I discuss how virtual reality can be used to acquire self-knowledge. Lawlor (Philos Phenomenol Res 79(1):47–75, 2009) and Cassam (Vices of the mind: from the intellectual to the political. OUP, Oxford, 2014) develop inferential accounts of self-knowledge in which one can use imagination to acquire self-knowledge. This is done by actively prompting imaginary scenarios and observing one’s reactions to those scenarios. These reactions are then used as the inferential basis for acquiring self-knowledge. I suggest that the imaginary scenarios can be (...) in principle replaced with scenarios in virtual reality in a way that still provides an inferential basis for self-knowledge. Instead of internal prompting in imagination, I call this external prompting in virtual reality. I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of external prompting. On one hand, external prompting avoids some of the common biases that can intervene with internal prompting in imagination. On the other hand, external prompting comes with some challenges of its own. External prompting might be more time-consuming and might be open to a game-like approach of the agent leading to a different sort of distortion that gets in the way of self-knowledge. I suggest that these are practical challenges, but nevertheless, external prompting seems worthwhile for self-knowledge that is otherwise especially difficult to acquire. (shrink)

The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc., respectively) necessary. This reading is usually taken for granted by modal logicians and indeed seems plausible when dealing with logical or metaphysical possibility. But what about epistemic possibility? We argue that the dual definition of epistemic possibility in terms of epistemic necessity generates tension when reasoning about non-idealized (...) agents and is a problem of concern for most hyperintensional epistemic logics that alleviate the problem of logical omniscience. The tension is particularly evident when knowledge is taken as a primitive to define other epistemic concepts, such as justification and belief, as done in the knowledge-first tradition. We propose a non-dual interpretation of epistemic possibility, employing a hyperintensionality filter similar to the one that makes the corresponding epistemic necessity operator hyperintensional. We employ the proposed semantics to model Stalnaker's belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a hyperintensional version of his bimodal logic of knowledge and belief. (shrink)

Would suppressing deepfakes violate freedom of expression norms? The question is pressing because the deepfake phenomenon in its more poisonous manifestations appears to call for a response, and automated targeting of some kind looks to be the most practically viable. Two simple answers are rejected: that deepfakes do not deserve protection under freedom of expression legislation because they are fake by definition; and that deepfakes can be targeted if but only if they are misleadingly presented as authentic. To make progress, (...) following a discussion of why freedom of expression deserves protection in a democracy, the question is reframed. At issue is not whether the arrival of deepfakes brings new and potentially serious dangers (it does), nor whether these dangers call for measures that potentially limit freedom of expression (they do), but whether the need for such measures raises any new and unfamiliar freedom-of-expression challenges. The answer to that question, surprisingly, is no. The balancing act needed to cope with the arrival of deepfakes brings plenty of difficulties, certainly, but none of the measures likely to be effective in tackling deepfake harms raises freedom-of-expression concerns that aren’t familiar from consideration of non-deepfake harms. In that respect, at least, the arrival of deepfakes makes no difference. (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) seeks to produce explanations for those machine learning methods which are deemed opaque. However, there is considerable disagreement about what this means and how to achieve it. Authors disagree on what should be explained (topic), to whom something should be explained (stakeholder), how something should be explained (instrument), and why something should be explained (goal). In this paper, I employ insights from means-end epistemology to structure the field. According to means-end epistemology, different means ought to be (...) rationally adopted to achieve different epistemic ends. Applied to XAI, different topics, stakeholders, and goals thus require different instruments. I call this the means-end account of XAI. The means-end account has a descriptive and a normative component: on the one hand, I show how the specific means-end relations give rise to a taxonomy of existing contributions to the field of XAI; on the other hand, I argue that the suitability of XAI methods can be assessed by analyzing whether they are prescribed by a given topic, stakeholder, and goal. (shrink)

How should we understand the arrogance of groups that do not seem to exhibit group agency? Specifically, how should we understand the putative epistemic arrogance ascribed to men and privileged or powerful groups in cases raised in the extant philosophical literature? Groups like these differ from others that are usually the subject of work on collective vice and virtue insofar as they seem to lack essential features of group agency; they are sub-agential groups. In this article, I ask whether extant (...) summative or anti-summative accounts of collective epistemic vice offer a basis for understanding the structure of the epistemic arrogance of men and the privileged. I argue that a summative formulation and two prominent anti-summative positions fail to adequately account for the structure of group arrogance in such cases. This leaves us lacking an understanding of how sub-agential group arrogance works. To address this, I defend a collectivist account of group arrogance that takes social norms as the determinative basis of group arrogance. (shrink)

Carter (Noûs 55(1):171–198, 2021) argued that while most simple positive numerical sentences are literally false, they can communicate true contents because relevance has a weakening effect on their literal contents. This paper presents a challenge for his account by considering entailments between the imprecise contents of numerical sentences and the imprecise contents of comparatives. I argue that while Carter's weakening mechanism can generate the imprecise contents of plain comparatives such as `A is taller than B', it cannot generate the imprecise (...) contents of comparatives that quantify the difference between their arguments, such as `A is exactly n times as tall as B'. I then propose an alternative theory on which intervals serve as both thick degrees on a scale and denotations of numerical expressions. I argue that the alternative theory can account for the imprecise contents of both forms of comparatives as well as the data that motivate Carter's theory. (shrink)

Is the set of all self-membered sets, S, a member of itself? In naive set theory, this is Russell’s hypodox. By the Laws of Excluded Middle and Non-contradiction, S is a member of itself xor it is not, but no principle of classical logic or naive set theory determines which. (Herein, ‘xor’ extends English with a specifically exclusive disjunction.) As a hypodox, the Truth-teller is a sentence that says of itself simply that it is true; by the above mentioned principles, (...) the Truth-teller is true xor not true, but no principle of classical logic or naive truth determines which. Many concepts that have paradoxes have related hypodoxes, although the focus here is on these two. I argue that the Truth-teller does not rely on a principle of truth, in particular it does not rely on the T-schema. I also argue that Russell’s hypodox does not rely on Comprehension. Yet I relate Russell’s paradox and hypodox based on involution functions. The Liar and the Truth-teller are also related by means of involutions. Relations based on these involution functions can be represented in duality squares. Although hypodoxes are not paradoxes, these involution functions and duality relations warrant some commonality in a correct solution to a paradox and its dual hypodox. Using this and some other premises, I provide novel arguments supporting non-classical solutions for the Liar paradox and the significance of Russell’s hypodox for solutions to Russell’s paradox. (shrink)

Twin Earth thought experiments are a standard philosophical tool for those offering, or criticizing, metasemantic theories: theories that attempt explain why referring words have the particular referents they have. The general recipe for Twin Earth thought experiments centrally features the description of a planet and population just like Earth and Earthlings, but with some single crucial differeence. In Hilary Putnam’s original version of the experiment, the difference is that the chemical composition of the stuff that looks and behaves like (our) (...) water is XYZ rather than H2O. Such cases show how variation in the physical environment can induce a corresponding variation in reference. In other versions, variations in the linguistic dispositions of speakers are shown to induce corresponding variations in reference. The extension of the word ‘red’ depends on how the linguistic community is disposed to apply that word, as against ‘purple’ or ‘orange’. Perhaps most interestingly, basic normative terms like ‘ought’ or ‘immoral’ seem to vary in neither of these ways. Even if Earthlings and Normative Twin Earthlings consistently made moral judgments in line with two quite distinct moral theories, they might still be talking about the very same property: moral wrongness. The present paper describes and applies a general metasemantic view that yields plausible claims about all three sorts of cases. The view I will defend—neopragmatism—is a fully generalized version of the sort of local expressivism defended in the past by people like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard. Throughout the paper, a contrast is made with a rival approach to the same phenomena: an appeal to reference magnetism. (shrink)

