. The volume concludes with (...)
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  82. Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...)
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  83. Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. pp. 187-205.
  84.  16
    Practical Mistakes and Intentional Actions.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):249 - 260.
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  85. Self-Deception and Delusions.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
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  86.  87
    The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: A Commentary.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture.
    In this commentary, I discuss the three main articles in this volume that present survey data relevant to a search for something that might merit the label “the folk concept of intentional action” – the articles by Joshua Knobe and Arudra Burra, Bertram Malle, and Thomas Nadelhoffer. My guiding question is this: What shape might we find in an analysis of intentional action that takes at face value the results of all of the relevant surveys about vignettes discussed in these (...)
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  87.  52
    Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration.Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.
  88. Dennett on Freedom.Alfred Mele - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):414-426.
    This article is my contribution to an author-meets-critics session on Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves (Viking, 2003) at the 2004 meetings of the American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division. Dennett criticizes a view I defend in Autonomous Agents (Oxford University Press, 1995) about the importance of agents’ histories for autonomy, freedom, and moral responsibility and defends a competing view. Our disagreement on this issue is the major focus of this article. Additional topics are manipulation, avoidance, and avoidability.
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  89.  29
    Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 78-88.
    What are actions? And how are actions to be explained? These two central questions of the philosophy of action call, respectively, for a theory of the nature of action and a theory of the explanation of actions. Many ordinary explanations of actions are offered in terms of such mental states as beliefs, desires, and intentions, and some also appeal to traits of character and emotions. Traditionally, philosophers have used and refined this vocabulary in producing theories of the explanation of intentional (...)
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  90.  6
    Agnostic Autonomism Revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
  91. A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (285):75-80.
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  92. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.
  93. Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Journal of Ethics 10 (3):283-294.
    The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply. Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness.
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  94. Libertarianism, Luck, and Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
    This article critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that luck poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarians.
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  95.  85
    Motivation and Agency: Precis.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):243-247.
    This is a POD only reprint of a 2002 philosophy monograph, which discusses themes related to motivation and human action.
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  96.  27
    Motivation and Agency: Replies. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):295 - 311.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
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  97.  34
    The Oxford Handbook of Rationality.R. Mele Alfred & Rawling Piers (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, (...)
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  98.  6
    Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - In John Hyman & Helen Steward (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-241.
    Libertarians hold that free action and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism and that some human beings occasionally act freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do. Can libertarians who know both that they are right and that they are free make sincere promises? Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, contends that they cannot—at least when they assume that should they do what they promise to do, they would do it freely. Probably, this strikes many readers as a (...)
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  99. Can Libertarians Make Promises?: Alfred Mele.Alfred Mele - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:217-241.
    Libertarians hold that free action and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism and that some human beings occasionally act freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do. Can libertarians who know both that they are right and that they are free make sincere promises? Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, contends that they cannot—at least when they assume that should they do what they promise to do, they would do it freely. Probably, this strikes many readers as a (...)
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  100.  38
    Rational Irrationality.Alfred Mele - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):31-32.
  101. Rational Irrationality.Alfred Mele - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 26:31-32.
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  102. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):735-737.
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  103.  38
    Discussion – Velleman on Action and Agency. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):249 - 261.
  104.  2
    Discussion – Velleman on Action and Agency. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):249-261.
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  105.  25
    Motivated Irrationality.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    The literature on motivated irrationality has two primary foci: action and belief. This article explores two of the central topics falling under this rubric: akratic action (action exhibiting so-called weakness of will or deficient self-control) and motivationally biased belief (including self-deception). Among other matters, this article offers a resolution of Donald Davidson's worry about the explanation of irrationality. When agents act akratically, they act for reasons, and in central cases, they make rational judgments about what it is best to do. (...)
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  106.  12
    Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 262.
