In appreciating paintings, what we experience is either a result of their medium or object, regardless of whether the object is an actual thing, a fictional thing, an internal emotion, an abstract idea, or something else. However, the conceptions of ‘betweenness’ in traditional Chinese aesthetics and ‘twofoldness’ in contemporary Western aesthetics tell us that our experience of paintings might not be simply from the object or the medium itself but rather from a relation between the two. This study considers the (...) intercultural value of the above concepts while examining how our aesthetic pleasure might derive from awareness of the object, the medium, and the play of our mind and body. (shrink)

The conceptions of three kinds of knowledge in Buddhism and in Spinoza are compared. There are both similarities and differences in the two conceptions, both of which provide interesting insights into both traditions. The similarities are that the three kinds of knowledge represent a hierarchical structure, starting from the first kind, characterized by sense perception. The second kind for Spinoza is characterized by rational knowledge, which is comparable to the Buddhist second kind, which is about thinking through what one has (...) heard. These two kinds lead to the third kind of knowledge, which in Spinoza is intuitive knowledge, and in Buddhism is knowledge by mental cultivation. In both traditions, these three kinds of knowledge lead to soteriological aims. Among the differences is that Spinoza presents his three kinds of knowledge through a series of axioms and proofs, whereas in Buddhism they form a guideline for the practitioner. (shrink)

The New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan once compared the ethics of Mengzi to that of Kant, claiming that Mengzi’s ethics shares the same fundamental features with Kant’s and can therefore be better understood through a Kantian lens. This paper aims to argue against Mou by elaborating on two important but hitherto insufficiently addressed differences between Kant’s and Mengzi’s ethics. First, the paper shows that, as opposed to what Mou suggests, passages 6A1 to 6A3 of the Mengzi demonstrate Mengzi’s adoption of (...) an a posteriori approach to ethics that stands in direct contrast to Kant’s a priori approach. Second, the paper argues that even if we read Kant’s ethics in a non-rigorous way that works in favor of Mou’s interpretation, ren (humaneness), yi (optimal appropriateness), li (observance of rites), and zhi (wisdom), as the core concepts of Mengzi’s ethics, can still hardly be regarded as Kantian moral laws. (shrink)

Han Fei (around 280 to 233 B.C.) advocates a strong and orderly state based on the absolute authority of the state and the law. Han Fei is usually not associated with human rights. His philosophy is difficult to reconcile with civil and political human rights, even if some of his political concepts support the realization of certain human rights. However, Han Fei’s ideas help us to gain a better understanding of the People’s Republic of China’s official human rights narrative. The (...) PRC emphasizes collective social and economic human rights, views the authority of the Communist Party as a prerequisite for the realization of human rights, and advocates rule by law, i.e. using the law as a tool of governance. This largely conforms to Han Fei‘s views on the role of the authority of the state and the law, and the relationship between the government and its citizens. (shrink)

This paper excavates the practice-oriented background and therapeutic significance of emptiness in the Madhyamaka philosophy attributed to Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao. Buddhist emptiness unravels experiential and linguistic reification through meditation and argumentation. The historical contexts and uses of the word indicate that it is primarily a practical diagnostic and therapeutic concept. Emptiness does not lead to further views or truths but, akin to yet distinct from Ajñāna and Pyrrhonian skepticism, the suspension of assertion. This sense of emptiness as a practice can (...) be traced in the intercultural transmission of Madhyamaka from Nāgārjuna, its paradigmatic philosopher, to Sengzhao 僧肇, its first pivotal indigenous Chinese representative. (shrink)

It is with great sadness that we record the death at the age of 76 of Dr Brian Carr, the co-founder and co-editor with Professor Indira Mahalingam Carr of Asian Philosophy.Brian was born on 12 June...

The scholar Jin Tian-zhu (1690 ~ 1765) was a Muslim of the Hui 回 ethnic group in the Qing dynasty who adhered to Islamic traditions handed down from generation to generation. In Qing Zhen Shi Yi, Jin Tian-zhu attempts to combine Confucianism and Islam through a simple comparison of their rituals. Jin Tian-zhu expresses his respect for Allah by attesting Allah’s existence and insisting that humans should obey Allah. He admits that in reality, besides Allah, the ruler is also clearly (...) an object of loyalty. In addition, he asserts that it is basic propriety for Muslims to be filial to their parents and that the scope of practice of filial piety must also apply to their ancestors beyond their parents. Jin Tian-zhu further expands his view of zhongxiao 忠孝 by asserting that the ultimate Muslim interest is in renlun 人倫, which he believes must be rectified. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 1, February 2023, Page 1-14.