According to Daniel Philpott (2009, 2019, 2021), religious activity can be understood as meaningfully distinct from political activity. Call this the distinct sphere claim. In this article, I will argue that the distinct sphere claim should be rejected. I will consider three different arguments for the distinct sphere claim that Philpott appears to offer: that it is generally accepted by adherents of religions; that it follows from a suitable definition of religion; and that it is supported by everyday intuitions about (...) religion. I will show that all three arguments are unsuccessful. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the emergence of a new gendered division of labour. More men than women occupy ‘greedy jobs’ that offer high wages and swift career progress in return for long work hours and unforeseeable schedules. As a result, women earn less income and occupy fewer positions of power than men. This division of labour is the result of patriarchal norms that make it costlier for women than for men to occupy greedy jobs. This article analyses the morality of (...) greedy employment. It offers a novel explanation of why norms that give rise to the new gendered division of labour are morally objectionable. The main claim is that it is morally objectionable to adopt the new gendered division of labour because this perpetuates patriarchal norms that impose unjustifiable costs on others. (shrink)

The Senate filibuster is among the most criticized political institutions in the United States. This paper examines the ethics of filibustering. The way filibustering currently proceeds in the Senate, I argue, is morally indefensible. Yet, there is a way filibustering could proceed that is both defensible and desirable from a normative perspective. This is because filibustering—if it is properly institutionalized—allows minority parties in the legislature to protect and advance their interests in a manner that avoids shortcomings faced by other institutions (...) proposed to accomplish these goals, such as supermajority rule and judicial review. (shrink)

No-connection theories and special connection global justice theories attempt to explain our global responsibilities. No-connection theories, while universal are less than motivating. Special-connection theories, while motivating, have been unable to fully ground global responsibilities. “Bootstrapping” theories like those of Thomas Donahue-Ochoa or Shannon Vallor are both universal and motivating. Donahue-Ochoa argues that systemic injustice reduces everyone’s freedom. Vallor argues that virtues have global scope given how they are grounded. Both have flaws. I propose “absolute resistance theory.” I claim if we (...) cannot resist systemic injustice locally without global resistance, we have global responsibilities to resist injustice stemming from proximate relationships. (shrink)

Almost everyone in the philosophical literature, no matter their account of racism, adopts one of two views about the immorality of racist conduct. They either take it to be a function of the attitudes that issue in it or of the societally-imposed harms that result from it. This article seeks to show that neither view captures the complete picture. To properly account for the full range of cases, it helps to invoke a distinction between two senses of “immoral”: impermissible and (...) blameworthy. Doing so allows us to appreciate that racism is necessarily immoral, just not always in the same way. (shrink)

The article argues that liberty-based arguments alone are not enough to justify a universal basic income, whether as a replacement of current welfare programs, or as an addition to them. Appeals to negative liberty, real freedom, republican liberty, and autonomy cannot show that a universal basic income is superior to (all kinds of) conditional benefits. To do so, proponents of a universal basic income will have to invoke values beyond liberty.

Pogge’s 2006 framework of global justice can be adapted for individual agents or collective unilateral donations in the same way Singer’s framework has been. I do so by amending Pogge’s institutional principles for international human rights NGOs and by adding two further principles to address challenges that arise when his framework is applied. This adapted framework enjoins donors to make principled philanthropic decisions that prioritize existing and near-term suffering, while also rectifying their part in causing this suffering. It makes Pogge’s (...) negative duty account easier to implement than his previous proposal, and provides well-off individuals with an alternative to Effective Altruism. (shrink)