    Practical conflicts include conflicts in agents who judge, from the perspective of their own values, desires, beliefs, and the like, that one prospective course of action is superior to another but are tempted by what they judge to be the inferior course of action. A man who wants a late-night snack, even though he judges it best, from the identified perspective, to abide by his recent New Year's resolution against eating such snacks until he has lost ten pounds, is the (...)
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  107.  8
    Review: Discussion: Velleman on Action and Agency. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):249 - 261.
  108.  44
    The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):193-213.
  109.  14
    Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press. pp. 78.
    Weakness of will has perplexed philosophers since Plato's time. This chapter places some of the literature on volitional disorders and addictions in a philosophical context dating back to Plato and Aristotle in an attempt to shed light on issues that a theorist who wishes to analyze the idea of a volitional disorder will face. Key here is the notion of the irresistability and resistability of pertinent desires, which is explored in relation to George Ainslie's work on the ability to make (...)
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  110.  50
    Introduction: Aspects of Rationality.Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    This article examines the nature of rationality. The domain of rationality is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe, and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. This article raises some of the main issues relevant to philosophical discussion of the nature of rationality. Discussions of the nature of practical (...)
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  111.  67
    Motivation and Agency.R. Mele Alfred - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
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  112.  4
    Intending and Trying: Tuomela Vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade.Alfred Mele - 2003 - In Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.), Realism in Action. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    I have long been an admirer of Raimo Tuomela’s work in the philosophy of action. In this paper I will address a disagreement between Tuomela and Michael Bratman about intention and trying. I will argue that each disputant is partly right and partly wrong.
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  113.  20
    Chisholm on Freedom.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (5):630-648.
    This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action-producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a relatively new variant of a Frankfurt-style case for Chisholm's views (...)
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  114.  11
    Belief's Own Ethics. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Ethics 114 (1):156-158.
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  115. Agents' Abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.
  116. Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 163-179.
    According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceivers intentionally deceive others into believing something, p , and there is a time at which the deceivers believe that p is false while their victims falsely believe that p is true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something, p , and there is a time at which they believe that p (...)
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  117. Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
    This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and what they intend in various stories and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments about what (...)
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  118.  4
    Living Without Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):375-378.
  119.  89
    Philosophy of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Donald Davidson. Cambridge University Press.
    The basic subject matter of the philosophy of action is a pair of questions: (1) What are actions? (2) How are actions to be explained? The questions call, respectively, for a theory of the nature of action and a theory of the explanation of actions. Donald Davidson has articulated and defended influential answers to both questions. Those answers are the primary focus of this chapter.
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  120.  18
    Review of Derk Pereboom's Living Without Free Will[REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):375-378.
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  121.  9
    Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 251--264.
  122.  4
    X. Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:163-179.
    According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceivers intentionally deceive others into believing something, p, and there is a time at which the deceivers believe that p is false while their victims falsely believe that p is true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something, p, and there is a time at which they believe that p is false (...)
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  123.  14
    Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 107--126.
  124. Humean Compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.
    Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a (...)
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  125.  39
    Autonomy and Akrasia.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):207 – 216.
    Strict akratic actions, by definition, are performed freely. However, agents may seem not to be selfgoverned with respect to such actions and therefore not to perform them autonomously. If appearance matches reality here, freedom and autonomy part company in this sphere. Do they? That is this article's guiding question. To make things manageable, it is assumed that there are free actions, including strict akratic actions. Two theses are defended. First, the combination of (i) an intentional action's being uncompelled and (ii) (...)
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  126.  31
    Akratics and Addicts.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):153 - 167.
  127. Autonomy, Self-Control and Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  128. Rationality in Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):905-909.
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  129.  25
    Review of Searle's Rationality in Action[REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):905-909.
  130.  59
    Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions.Alfred Mele - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 27--43.
  131.  30
    Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Ethics 111 (2):400-403.
  132.  45
    Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? -/- Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, (...)
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  133.  73
    Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):279 - 300.