Despite quantum theory’s remarkable success at predicting the statistical results of experiments, many philosophers worry that it nonetheless lacks some crucial connection between theory and experiment. Such worries constitute the Quantum Measurement Problems. One can broadly identify two kinds of worries: (1) pragmatic: it is unclear how to model our measurement processes in order to extract experimental predictions, and (2) realist: we lack a satisfying metaphysical account of measurement processes. While both issues deserve attention, the pragmatic worries have worse consequences (...) if left unanswered: If our pragmatic theory-to-experiment linkage is unsatisfactory, then quantum theory is at risk of losing both its evidential support and its physical salience. Avoiding these risks is at the core of what I will call the Pragmatic Measurement Problem. Fortunately, the pragmatic measurement problem is not too difficult to solve. For non-relativistic quantum theory, the story goes roughly as follows: One can model each of quantum theory’s key experimental successes on a case-by-case basis by using a measurement chain. In modeling this measurement chain, it is pragmatically necessary to switch from using a quantum model to a classical model at some point. That is, it is pragmatically necessary to invoke a Heisenberg cut at some point along the measurement chain. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, one can then strive for a wide-scoping measurement theory capable of modeling all (or nearly all) possible measurement processes. For non-relativistic quantum theory, this leads us to our usual projective measurement theory. As a bonus, proceeding this way also gives us an empirically meaningful characterization of the theory’s observables as (positive) self-adjoint operators. But how does this story have to change when we move into the context of quantum field theory (QFT)? It is well known that in QFT almost all localized projective measurements violate causality, allowing for faster-than-light signaling; These are Sorkin’s impossible measurements. Thus, the story of measurement in QFT cannot end as it did before with a projective measurement theory. But does this then mean that we need to radically rethink the way we model measurement processes in QFT? Are our current experimental practices somehow misguided? Fortunately not. I will argue that (once properly understood) our old approach to modeling quantum measurements is still applicable in QFT contexts. We ought to first use measurement chains to build up a case-by-case measurement framework for QFT. Modeling these measurement chains will require us to invoke what I will call a QFT-cut. That is, at some point along the measurement chain we must switch from using a QFT model to a non-QFT model. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, we can then strive for both a new wide-scoping measurement theory for QFT and an empirically meaningful characterization of its observables. It is at this point that significantly more theoretical work is needed. This paper ends by briefly reviewing the state of the art in the physics literature regarding the modeling of measurement processes involving quantum fields. (shrink)

Alethic pluralists often claim that truth is not only relevant to normative evaluations, but inherently normative. I raise a problem for such versions of pluralism, based on the dual phenomena of “blindspots” and “brightspots.” If truth is inherently a kind of fitness for belief, then all true propositions should be fit for belief, and no false ones should be. Blindspots, however, are true propositions that can’t be the content of true beliefs. I argue that they aren’t fit for belief. Similarly, (...) brightspots are false propositions that can’t be the contents of false beliefs. They are fit for belief. I also consider some moves alethic pluralists might make to avoid the problem. (shrink)

This article aims to give an analysis of the phenomena of unjust misappropriation of marginalised groups’ terms online, using the example misappropriation of ‘woke’ from the Black community on Twitter. I argue that using terms such as these outside their original context warps their meaning, decreasing the intelligibility of the experiences of the marginalised agents who use them when attempting to express themselves both within their community and without. I intend to give an analysis of this phenomena, with the expectation (...) that understanding it better will provide a crucial step in combatting it. To this end, I argue it can be understood as a specialised form of what Kristie Dotson calls ‘contributory injustice’, injustices which involve the suppression of a marginalised community’s existing hermeneutical resources, combined with a specific consequence of what Boyd and Marwick call ‘context collapse’, the removal of social norms created through the homogenising effect of social media sites like Twitter. The result is a novel misappropriation phenomenon, I label ‘Context-Collapsed Contributory Injustice’ or ‘CC.CI’. This type of misappropriation is particularly harmful due to it being faster-acting than historical varieties of misappropriation. Furthermore, unchecked continual cases of CC.CI can cause a novel from of what Miranda Fricker calls ‘hermeneutical injustice’, which is demarcated from standard cases by its ability to reintroduce conceptual lacunas through undermining existing hermeneutical resources. I finish by disambiguating cases of CC.CI from natural meaning change and critically analysing some existing philosophical treatments of “woke”. (shrink)

This paper initiates analytic inquiry into the metaphysics of masculinity. I argue that individual masculinities (such as ‘clone masculinity’ and ‘incel masculinity’) are distinct homeostatic property cluster kinds related to gender structures via processes of adherence, failed-adherence, selective adherence, and/or reinterpretation with respect to male-coded social norms.

Justin Clarke-Doane offers what purports to be a stand-alone argument, relying on Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, that if we hold that PA + Con(PA) and PA + ~ Con(PA) are equally true of their intended subjects, then there is no objective fact as to whether PA is consistent. It is shown that the argument is fallacious, although illuminating: The fallaciousness of the argument arises from a 20th-century shift in our understanding of interpreted languages from the view—derived from our experience of (...) language—of sentences as intrinsically interpreted to one which sharply distinguishes syntax and semantics, and treats uninterpreted syntactic forms as endowed with interpretations by models. It is shown that this syntax/semantic distinction, because it is “unintuitive” induces fallacies such as the one that Clarke-Doane’s argument exemplifies. (shrink)

It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the dynamical explanation. We empirically test two (...) versions of the dynamical explanation. The first is the moving ego explanation—according to which it is our belief that the ego moves, or our phenomenology as of the ego moving, that jointly (partially) explains future- and near-bias. The second is the moving time explanation—according to which it is our belief that time robustly passes, or our phenomenology as of robust passage, which jointly (partially) explain future- and near-bias. We found no evidence in favour of either explanation. (shrink)

The distinction between multilevel selection 1 (MLS1) and multilevel selection 2 (MLS2) is classically regarded as a distinction between two multilevel selection processes involving two different kinds of higher-level fitness. It has been invoked to explain evolutionary transitions in individuality as a shift from an MLS1 to an MLS2 process. In this paper, I argue against the view that the distinction involves two different kinds of processes. I show, starting from the MLS2 version of the Price equation, that it contains (...) the MLS1 version if, following the assumption that a collective constitutively depends (i.e., mereologically supervenes) on its particles, one considers that a necessary map between fitness at two levels exists. I defend the necessity of such a map, making the distinction between MLS1 and MLS2 a matter of perspective and limited knowledge (i.e., epistemic limitations) rather than objective facts. I then provide some reasons why the MLS1/MLS2 distinction nonetheless has some pragmatic value and might be invoked usefully in some contexts, particularly within the context of explaining evolutionary transitions in individuality. (shrink)