  134. Contents.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press.
     
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  135. CHAPTER 4. Attempted Empirical Demonstrations of Strict Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 76-93.
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  136. CHAPTER 6. Conclusion.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 119-124.
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  137. CHAPTER 2. Garden-Variety Straight Self-Deception: Some Psychological Processes.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 25-49.
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  138. CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Approaches, Puzzles, Biases and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 3-24.
     
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  139. CHAPTER 3. Self-Deception Without Puzzles.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 50-75.
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  140. CHAPTER 5. Twisted Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 94-118.
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  141.  67
    Deciding to Act.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):81–108.
    As this passage from a recent book on the psychology of decision-making indicates, deciding seems to be part of our daily lives. But what is it to decide to do something? It may be true, as some philosophers have claimed, that to decide to A is to perform a mental action of a certain kind – specifically, an action of forming an intention to A. (Henceforth, the verb ‘form’ in this context is to be understood as an action verb.) Even (...)
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  142. Notes.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press. pp. 125-136.
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  143. Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style-Cases.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In M. Betzler & B. Guckes (eds.), Autonomes Handeln: Beitrage Zur Philosophie von Harry G. Frankfurt. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
     
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  144.  67
    Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447-452.
  145. Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447-452.
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  146.  22
    Review: Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447 - 452.
  147.  89
    Self-Deception and Emotion.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.
    Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires (...)
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  148. Griffiths, PE-What Emotions Really Are.A. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40:49-50.
  149.  39
    Is There a Place for Intention in an Analysis of Intentional Action?Alfred Mele - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):419-432.
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  150. Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
    This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the "Intelligibility" and "Existence" questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls "The Significance Question" about free will: "Why do we, (...)
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  151. Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of Desires.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1:77-86.
  152.  78
    Twisted Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.
    In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted (...)
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  153.  75
    Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...)
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  154. Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...)
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  155.  18
    Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays.J. L. Ackrill, Julia Annas, M. F. Burnyeat, John M. Cooper, Marcia L. Homiak, Rosalind Hursthouse, T. H. Irwin, L. A. Kosman, Richard Kraut, John McDowell, Alfred R. Mele & Martha C. Nussbaum - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    The ethics of Aristotle , and virtue ethics in general, have enjoyed a resurgence of interest over the past few decades. Aristotelian themes, with such issues as the importance of friendship and emotions in a good life, the role of moral perception in wise choice, the nature of happiness and its constitution, moral education and habituation, are finding an important place in contemporary moral debates. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide a close analysis of central arguments in Aristotle's (...)
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  156.  9
    Liberation From Self. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):995-996.
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  157.  16
    Flickers of Freedom. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):144-156.
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  158.  31
    Motivated Belief and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):353 – 369.
    Can the existence of motivationally biased beliefs plausibly be explained without appealing to actions that are aimed at producing or protecting these beliefs? Drawing upon some recent work on everyday hypothesis testing, I argue for an affirmative answer. Some theorists have been too quick to insist that motivated belief must involve, or typically does involve, our trying to bring it about that we acquire or retain the belief, or our trying to make it easier for ourselves to believe a preferred (...)
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  159.  45
    Motivational Strength.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):23-36.
    It is often suggested that our desires vary in motivational strength or power. In a paper expressing skepticism about this idea, Irving Thalberg asked what he described, tongue in cheek, as "a disgracefully naive question" (1985, p. 88): "What do causal and any other theorists mean when they rate the strength of our PAs," that is, our "desires, aversions, preferences, schemes, and so forth"? His "guiding question" in the paper seems straightforward (p. 98): "What is it for our motivational states (...)
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  160.  16
    Noninstrumental Rationalizing.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):236–250.
    A central notion in Donald Davidson's philosophy of mind and action is "rationalization," a species of causal explanation designed in part to reveal the point or purpose of the explananda. An analogue of this notion - noninstrumental rationalization - merits serious attention. I develop an account of this species of rationalization and display its utility in explaining the production of certain desires and of motivationally biased beliefs.