Skilful expertise is grounded in practical, performative knowledge-how, not in detached, spectatorial knowledge-that, and knowledge-how is embodied by habitual dispositions, not representation of facts and rules. Consequently, as action control is a key requirement for the intelligent selection, initiation, and regulation of skilful performance, habitual action control, i.e. the kind of action control based on habitual dispositions, is the true hallmark of skill and the only veridical criterion to evaluate expertise. Not only does this imply that knowledge-that does not make (...) your actions more skilful, but it also implies that it makes them less skilful. This thesis, that I call Radical Habitualism, finds a precursor in Hubert Dreyfus. His approach is considered extreme by most philosophers of skill & expertise: an agent –says Dreyfus– does not perform like an expert when they lack the embodied dispositions necessary to control their action habitually or when they stop relying on such dispositions to control their actions. Thus, one cannot perform skilfully if their actions are guided by representations (isomorphic schemas, explicit rules, and contentful instructions), as the know-that that they convey disrupts or diminishes the agent’s habitual engagement with the task at hand. In defence of Radical Habitualism, I will argue that only the contentless know-how embedded in habitual dispositions fulfils (i) the genetic, (ii) the normative, and (iii) the epistemic requirements of skilful performance. I will examine the phenomenological premises supporting Dreyfus’ approach, clarify their significance for a satisfactory normative and explanatory account of skilful expertise, and rebut the most common objections raised by both intellectualists and conciliatory habitualists, concerning hybrid actions guided by a mix of habitual and representational forms of control. In revisiting Dreyfus anti-representationalist approach, I will particularly focus on its epistemological implications, de-emphasizing other considerations related to conscious awareness. (shrink)

Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called _haptic realism_. This account foregrounds the process by which the instrumental goals of neuroscience shape the way (...) that objects of investigation are probed experimentally and conceptualised through modelling. Because such models do not aim to represent their targets exactly as they are, but in ways that are most useful for the investigators, the models should not be interpreted as literal descriptions of neural systems. Scientific realism traditionally involves a semantic commitment to interpreting theories and models as literal descriptions of human-independent nature. Haptic realism makes a significant departure from this tradition. Haptic realism also calls us to reassess the ontological commitments and knowledge claims of neuroscientific models and theories. (shrink)

What kind of collective is responsible for the deception that follows disinformation campaigns? Jennifer Lackey argues in The Epistemology of Groups that a group agent is responsible for such deception. She analyzes this deception as a group lie, which involves a group misrepresenting its own beliefs through a jointly accepted assertion or a spokesperson. Against this view, I argue that the group responsible for disinformation campaigns is a diffuse network. This deception involves misrepresenting scientific knowledge, not a group belief. Taking (...) tobacco industry disinformation campaigns as an example, I argue that these corporate groups needed a network of epistemically authoritative sources—including scientists, doctors, and reputable publishers—to create and spread disinformation in order to make a skeptical view of scientific knowledge appear credible. As such, I argue that a network is epistemically responsible for this deception. First, I challenge the assumption within group epistemology that assertion is the basis of epistemic responsibility and argue that credibility enhancement is the basis instead. This explains how non-testimonial forms of support and corroboration from multiple sources can bolster the apparent credibility of an implausible view. Next, I describe the roles of different corroborators to show why it is necessary to include them. Finally, I defend a network model of epistemic responsibility for deception. Understanding how enhancing the credibility of disinformation is a matter of responsibility can help us to build more trustworthy communities. (shrink)

In recent years, so-called organizational accounts (OA) have emerged in theoretical biology as a powerful, viable strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity. In the wake of the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and biological autonomy, OA notably propose a new meaning for the notion of “organization,” which they claim to be capable, among other things, of grounding objective and observer-independent normative teleological ascriptions. In this paper, I focus on this last claim, asking “How are ‘organization’ and ‘normativity’ conceptually connected?” The basic (...) insight mobilized by the OA framework to answer this question is most often expressed as a counterfactual argument regarding the “conditions of existence” of organized entities. In this paper, I show that careful scrutiny of this core OA argument reveals a substantial shortcoming. To make this point, I first analyze how the OA framework positions the idea of “conditions of existence” via the notions of “dependence”, “constraint,” and “closure.” Second, I consider various possible interpretations of the OA counterfactual argument grounding norms. I conclude that the implications of this argument do not enable OA to deliver what they promise, i.e., a straightforward link between organization and norms. I argue that a different strategy is needed to capture the basic organizational intuition about biological normativitiy and suggest that a stipulative route might be better suitable to that end. (shrink)

A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the ‘bounds of authenticity’. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of ‘Situated Authenticity’ which highlights that the norms of authenticity are context-dependent. In (...) particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our account, which is currently elaborated targeting a phenomenological level, may also be elaborated on a processing level using the concept of representational format. (shrink)

This paper explores how transformative experience generates decision-making problems of particular seriousness in medical settings. Potentially transformative experiences are especially likely to be encountered in medicine, and the associated decisions are confronted jointly by patients and clinicians in the context of an imbalance of power and expertise. However in such scenarios the principle of informed consent, which plays a central role in guiding clinicians, is unequal to the task. We detail how the principle’s assumptions about autonomy, rationality and information handle (...) transformative experiences poorly, appealing to several difficult cases for medical decision-making to illustrate the resulting problem, and we consider how the existing literature on complications with consent fails to offer a resolution. We argue that recognition of the problem has a role to play in achieving a more effective response to transformative decisions. In Sect. 1 we introduce several representative cases of challenging patient decision-making that clinicians might face. In Sect. 2 we detail how transformative experience has been analysed in the recent literature, before outlining in Sect. 3 the theoretical basis of the principle of informed consent, which plays a central role in how clinicians are expected to support decision-making. In Sect. 4, having laid the groundwork for a clear description, we return to the cases given in Sect. 1 to confirm how their transformative nature presents a problem: either clinicians treat the decisions faced by these patients as ‘normal’, encouraging them to focus on information provision that patients may be unable to act on, or they treat them as transformative, in which case they lack the resources to recognise whether they are helping patients make (subjectively) good decisions. In Sect. 5 we argue that the existing literature does not offer any escape from this problem. We close in Sect. 6 by noting the significant impact that appreciating the problem of transformative experience could have on supporting transformative decisions in medicine and briefly suggesting how we might aim to develop new approaches to dealing with these. (shrink)

The new mechanistic philosophy seeks to identify and explain the mechanisms of various phenomena, including their overall organization and the interactions between the individualized components. This paper argues that among the phenomena that can be approached within the new mechanistic framework are near-death experiences, which can be included within the vast range of experiences that are grouped under the category of religious experience. Such experiences involve a complex set of cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes. Since studying such experiences is far (...) from methodologically simple, we try to show the feasibility of applying the mechanistic explanation to near-death experiences. While some scholars (such as Egil Asprem and Ann Taves) argue that mechanistic explanation can shed new light on the explanation of religion, we instead emphasize neglected limits of such an explanation, as well as its epistemic-methodological advantages in comparison with alternative explanatory models, especially the models proposed by Michael Marsh, Frederick S. Barrett and Roland R. Griffiths. (shrink)

It is commonly held that political ignorance is rational, a response to the high costs and low benefits of acquiring political information. But many recent critics of the claim that political ignorance is rational instead urge that it is a simple consequence of agents not concerning themselves with the acquisition of political information whatsoever. According to such critics, political ignorance is inadvertent radical ignorance rather than a rational response to the incentives faced by agents in democracies. And since political ignorance (...) is not a response to incentives, these critics urge, it cannot be ameliorated by incentivizing the acquisition of political information. This paper has two goals. First, I show that these seemingly competing accounts of political ignorance are in fact complementary, together explaining much political ignorance. Indeed, there is a sense in which political ignorance can be both rational and radical at the same time. Second, I more closely examine the relationship between incentives, kinds of political ignorance, and the acquisition of political information. On the one hand, from the fact that political ignorance is rational it does not follow that it can be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. On the other hand, from the fact that political ignorance is radical it does not follow that it cannot be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. Lastly, the complexity of the information in question is more relevant to determining whether ignorance can be overcome than whether such ignorance is rational or radical. (shrink)