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  161.  25
    Review of Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will[REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (11):581-584.
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  162.  62
    Synchronic Self-Control Revisited: Frog and Toad Shape Up.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):305–310.
  163. Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - In Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. CSLI Publications.
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  164.  29
    The Significance of Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (11):581-584.
  165. Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.
    Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed "the principle of alternate possibilities" (the thesis that people are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise), Harry Frankfurt offered an ingenious thought-experiment that has played a major role in subsequent work on moral responsibility and free will. Several philosophers, including David Widerker and Robert Kane, argued recently that this thought-experiment and others like it are fundamentally flawed. This paper develops a (...)
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  166. Evaluating Emotional Responses to Fiction.Paisley Livingston & Alfred Mele - 1997 - In Mette Hjort & Sue Laver (eds.), Emotion and the Arts.
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  167. The Philosophy of Action.R. Mele Alfred (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    The latest offering in the highly successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Action features contributions from twelve leading figures in the field, including: Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Donald Davidson, Wayne Davis, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Jennifer Hornsby, Jaegwon Kim, Hugh McCann, Paul Moser, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. Alfred Mele provides an introductory essay on the topics chosen and the questions they deal with. Topics addressed include intention, reasons for action, and the nature and explanation of internal (...)
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  168. Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle.Alfred Mele - 1997 - ProtoSociology 8.
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  169. Agency and Mental Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):231-249.
  170.  5
    Agency and Mental Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Noûs 31:231-249.
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  171. Introduction.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - In The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
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  172. Passive Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - In Ghitta Holstrom-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, Volume 1. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  173. Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.
    Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs subject to (...)
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  174.  31
    Strength of Motivation and Being in Control - Learning From Libet.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):319-32.
  175.  74
    Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
    This response addresses seven main issues: (1) alleged evidence that in some instances of self-deception an individual simultaneously possesses “contradictory beliefs”; (2) whether garden-variety self-deception is intentional; (3) whether conditions that I claimed to be conceptually sufficient for self-deception are so; (4) significant similarities and differences between self-deception and interpersonal deception; (5) how instances of self-deception are to be explained, and the roles of motivation in explaining them; (6) differences among various kinds of self- deception; (7) whether a proper conception (...)
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  176.  87
    Underestimating Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):119–123.
  177.  20
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Barbara Abbott, Annette Herskovits, Philip L. Peterson, Alfred R. Mele, David J. Cole, Daniel Crevier, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Istvan S. N. Berkeley, Brendan J. Kitts, Mike Brown & George Paliouras - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (2):239-285.
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  178.  18
    Socratic Akratic Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (3):149-159.
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  179.  53
    Addiction and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):99 - 117.
  180.  53
    Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):727-753.
    This paper criticizes the conjunction of two theses: 1) cognitivism about first-person moral ought-beliefs, the thesis (roughly) that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued contents; 2) robust internalism about these beliefs, the thesis that, necessarily, agents' beliefs that they ought, morally, to A constitute motivation to A. It is argued that the conjunction of these two theses places our moral agency at serious risk. The argument, which centrally involves attention to clinical depression, is extended to a less demanding, recent brand (...)
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  181.  21
    Motivation and Intention.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:51-67.
    This essay defends the compatibility of a pair of popular theses in the philosophy of action and rebuts arguments of Hugh McCann’s (1995) designed to show that my earlier efforts, in Springs of Action, to resolve the apparent tension were unsuccessful. One thesis links what agents intentionally do at a time, t, to what they are most strongly motivated to do at t. The other is a thesis about the nature and functions of intent.
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  182.  1
    Motivation and Intention.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:51-67.
    This essay defends the compatibility of a pair of popular theses in the philosophy of action and rebuts arguments of Hugh McCann’s designed to show that my earlier efforts, in Springs of Action, to resolve the apparent tension were unsuccessful. One thesis links what agents intentionally do at a time, t, to what they are most strongly motivated to do at t. The other is a thesis about the nature and functions of intent.