In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have investigated folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, and their compatibility with determinism. To determine whether laypeople are “natural compatibilists” or “natural incompatibilists”, they have used vignettes describing agents living in deterministic universes. However, later research has suggested that participants’ answers to these studies are plagued with comprehension errors: either people fail to really accept that these universes are deterministic, or they confuse determinism with something else. This had led certain experimenters (...) to conclude that maybe folk intuitions about the compatibility of free will with determinism could not be empirically investigated. Here, we propose that we should refrain from embracing this pessimistic conclusion, as scenarios involving time loops might allow experiments to bypass most of these methodological issues. Indeed, scenarios involving time loops belong both to the philosophical literature on free will and to popular culture. As such, they might constitute a bridge between the two worlds. We present the results of five studies using time loops to investigate people’s intuitions about determinism, free will and moral responsibility. The results of these studies allow us to reach two conclusions. The first is that, when people are introduced to determinism through time loops, they do seem to understand what determinism entails. The second is that, at least in the context of time loops, people do not seem to consider determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims of early modern philosophy. The significance of this (purported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical, infused in how we teach and think about the _Meditations_. Though prevalent, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his analysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized this, (...) given his insistence that God is not a deceiver, and the role this plays in his system. But this is a concession Descartes can grant if we are careful about the kind of deception at play—a kind Descartes _does_ recognize, albeit not without some ambiguity. On our story, Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology are not driven by concerns about deception _per se_, but by concerns about God’s _benevolence_. (shrink)

According to the interpretational theory of logical validity (IR), logical validity is preservation of truth in all interpretations compatible with the intended meaning of logical expressions. IR suffers from a seemingly defeating objection, the so-called cardinality problem: any instance of the statement ‘There are _n_ things’ is true under all interpretations, since it can be written down using only logical expressions that are not to be reinterpreted; yet ‘There are _n_ things’ is not logically true. I argue that the cardinality (...) problem is indeed a serious problem for IR, when understood in terms of ‘asymmetry of information’. I then argue that IR can be rehabilitated by making quantifiers context-sensitive: what we do not reinterpret is the Kaplanian character of a quantifier, rather than its content. ‘There are _n_ things’ is false in a context where fewer than _n_ things are relevant, so it is not logically true in IR. I finally discuss some objections and ramifications of my account: I discuss how to make space for the possibility of an explicitly absolutely general quantifier in my framework, how terms can be logical even though context-sensitive, and how to recapture classical logic within my framework. (shrink)

In a class of quantum gravity approaches it is indicated that our observable world emerges out of a fundamental structure that appears highly resistant to any clear spatial or temporal interpretation. In this work we are examining an analogue quantum system that appears to simulate such an unintuitive structure: the emergence of the so called topological phase of matter depicted by the Chern–Simons gauge theory. By investigating the proposed analogy from the lens of category theory, we offer a clear interpretation (...) of the way in which space and time act at the fundamental level. (shrink)

In the past two decades there has been a high-profile debate between two frameworks for exploring biodiversity in ecology: the niche-based framework and the neutral framework. This paper discusses contrasting approaches to forge a causal relationship between the niche theory and the neutral theory. The first approach suggests that evolution for niche _differentiation_ may lead to neutrality, and the second suggests that evolution for niche _convergence_ may do so. Although counterintuitive and rarely considered, here I argue that the differentiation hypothesis (...) is more promising. As will be demonstrated, adopting this hypothesis has notable implications for how the neutral theory is received. (shrink)

The current understanding of cognitive development rests on the premise that infants can individuate objects early on. However, the so-called object-first account faces severe difficulties explaining extant empirical findings in object individuation tasks while alternative, more parsimonious explanations are available. In this paper, we assume that children start as feature-thinkers without being able to individuate objects and show how this ability can be learned by thinkers who do not already implicitly possess the notion of an object. Based on Tugendhat's ideas (...) on the relation between singular terms and object reference, we argue that spatial indexicals comprise the fundamental means of object individuation and describe how feature thinkers might acquire the complex substitutional system of spatial indexicals. In closing, two accounts of object cognition that do not rely on symbolic capacities, namely Pylyshyn's FINST indexes and Burge's perceptual objectivity, are critically discussed. (shrink)

It is traditionally thought that integration in cognitive science requires combining different perspectives, elements, and insights into an integrated model or theory of the target phenomenon. In this paper I argue that this type of integration is frequently not possible in cognitive science due to our reliance on using different idealizing and simplifying assumptions in our models and theories. Despite this, I argue that we can still have integration in cognitive science and attain all the benefits that integrated models would (...) provide, without the need for their construction. Models which make incompatible idealizing assumptions about the target phenomenon can still be integrated by understanding how to draw coherent and compatible inferences across them. I discuss how this is possible, and demonstrate how this supports a different kind of integration. This sense of integration allows us to use collections of contradictory models to develop a consistent, comprehensive and non-contradictory understanding of a single unified phenomenon without the need for a single integrated model or theory. (shrink)

We provide a version of first-order hybrid tense logic with predicate abstracts and definite descriptions as the only non-rigid terms. It is formalised by means of a tableau calculus working on sat-formulas. A particular theory of DD exploited here is essentially based on the approach of Russell, but with descriptions treated as genuine terms. However, the reductionist aspect of the Russellian approach is retained in several ways. Moreover, a special form of tense definite descriptions is formally developed. A constructive proof (...) of the interpolation theorem for this calculus is given, which is an extension of the result provided by Blackburn and Marx. (shrink)

During emerging public health crises, both policymakers and members of the public are looking to scientific experts to provide guidance. Even in cases where there are significant uncertainties, there is pressure for experts to “speak with one voice” to avoid confusion, allow officials to make evidence-based decisions rapidly, and encourage public support for such decisions. This can lead experts to engage in masking of information about the state of the science or regarding assumptions involved in policy recommendations. Although experts might (...) have good reasons for masking disagreements, uncertainties, or assumptions when offering policy advice, we argue that this strategy can result in epistemic harms. Using the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that public health authorities masked two types of information necessary for laypersons to evaluate public health recommendations: (1) experts’ disagreements about the scientific evidence and (2) the role of values in making inferences from the science to policy positions. We contend that this resulted in epistemic harms against laypeople that provide a pro tanto case against masking information. We further argue that when the science is in flux and policies need to be implemented despite significant uncertainties, there is an all-things-considered case against masking the types of information discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I explain and defend a version of illocutionary pluralism called illocutionary relativism. I use this position to explain Rae Langton’s now-famous example of a woman who is illocutionarily disabled in her attempt to refuse sex. Illocutionary relativism gives us the tools to explain both why the woman refused and why she is illocutionarily disabled. I base my explanation of illocutionary relativism in background literature in speech act theory from Austin and Sbisa. Finally, I close by pointing out (...) some implications for how we should understand consent. (shrink)

I argue for a commitment-discharging condition of reasoning, according to which to engage in reasoning is to discharge the theoretical and practical commitments one has undertaken. I highlight the ways in which this condition is distinct from other proposals, particularly the Taking Condition, and argue that it can explain certain intuitions about reasoning that otherwise remain elusive. In particular, I argue that the commitment-discharging condition can provide a unified account of attitude-formation and premise-discharging reasoning as well as practical and theoretical (...) reasoning. It also provides a novel way to evade the regress that bedevils many accounts of inference. (shrink)