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  183. Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Proto Sociology 8:39-52.
  184.  36
    Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):123-41.
  185. Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):123-141.
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  186.  67
    Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred Mele & Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):265 - 287.
  187. Mental Causation.John Heil & Alfred Mele - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (1):105-106.
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  188. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy.R. Mele Alfred - 1995 - Oup Usa.
    Autonomous Agents addresses the related topics of self-control and individual autonomy. "Self-control" is defined as the opposite of akrasia-weakness of will. The study of self-control seeks to understand the concept of its own terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, emotions, and personal values. It goes on to consider how a proper understanding of self-control and its manifestations can shed light on personal autonomy and autonomous behaviour. Perspicuous, objective, and incisive throughout, Alfred Mele makes a (...)
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  189.  8
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):637.
  190.  17
    Conceptualizing Self-Control.Alfred Mele - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):136-137.
    A pair of arguments suggests that self-control is not properly conceptualized on the pattern/act/preference model Rachlin proposes. The first concerns the irrational following of personal rules. The second concerns scenarios in which behavioral patterns an agent deems good come into conflict.
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  191.  9
    Review of Robert Audi's Action, Intention, and Reason[REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):145-8.
    This volume is a welcome contribution to the philosophy of action. Audi employs a host of subtle distinctions and carefully crafted arguments in defending a unified position on the major issues in action theory. In his characteristically lucid prose, he makes vivid the location of those issues at the intersection of ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. Given the tight organization and the unifying introduction, this volume is an exceptionally cohesive collection of essays. It will make a lasting contribution (...)
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  192.  41
    Effective Deliberation About What to Intend: Or Striking It Rich in a Toxin-Free Environment. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (1):85 - 93.
  193.  51
    Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (3):387-423.
  194.  5
    Review: Teleological Behaviorism. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):69 - 71.
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  195.  30
    Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams.Alfred R. Mele - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):627 - 636.
  196.  20
    Self-Control and Belief.Alfred R. Mele - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):419 – 435.
    Although the extent to which motivational factors are involved in the production and sustaining of biased or 'irrational' beliefs continues to be a controversial issue in social psychology, even those who urge that such beliefs are often explained by non-motivational tendencies admit that biased beliefs sometimes have motivational sources. Sometimes toe are influenced by motivational pressures in ways proscribed by principles that we accept for belief-acquisition or belief-revision ('doxastic' principles). Many garden-variety instances of self-deception are cases in point. We are (...)
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  197.  38
    Literary Theory After Davidson (Review).Alfred R. Mele - 1994 - Philosophy and Literature 18 (1):165-167.
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  198. Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
    We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...)
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  199.  72
    Mental Causation.John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) - 1993 - Clarendon Press.
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual knowledge (...)
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  200.  45
    History and Personal Autonomy.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):271 - 280.
  201. Justifying Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):335-337.
    In his "Purposive Intending" T.L.M. Pink (1991) instructively criticized a popular view about intentions and advanced an alternative position of his own. I challenged a pair of theses to which Pink's position committed him (Mele 1992a). Pink now agrees that both theses are false. His mistake, he says, was to express his view in terms of reasons; his position is now to be framed in terms of "justifications" (1993).
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  202.  12
    Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  203.  7
    Motivated Belief.Alfred R. Mele - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 21 (2):19 - 27.
  204. The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
  205.  54
    Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.R. Mele Alfred - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from (...)
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  206.  66
    Intending for Reasons.Alfred Mele - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):327-333.
    T. L. M. Pink, in his (1991) "Purposive Intending", raises an important question about intentions, instructively criticizes a familiar response, and advances an interesting answer of his own. Pink's question is this (p. 343): "What psychological attitudes rationalize and explain intentions to act?" The burden of this note is to show that his answer is problematic.
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  207.  35
    On Action, by Carl Ginet.Alfred Mele - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):488-491.
  208. Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionally.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73:355-374.
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  209. Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Noûs 26 (3):281-302.
    Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, (...)
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  210.  88
    Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (2):171 - 194.
  211.  54
    Recent Work on Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.
  212.  3
    Intentions and Interpretations.Alfred R. Mele & Paisley Livingston - 1992 - MLN 107 (5):931-949.
    Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zeno's arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to any other point B. One (...)
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  213.  5
    Intention and Literature.Alfred R. Mele & Paisley Livingston - 1992 - Stanford French Review 16:173-196.
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  214.  59
    Mental Causes.John Heil & Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):61-71.
  215. Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:33-47.
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  216.  22
    Dretske's Intricate Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.
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  217.  61
    He Wants to Try Again: A Rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):225 - 228.
  218. He wants to try again: a rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Erkenntnis 51:225.
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  219.  27
    Incontinent Belief.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
    Brian McLaughlin, in “Incontinent Belief” (Journal of Philosophical Research 15 [1989-90] , pp. 115-26), takes issue with my investigation, in lrrationality (Oxford University Press, 1987), of a doxastic analogue of akratic action. He deems what I term “strict akratic belief” philosophically uninteresting. In the present paper, I explain that this assessment rests on a serious confusion about the sort of possibility that is at issue in my chapter on the topic, correct a variety of misimpressions, and rebut McLaughlin’s arguments as (...)
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  220.  1
    Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
    Brian McLaughlin, in “Incontinent Belief”, takes issue with my investigation, in lrrationality, of a doxastic analogue of akratic action. He deems what I term “strict akratic belief” philosophically uninteresting. In the present paper, I explain that this assessment rests on a serious confusion about the sort of possibility that is at issue in my chapter on the topic, correct a variety of misimpressions, and rebut McLaughlin’s arguments as they apply to the psychological possibility of strict akratic belief and to the (...)
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  221.  21
    Motivational Ties.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:431-442.
    Must a rational ass equidistant from two equally attractive bales of hay starve for lack of a reason to prefer one bale to the other? Must a human being faced with a comparable, explicitly motivational, tie fail to pursue either option? Surely, one suspects, some practical resolution is possible. Surely, ties of either sort need not result in death or paralysis. But why? Donald Davidson has suggested that, in the human case, resolution depends upon the tie’s being broken---upon the agent’s (...)
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  222.  1
    Motivational Ties.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:431-442.
    Must a rational ass equidistant from two equally attractive bales of hay starve for lack of a reason to prefer one bale to the other? Must a human being faced with a comparable, explicitly motivational, tie fail to pursue either option? Surely, one suspects, some practical resolution is possible. Surely, ties of either sort need not result in death or paralysis. But why? Donald Davidson has suggested that, in the human case, resolution depends upon the tie’s being broken---upon the agent’s (...)
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  223.  1
    Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder.A. Mele - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
    Brian McLaughlin, in “Incontinent Belief” , takes issue with my investigation, in lrrationality , of a doxastic analogue of akratic action. He deems what I term “strict akratic belief” philosophically uninteresting. In the present paper, I explain that this assessment rests on a serious confusion about the sort of possibility that is at issue in my chapter on the topic, correct a variety of misimpressions, and rebut McLaughlin’s arguments as they apply to the psychological possibility of strict akratic belief and (...)
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  224.  29
    Exciting Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312.
    In this paper, I restrict the discussion to overt intentional action, intentional action that essentially involves peripheral bodily movement. My guiding question is this: If there is a specific motivational role that intention is plausibly regarded as playing in all cases of overt intentional action, in virtue of what feature(s) of intention does it play this role? I am looking for an answer that can be articulated in the terminology of intentionalist psychology.
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  225.  21
    He Wants to Try.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Analysis 50 (4):251 - 253.