Buoyed by research in philosophy and moral psychology, virtue ethics has become increasingly influential in the literature. This renewed attention has also led to the development of the situationist challenge: empirical studies undermine the idea that we possess character traits that allow us to act virtuously across contexts. A promising reply to the situationist challenge is that we should not conceive of virtues as traits. Instead, we should conceive of them as expert skills. Here, I raise a new challenge for (...) those who go in for the (s)kill against situationism. Expert skills are brittle, rather than flexible or robust. They typically develop in narrow ways and can falter in novel situations. Experts also sometimes perform worse than novices in novel situations. Such findings present a problem for the virtue-as-skill thesis. Someone who will help others only in narrow contexts or who causes more harm than good does not exemplify virtue. The brittleness of expert skills means that virtue theorists must either (a) abandon the idea that virtues explain behaviour across contexts or (b) abandon the idea that virtues are expert skills. It’s brittle virtue or bust – you can’t teach an old dogma new skills. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’s suggestion that there are valid material inferences entails that validity is not limited to formal inferences. Because material inferences are expressed in ordinary language and deal with both conceptual and empirical matters, an interesting prospect unfolds: valid reasoning is irreducibly plural. However, it is not clear what the validity of inferences composed of non-logical and descriptive vocabulary means. I argue that it is better to speak of the legitimacy rather than the validity of material inferences. A material inference (...) can be understood as legitimate when one has a pragmatic propriety to infer from an assertion A to an assertion B. Pragmatic propriety designates the social-normative entitlement of inferencing. Because pragmatic proprieties are discipline-specific and local, legitimate reasoning is plural. Nevertheless, the shared general feature of reasoning practices is to preserve and improve the coherence of one’s system of belief. (shrink)

Quantum gravity’s suggestion that spacetime may be emergent and so only exist contingently would force a radical reconception of extant analyses of laws of nature. Humeanism presupposes a spatiotemporal mosaic of particular matters of fact on which laws supervene; primitivism and dispositionalism conceive of the action of primitive laws or of dispositions as a process of ‘nomic production’ unfolding over time. We show how the Humean supervenience basis of non-modal facts and primitivist or dispositionalist accounts of nomic production can be (...) reconceived, avoiding a reliance on fundamental spacetime. However, it is unclear that naturalistic forms of Humeanism can maintain their commitment to there being no necessary connections among distinct entities. Furthermore, non-temporal conceptions of production render this central concept more elusive than before. In fact, the challenges run so deep that the survival of the investigated analyses into the era of quantum gravity is questionable. (shrink)

We compared two digital humanities methods in the analysis of a contested scientific term. “Epigenetics” is as enigmatic as it is popular. Some authors argue that its meaning has diluted over time as this term has come to describe a widening range of entities and mechanisms (Haig, International Journal of Epidemiology 41:13–16, 2012). Others propose both a Waddingtonian “broad sense” and a mechanistic “narrow sense” definition to capture its various scientific uses (Stotz and Griffiths, History and Philosophy of the Life (...) Sciences 38:22, 2016). We evaluated these proposals by first replicating a recent analysis by (Linquist and Fullerton, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42:137–154, 2021). We analyzed the 1100 most frequently cited abstracts on epigenetics across four disciplines: proximal biology, biomedicine, general biology, and evolution. Each abstract was coded for its heritability commitments (if any) and functional interpretation. A second study applied LDA topic modelling to the same corpus, thus providing a useful methodological comparison. The two methods converged on a discipline-relative ambiguity. Within such disciplines as biomedicine or molecular biology that focus on proximate mechanisms, “epigenetic(s)” refers to a range of molecular structures while specifying nothing in particular about their heritability. This proximal conception was primarily associated with the functions of gene regulation and disease. In contrast, a second relatively uncommon sense of “epigenetic(s)” is restricted to a small proportion of evolutionary abstracts. It refers to many of the same molecular structures, but regards them as trans-generationally inherited and associated with adaptive phenotypic plasticity. This finding underscores the benefit of digital tools in complementing traditional conceptual analysis. Philosophers should be cautious not to conflate the relatively uncommon evolutionary sense of epigenetics with the more widely used proximal conception. (shrink)

There is a broad debate in contemporary philosophy of logic on the informativeness of proofs. In this context, informative proofs are demonstrations whose premises do not include the content of the conclusion. D’Agostino and Floridi (Synthese 167(2):271–315, 2009) claimed that proofs are informative if they use _virtual information_. In their terminology, this is the data carried by _dischargeable hypotheses_, assumptions entertained during proof and eliminated before concluding. Although these authors capture several cases of informative demonstrations, they do not explain the (...) nature of virtual information. Why does the use of dischargeable hypotheses increase the informativeness of a demonstration? Following a Kantian inspiration, D’Agostino and Floridi claim that virtual information adds a synthetic feature to our proofs. However, this appeal to Kantianism is misleading: for Kant, mathematics is synthetic because it requires the construction of concepts in pure intuition. On the other hand, the entertainment of provisional hypotheses does not seem to involve the construction of figures in (transcendental) imagination. Exploring a _dialogical_ characterization of logic, I suggest that virtual information results from the dynamics between a reasoner and her audience. When a reasoner provisionally assumes _P_, she enacts potential interlocutors who commit to _P_. Thus, “virtual information” denotes the content of some assumptions of the possible audience of a demonstration. This process of departing from one’s original premises to embrace the suppositions of other people is informative, but it is not synthetic: in this way, the reasoner does not entertain intuitions but only needs to reason through the conceptual content of other people’s premises. (shrink)

Philosophers of language are increasingly engaging with derogatory terms or slurs. Only few theorists take such language as a starting point for addressing puzzles in philosophy of language with little connection to our real-world problems. This paper aims to show that the political nature of derogatory language use calls for non-ideal theorising as we find it in the work of feminist and critical race scholars. Most contemporary theories of slurs, so I argue, fall short on some desiderata associated with a (...) non-ideal approach. They neglect crucial linguistic or political aspects of morally and politically significant meaning. I argue that a two-stage project is necessary to understand the perniciousness of slurs: accounting for the derogatory content of derogatory terms in general and, additionally, explaining the communicative function of slurs more specifically. I end by showing how inferentialism is well-suited to account for the content of derogatory terms whilst allowing for further explanations of the communicative functions of slurs. (shrink)

The epistemic value of a political procedure—such as democracy or a civil trial system—depends on how well it performs in arriving at decisions that are correct by some independent standard. A core assumption in the literature on epistemic democracy is that boosting the epistemic value of such a procedure makes it better overall. Even though this assumption seems innocuous (and hence has not been discussed in much detail), we will argue that it is not beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement. (...) For it is possible to increase the epistemic value of a political procedure in ways that give rise to egalitarian objections. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking arguments use the evolutionary origins of our moral attitudes to argue that our moral beliefs are not explained by realistically construed moral facts, and that our moral beliefs are therefore unjustified. Third-factor replies to debunking argument rely on substantive moral claims to argue that, even if our moral beliefs are not explained moral facts, they are explained by some third-factor that also explains those moral facts. This is supposed to show that our moral beliefs can be justified even (...) given the debunker’s evolutionary genealogy of those beliefs. In this paper I argue that third-factor replies fail. First, I argue that our belief is defeated if we withhold belief that it is explained by the fact that makes it true or by some third-factor that also explains that fact. I then argue that the third-factor replier cannot consistently take our beliefs about basic moral principles to be explained by some such third-factor because of the concession they make in response to debunking arguments and the meta-ethical view they are looking to defend. This implies that the third-factor replier’s beliefs about basic moral principles are defeated. Furthermore, we cannot take non-basic moral beliefs to be explained by some such third-factor if we withhold our basic moral beliefs, and so the third-factor replier’s non-basic moral beliefs are also defeated. Thus, the third-factor replier ought to withhold their moral beliefs in response to debunking arguments and, because their arguments rely crucially on moral claims, those arguments fail. (shrink)

Philosophers of mathematics often rely on the historical progress of mathematics in support of mathematical realism. These histories typically build on formal semantic tools to evaluate the changes in mathematics, and on these bases present later mathematical concepts as refined versions of earlier concepts which are taken to be vague. Claiming that this view does not apply to mathematical concepts in general, we present a case-study concerning projective geometry, for which we apply the tools of cognitive linguistics to analyse the (...) developmental trajectory of the domain. On the basis of this analysis, we argue for the existence of two conceptually incompatible inferential structures, occurring at distinct moments in history, both of which yield the same projective geometric theorems; the first invoked by the French mathematicians Girard Desargues (1591–1661) and Jean-Victor Poncelet (1788–1867), and the second characterising a specific modern mode. We demonstrate that neither of these inferential structures can be considered as a refinement of the other. This case of conceptual development presents an issue to the standard account of progress and its bearing on mathematical realism. Our analysis suggests that the features that distinguish the underlying conceptually incompatible inferential structures are invisible to the standard application of the tools of formal semantics. Thus this case-study stands as an example of the manner and necessity of linguistics—specifically cognitive linguistics—to inform the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Social bots are computer programs that act like human users on social media platforms. Social bot detection is a rapidly growing field dominated by machine learning approaches. In this paper, we propose a complementary method to machine learning by exploring bot detection as a model checking problem. We introduce Temporal Network Logic (TNL) which we use to specify social networks where agents can post and follow each other. Using this logic, we formalize different types of social bot behavior with formulas (...) that are satisfied in a model of a network with bots. We also consider an extension of the logic where we explore the expressive power of including elements from hybrid logic in our framework. We give model checking algorithms for TNL and its hybrid extension, and show that the complexity of the former is in p and the latter in pspace. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch a novel interpretationist account of linguistic content that has important consequences for thinking about intentionality. I solve the challenge presented by a foundational indeterminacy of reference argument to the effect that the meaning of linguistic expressions is radically indeterminate. Happily, my solution doesn’t require positing natural properties as “reference magnets”. Non-deflationist rivals to interpretationist metasemantics include various kinds of causal theories such as Fodor-style asymmetric-dependence accounts and Millikan-style teleosemantics. These accounts face their own indeterminacy challenges (...) that have yet to be solved, as well as similar indeterminacy of reference challenges at the level of individual words. Moreover, they must contend with our apparent reference to things that we are not plausibly causally acquainted with. If indeterminacy of reference arguments can be answered and we can avoid dubious use of natural properties, an interpretationist account like my own will be the strongest contender.. (shrink)

Given that conspiracies exist, can we be justified in dismissing conspiracy theories without concerning ourselves with specific details? I answer this question by focusing on contrarian conspiracy theories, theories about conspiracies that conflict with testimony from reliable sources of information. For example, theories that say the CIA masterminded the assassination of John F. Kennedy, 9/11 was an inside job, or the Freemasons are secretly running the world are contrarian conspiracy theories. When someone argues for a contrarian conspiracy theory, their options (...) are to appeal to eyewitness testimony, incriminating documents, photographs, audio recordings, video recordings, allegedly scientific evidence, anomalies, or considerations of cui bono (who benefits). Most laypeople don’t know how to adequately respond to arguments for contrarian conspiracy theories, but this doesn’t mean that it’s dogmatic to reject them. I argue that many laypeople are defeasibly justified in rejecting a variety of contrarian conspiracy theories based on testimony and this justification is rarely defeated by arguments for contrarian conspiracy theories even if we don’t know how to respond to these arguments. (shrink)

In ordinary conversation, speakers disagree not only about worldly facts, but also about how to use language to describe the world. For example, disagreement about whether Buffalo is in the American Midwest, whether Pluto is a planet, or whether someone has been canceled, can persist even with agreement about all the relevant facts. The speakers may still engage in “metalinguistic negotiation”—disputing what to mean by “Midwest”, “planet”, or “cancel”. I first motivate an approach to metalinguistic negotiation that generalizes a Stalnakerian (...) theory of communication by including linguistic commitments in the conversational common ground. Then, I turn to cases where the very status of a disagreement as metalinguistic or factual is unclear or contested. For example, after the publication of the New York Times Magazine’s 1619 Project, some responses claimed to identify factual errors, while others took those same “errors” to be matters of interpretation. I’ll consider how to extend our theorizing about metalinguistic negotiation to this type of (even more) “meta” disagreement, using the discussion following the 1619 Project as a case study. On my view, in most such cases, there will be a metalinguistic negotiation going on. Still, I explain several ways in which, despite a dispute being metalinguistic, the factualist side can sometimes receive important vindication. I also discuss why it can make sense for speakers to contest the status of a dispute. (shrink)

A large body of research in political science claims that the way in which democratic citizens think about politics is motivationally biased by partisanship. Numerous critics argue that the evidence for this claim is better explained by theories in which party allegiances influence political cognition without motivating citizens to embrace biased beliefs. This article has three aims. First, I clarify this criticism, explain why common responses to it are unsuccessful, and argue that to make progress on this debate we need (...) a more developed theory of the connections between group attachments and motivated reasoning. Second, I develop such a theory. Drawing on research on coalitional psychology and the social functions of beliefs, I argue that partisanship unconsciously biases cognition by generating motivations to advocate for party interests, which transform individuals into partisan press secretaries. Finally, I argue that this theory offers a superior explanation of a wide range of relevant findings than purely non-motivational theories of political cognition. (shrink)

Say that an audience understands a given utterance perfectly only if she correctly identifies which proposition (or propositions) that utterance expresses. In ideal circumstances, the participants in a conversation will understand each other’s utterances perfectly; however, even if they do not, they may still understand each other’s utterances at least in part. Although it is plausible to think that the phenomenon of partial understanding is very common, there is currently no philosophical account of it. This paper offers such an account. (...) Along the way, I argue against two seemingly plausible accounts which use Stalnaker’s notion of common ground and Lewisian subject matters, respectively. (shrink)

An account of mathematical understanding should account for the differences between theorems whose proofs are “easy” to discover, and those whose proofs are difficult to discover. Though Hilbert seems to have created proof theory with the idea that it would address this kind of “discovermental complexity”, much more attention has been paid to the lengths of proofs, a measure of the difficulty of _verifying_ of a _given_ formal object that it is a proof of a given formula in a given (...) formal system. In this paper we will shift attention back to discovermental complexity, by addressing a “topological” measure of proof complexity recently highlighted by Alessandra Carbone ( 2009 ). Though we will contend that Carbone’s measure fails as a measure of discovermental complexity, it forefronts numerous important formal and epistemological issues that we will discuss, including the structure of proofs and the question of whether impure proofs are systematically simpler than pure proofs. (shrink)

Reference may be fixed by stipulation through a speech act, just like bets and marriages. An utterance of _Let n refer to an/the F_ is a speech act by means of which, if successful, a speaker institutes a practice of referring, and a hearer coordinates by choosing a referent from the domain of discourse. We articulate a metasemantics for this view. On our view, the interlocutors can select a referent randomly, if necessary, motivated by the incentive to coordinate on the (...) use of a name. Moreover, we argue that reference fixed by a performative speech act is ‘thin’, or ‘undemanding’. Finally, we defend the thesis that co-reference might not determinately obtain despite reference being fixed. Performative reference makes sense of ordinary speakers’ practices, who appear to be very liberal and unimpressed by skepticism toward causally inert or epistemically indiscernible objects. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior (...) belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time. (shrink)