  226. He wants to try.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Erkenntnis 50 (4):251.
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  227.  54
    Intending and Motivation: A Rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):194 - 197.
  228. Intending and motivation: a rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Erkenntnis 50 (3):194.
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  229. Irresistible Desires.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Noûs 24 (3):455-72.
    The topic of irresistible desires arises with unsurprising frequency in discussions of free agency and moral responsibility. Actions motivated by such desires are standardly viewed as compelled, and hence unfree. Agents in the grip of irresistible desires are often plausibly exempted from moral blame for intentional deeds in which the desires issue. Yet, relatively little attention has been given to the analysis of irresistible desire. Moreover, a popular analysis is fatally flawed. My aim in this paper is to construct and (...)
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  230.  5
    Review: Practical Determinism. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):85 - 87.
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  231.  24
    The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511-531.
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  232.  70
    The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  233.  10
    The Rationality of Emotion.Alfred Mele - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (1):39-40.
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  234.  35
    Akratic Feelings.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):277-288.
    Elsewhere, I have argued for the possibility of strict or full-blown akratic action - roughly, free (or uncompelled), intentional action against the agent's better judgment.' My aim in the present paper is to defend and account for the possibility of an analogous variety of akratic feeling.
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  235.  18
    Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):19 - 30.
  236. Intentions by Default.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (2):155-166.
     
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  237.  34
    Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):417-36.
  238.  48
    She Intends to Try.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):101-106.
    My aim in this paper is to refute an intriguing argument of Hugh McCann's for the thesis that'S tried to A' entails 'S intended to A. I shall call this the strong intention thesis about trying, or SIT. SIT implies, as McCann observes, that even an agent who thinks that the probability of her A-ing is close to zero intends to A, provided only that she tries to A.
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  239.  41
    Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophia 18 (2-3):239-242.
    An influential belief/desire analysis of intention proposed by robert audi does not provide sufficient conditions for intention. Intending to "a" entails being settled upon "a"-Ing (or upon trying to "a"), And it entails being willing to "a". But an agent can satisfy audi's conditions for intending to "a" and yet be neither settled upon "a"-Ing (or trying to "a") nor willing to "a". The objection raised poses a serious problem for belief/desire analyses of intention in general.
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  240.  11
    Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4):723-731.
  241.  63
    Irrationality: A Precis.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):173-177.
    My primary aim in Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (1987) is to show that and how akratic action and self-deception are possible. The control that normal agents have over their actions and beliefs figures in the analysis and explanation of both phenomena. For that reason, an examination of self-control plays a central role in the book. In addition, I devote a chapter each to akratic belief and the explanation of intentional action. A precis of the book will (...)
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  242.  18
    Self-Deception and Akratic Belief: A Rejoinder.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):201-206.
  243.  3
    The Structure of Emotions.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophical Books 29 (4):224-225.
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  244.  62
    Are Intentions Self-Referential?Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):309-329.
    What is it, precisely, that an agent intends when he intends, as we might say, to clean his stove today? What is the content of his intention? In recent years, Gilbert Harman and John Searle have maintained that all intentions are self-referential -- that is, that an adequate expression of the content of any intention makes essential reference to the intention whose content is being expressed. I shall call this the self-referentiality thesis (SRT). Harman, in his paper 'Practical Reasoning', argues (...)
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  245.  37
    Intentional Action and Wayward Causal Chains: The Problem of Tertiary Waywardness. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):55 - 60.
  246. Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...)
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  247.  26
    Recent Work on Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (January):1-17.
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  248.  1
    Counting Surfaces, Avrum Stroll.Alfred R. Mele & Michael Stocker - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1).
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  249.  43
    Is Akratic Action Unfree?Alfred R. Mele - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):673-679.
    That incontinent action is possible, I have argued elsewhere. The purpose of the present paper is to ascertain whether such action can ever be free.
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  250.  46
    Incontinent Believing.Alfred R. Mele - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.