Two methods have been used in the investigation of the stakes-sensitivity of knowledge as it occurs in ordinary language: (a) asking participants about the truth or acceptability of knowledge ascriptions and (b) asking participants how much evidence someone needs to gather before they know that something is the case. This second, “evidence-seeking”, method has reliably found effects of stakes-sensitivity while the method of asking about knowledge ascriptions has not. Consistent with this pattern, in Francis et al. (Ergo, 2019), we found (...) evidence of scalar stakes effects using an evidence-seeking approach. Whilst we found this evidence across several cases using both negative (“don’t know”) and positive (“know”) polarities, there remain questions about the directness of the relationship between stakes and knowledge ascriptions; it is possible that stakes are affecting knowledge by affecting the confidence of the attributor. For example, Bach (in: Peter & Preyer, 2005) has argued that knowledge attributions do not track truth attributions but rather thresholds for doxastic confidence. To investigate the role of confidence in knowledge ascriptions, we use our existing paradigm (Francis et al., 2019) but include measures of both participant and protagonist confidence. As far as we are aware, this is the first empirical investigation of the role of confidence in stakes effects on knowledge that incorporates an evidence-seeking approach using several scenarios. Overall, across both positive (“know”) and negative (“don’t know”) polarity conditions, we find further evidence of a stakes effect on knowledge using an evidence-seeking paradigm. However, and importantly, we do not find evidence that changes in participant confidence partially or fully mediate the stakes effect on knowledge. (shrink)

The theory of pragmatic encroachment states that the risks associated with being wrong, or the practical stakes, can make a difference to whether one’s evidence is good enough to justify belief. While still far from the orthodox view, it has garnered enough popularity that it is worth exploring the implications when we apply the theory of pragmatic encroachment to group epistemology, specifically to the justificatory status of the beliefs of group agents. When we do, I claim, we discover two novel (...) cases of divergence; cases where a group epistemic agent is justified in believing but none of the members are, and vice versa. Using Jennifer Lackey’s influential Group Epistemic Agent Account as a foil, in particular Lackey’s arguments against previous proposed cases of divergence, the present paper defends the following argument, which I call Pragmatic Encroachment Divergence (PED): (i) Practical stakes make a difference to what an agent (group or individual) is justified in believing. (ii) The practical stakes of a group agent can come apart from the practical stakes of the (operative) members. (iii) Therefore, it is possible for the justified beliefs of a group to diverge from the justified beliefs of its members. (shrink)

We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, (...) which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (shrink)

It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis of deep temporality typically involves two ideas: that reality is temporally compartmentalised into distinct present, past, and future ‘realms’, and that this compartmentalisation is temporally dynamic in the (...) sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality be tensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to the question of what it is for a fact to be tensed. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach, perspectivalism about temporal reality, that seeks to vindicate the hypothesis of deep temporality by ascribing to reality a certain kind of temporally perspectival structure, which also provides a straightforward answer to the question of what the tensedness of facts consists in as well as to the question of what it is for reality to be constituted by such facts. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward an alternative interpretation of time-reversal symmetry in philosophy of physics: Humean time-reversal symmetry. According to it, time-reversal symmetry is understood as a heuristic, epistemic virtue of the best system, not as a property of the Humean mosaic. One of the consequences of this view is that one of the main arguments against a primitive direction of time is rendered harmless, which paves the way for primitivism about the direction of time.

Does the very existence of money depend in any sense on our “recognition” of it? According to certain functionalist views, no such attitudes are necessary. This paper argues to the contrary for recognition dependence, of a minimal sort. What’s needed in a population is (1) the functional know-how of money use, (2) an ideational structure founded upon people’s thinking about what others are thinking, and (3) wide enough acceptance of a payment or settlement obligation (as expressed, e.g., when someone asks (...) a vendor “So what do I owe ya?”). (shrink)

How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought behind “separatism” is easy to articulate. Assuming that knowledge of any kind is defeasible, since knowledge-that and knowledge-how (...) are fundamentally different beasts, the best accounts of their defeasibility must reflect the underlying differences between them. I reject a separatist treatment of the defeasibility of knowledge-that and knowledge-how. One can acknowledge certain important differences between knowledge-that and knowledge-how without thereby needing two theories of defeasibility. Ultimately, though, I’ll argue that the defeasibility of basic knowledge-how, unlike non-basic knowledge-how, is a much more difficult issue than has been acknowledged. (shrink)

Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to (...) the perceiver in perceptual experience. I argue that the two elements cannot play together as Matthen envisages. Beginning with the referential element, I show that the feeling of presence is unable to both provide demonstrative reference and assert that the visual state reflects how things are. Turning to the descriptive element, I argue that Matthen is committed to a view on which descriptive (or image) content is a mental entity, a reified image. This is a common element across perceptual experience, episodic memory and visual imagination. The mental entity proves a defective ingredient in assembling perceptual content that purports to present reality. There are problems integrating the depicted viewpoint with the subject’s actual viewpoint, and problems maintaining a coherent notion of assertion. I argue that the project of assembling perceptual experience from descriptive and referential elements is unworkable. (shrink)

The issue of the relationship between predictive processing (PP) and the free energy principle (FEP) remains a subject of debate and controversy within the research community. Many researchers have expressed doubts regarding the actual integration of PP with the FEP, questioning whether the FEP can truly contribute significantly to the mechanistic understanding of PP or even undermine such integration altogether. In this paper, I present an alternative perspective. I argue that, from the viewpoint of the constraint-based mechanisms approach, the FEP (...) imposes an important constraint, namely variational free energy, on the mechanistic architecture proposed by PP. According to the constraint-based mechanisms approach, high-level cognitive mechanisms are integral parts of extensive heterarchical networks that govern the physiology and behavior of agents. Consequently, mechanistic explanations of cognitive phenomena should incorporate constraints and flows of free energy as relevant components, given that the implemented constraints operate as long as free energy is available. Within this framework, I contend that the FEP provides a relevant constraint for explaining at least some biological cognitive mechanisms described in terms of Bayesian generative models that minimize prediction errors. (shrink)

On the standard Paulian definition of epistemically transformative experiences (ETE), we can’t know what an ETE is like before we have it. ETEs are new kinds of experiences and, importantly, can’t be imagined—this is why they have a unique ability to teach us what a particular experience is like. Contra Paul, some philosophers (Sharadin, 2015; Wilkenfeld, 2016; Ismael, 2019; Kind, 2020; Daoust, 2021; Cath, 2022) have argued that transformative experiences can be imagined. A neglected consequence of this argument is that (...) if transformative experiences can in fact be imagined, then it is unclear how they could be epistemically transformative. What do they teach us if we can imagine what they’re like in advance? I will argue not only that imaginable experiences can be transformative, but that experiences of a kind which an agent is experientially acquainted with can also be transformative. This latter kind of transformative experiences, which I will call familiar transformative experiences, are transformative not because the agent learns what a new kind of experience is like—by definition, they are not new kinds of experiences—but because the transformativeness of the experience is brought out by features of the agent experiencing them. Epistemic transformation in these cases may be explained by facts about the agent’s perspective and social environment, which allow them to appreciate elements of the experience they did not previously. (shrink)