    In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be at (...)
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  251. Self-Deception and "Akrasia". [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1986 - Behavior and Philosophy 14 (2):183.
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  252.  20
    Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Review of David Pears's Motivated Irrationality. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1986 - Behaviorism 14 (2):183-191.
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  253.  36
    Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1985 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (4):375 - 393.
  254.  9
    How to Represent Aristotelian Deliberation Syllogistically.Alfred R. Mele - 1985 - New Scholasticism 59 (4):484-492.
  255.  10
    Self-Control, Action, and Belief.Alfred R. Mele - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (2):169 - 175.
  256.  3
    Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele & Troels Engberg-Pedersen - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (2):273.
  257.  29
    Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and Justification.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (22):124–147.
  258.  6
    Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Vol. X:133-155.
  259.  6
    Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (sup1):133-155.
  260. Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 10:133.
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  261.  49
    Aristotle's Wish.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (2):139-156.
    In the bulk of this paper, I shall attempt to clarify the meaning and significance of each of these claims and to resolve (sometimes in footnotes) the interpretational problems which surround them. I hope thereby to contribute not only to our knowledge of the part assigned to wish in the generation of "chosen" or "ethical" action, but to our appreciation, more generally, of Aristotle's position on the roles of thought and desire in action of this sort and his understanding of (...)
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  262. Dominic J. O'Meara, Ed.: "Studies in Aristotle". [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - The Thomist 48 (2):318.
     
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  263. Intending and the Balance of Motivation.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (4):370-376.
  264. Michael A. Simon: "Understanding Human Action". [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - The Thomist 48 (1):121.
  265.  13
    Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 1984 - Philosophia 14 (1-2):145-152.
  266.  76
    Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes.Alfred R. Mele - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (3):345-368.
    The occurrence or apparent occurrence of incontinent actions challenges several influential views in ethics and the philosophy of mind, e.g., Hare's prescriptivism and the Socratic idea that we always act in the light of the imagined greatest good. It also raises, as I shall explain, an interesting and instructive problem for proponents of causal theories of action. But whereas Socrates and Hare attempt to avoid the difficulties with which akrasia confronts them by denying - wrongly, I shall argue - that (...)
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  267.  62
    Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (October):366-377.
    Self-Deception, Properly understood, Is not paradoxical. Although self-Deception involves motivated false belief, It is not properly modeled after "intentional" interpersonal deception. Thus, The major source of paradox is dissolved. Moreover, Even intentional self-Deception need not be paradoxical and there is good reason to believe that a kind of self-Deception which "would" be paradoxical never occurs. Finally, In cases of self-Deception, As in instances of akratic action, There is scope for blame.
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  268.  11
    Aristotle on the Justification of Ends.Alfred R. Mele - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:79-86.
  269. Aristotle on the Justification of Ends.Alfred R. Mele - 1982 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 56:79.
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  270.  23
    'Self-Deception, Action, and Will': Comments.Alfred R. Mele - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):159-164.
    Since the virtues of Professor Audi's paper are obvious and my time is limited, 1 shall restrict myself here to negative comments. I shall argue, first, that condition (1) - the unconscious true belief condition - in Audi's account of "clear cases of self-deception" is too strong and, second, that he does not succeed in justifying his limitation of the self-deceiver to sincere avowals of the proposition with respect to which he is in self-deception.
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  271.  4
    The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher.Alfred R. Mele - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:79-86.
  272.  31
    Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge.Alfred R. Mele - 1981 - Modern Schoolman 58 (3):137-157.
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  273.  83
    Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics.Alfred R. Mele - 1981 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (4):405-423.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and (...)
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  274.  58
    The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle's Causal Theory of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1981 - New Scholasticism 55 (3):281-316.
  275. The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1981 - New Scholasticism 55 (3):281-316.
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  276.  21
    On “Happiness and the Good Life”.Alfred R. Mele - 1979 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):181-187.
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