In this introduction to the Topical Collection on Social and Cognitive Diversity in Science, we map the questions that have guided social epistemological approaches to diversity in science. Both social and cognitive diversity of different types is claimed to be epistemically beneficial. The challenge is to understand how an increase in a group’s diversity can bring about epistemic benefits and whether there are limits beyond which diversity can no longer improve a group’s epistemic performance. The contributions to the Topical Collection (...) discuss various proposals to maintain an appropriate amount of cognitive diversity in science, for instance, by recruiting and retaining practitioners from underrepresented social groups, providing incentives for explorative and risky research, encouraging interdisciplinary collaborations and stakeholder participation in research, requiring industry scientists to share their evidence, and developing strategies to encounter politically motivated attempts to manufacture doubt. To be successful, efforts to promote diversity in science should anticipate risks related to institutional interventions, navigate trade-offs between different types of epistemically good outcomes, and identify hidden costs that such policies may cause for various actors. Such efforts need to be assessed not only from an epistemic perspective but also from the point of view of fairness and the political legitimacy of scientific institutions. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from “standard” explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathematical constraints, and causal constraints. This classification helps capture unique features of constraint types, the different roles they play in explanation, and (...) it includes causal constraints, which are often overlooked in this literature. (shrink)

Mathematical structuralism can be understood as a theory of mathematical ontology, of the objects that mathematics is about. It can also be understood as a theory of the semantics for mathematical discourse, of how and to what mathematical terms refer. In this paper we propose an epistemological interpretation of mathematical structuralism. According to this interpretation, the main epistemological claim is that mathematical knowledge is purely structural in character; mathematical statements contain purely structural information. To make this more precise, we invoke (...) a notion that is central to mathematical epistemology, the notion of (informal) proof. Appealing to the notion of proof, an epistemological version of the structuralist thesis can be formulated as: Every mathematical statement that is provable expresses purely structural information. We introduce a bi-modal framework that formalizes the notions of structural information and informal provability in order to draw connections between them and confirm that the epistemological structuralist thesis holds. (shrink)

The social sciences are facing numerous crises including those related to replication, theory, and applicability. We highlight that these crises imply epistemic malfunctions and affect science communication negatively. Several potential solutions have already been proposed, ranging from statistical improvements to changes in norms of scientific conduct. In this paper, we propose a structural solution: the elimination of the discussion section from social science research papers. We point out that discussion sections allow for an inappropriate narrativization of research that disguises actual (...) results and enables the misstatement of true limitations. We go on to claim that removing this section and outsourcing it to other publications provides several epistemic advantages such as a division of academic labour, adversarial modes of progress, and a better alignment of the personal aims of scientists with the aims of science. After responding to several objections, we conclude that the potential benefits of moving away from the traditional model of academic papers outweigh the costs and have the potential to play a part in addressing the crises in the social sciences alongside other reforms. As such, we take our paper as proffering a further potential solution that should be applied complimentarily with other reform movements such as Open Science and hope that our paper can start a debate on this or similar proposals. (shrink)

The paper is inspired by and explicitly presupposes the readers’ knowledge of the Kürbis normalization procedure for the Milne tree-like natural deduction system _C_ for classical propositional logic. The novelty of _C_ is that for each conventional connective, it has only _general_ introduction and elimination rules, whose paradigm is the rule of proof by cases. The present paper deals with the Milne–Kürbis troublemaker—adding universal quantifier—caused by extending the normalization procedure to \(\mathbf {C^{\exists }_{\forall }} \), the first-order variant of _C_. (...) For both quantifiers, \( \mathbf {C^{\exists }_{\forall }}\) has only general quantifier rules, whose paradigm is the indirect rule of existential elimination. We propose the classical first-order tree-like natural deduction system \( \mathbf {NC^{\exists }_{\forall }}\) such that it contains all the propositional and half the quantifier rules of \(\mathbf {C^{\exists }_{\forall }}\) and differs from it with respect to the other half of the quantifier rules and the notion of a deduction. We show that in the case of \(\mathbf {NC^{\exists }_{\forall }} \), whose specifics is based on the Quine treatment of _flagged_ variables in the linear-style natural deduction system as well as on the Aguilera-Baaz treatment of _characteristic_ and _side_ variables for sequent-style calculi, the troublemaker doesn’t occur. In order to handle another specifics of \(\mathbf {NC^{\exists }_{\forall }}\) —an auxiliary notion of a _finished_ deduction that makes deductions _nonhereditary_—we show soundness and completeness of \( \mathbf {NC^{\exists }_{\forall }} \). While emphasizing the former with the help of the Smirnov technique, we additionally indicate a fixable gap in the Quine soundness argument. At last, the philosophical significance of the main result of this paper is developed in more detail. (shrink)

This paper argues that qualia share their physical correlates' locations. The first premise comes from the theory of relativity: If something shares a time with a physical event in all reference frames, it shares that physical event’s location. The second premise is that qualia share times with their correlates in all reference frames. Having qualia and correlates share locations makes relations between them easier to explain, improving both physicalist and dualist theories.

According to Amie Thomasson, most of the existence questions that concern ontologists can be easily answered using trivial arguments from uncontroversial premises. In this paper, I examine Thomasson’s main argument for this significant and striking thesis, focusing on the crucial premise that sortal terms have application conditions. I argue that Thomasson’s defence of this premise fails to support it. I also argue that it faces a serious objection.

In this paper we analyze relations between _ontology_ in anthropology and philosophy beyond simple homonymy or synonymy and show how this diagnosis allows for new interdisciplinary links and insights, while minimizing the risk of cross-disciplinary equivocation. We introduce the ontological turn in anthropology as an intellectual project rooted in the critique of dualism of culture and nature and propose a classification of the literature we reviewed into first-order claims about the world and second-order claims about ontological frameworks. Next, rather than (...) provide a strict definition of _ontology_ in anthropological literature, we argue that the term is used as a heuristic addressing a web of sub-concepts relating to interpretation, knowledge, and self-determination which correspond to methodological, epistemic, and political considerations central to the development of the ontological turn. We present a case study of rivers as persons to demonstrate what the ontological paradigm in anthropology amounts to in practice. Finally, in an analysis facilitated by a parallel between the first- and second-order claims in anthropology, and _ontology_ and meta-_ontology_ in philosophy (respectively), we showcase the potential for contribution of ontological anthropology to contemporary philosophical debates, such as ontological gerrymandering, relativism and social _ontology_, and vice versa. (shrink)

This paper studies Paul Cohen’s philosophy of mathematics and mathematical practice as expressed in his writing on set-theoretic consistency proofs using his method of forcing. Since Cohen did not consider himself a philosopher and was somewhat reluctant about philosophy, the analysis uses semiotic and literary textual methodologies rather than mainstream philosophical ones. Specifically, I follow some ideas of Lévi-Strauss’s structural semiotics and some literary narratological methodologies. I show how Cohen’s reflections and rhetoric attempt to bridge what he experiences as an (...) uncomfortable tension between reality and the formal by means of his notion of intuition. (shrink)

Traditional models of mathematical proof describe proofs as sequences of assertion where each assertion is a claim about mathematical objects. However, Tanswell observed that in practice, many proofs do not follow these models. Proofs often contain imperatives, and other instructions for the reader to perform mathematical actions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of instructions in proofs by systematically analyzing how instructions are used in Kunen’s Set theory: An introduction to independence proofs, a widely used graduate (...) text in set theory. I use Kunen’s text to describe how instructions and constructions in proof work in mathematical practice and explore epistemic consequences of how proofs are read and understood. (shrink)

Does lying require objective falsity? Given that consistency with ordinary language is a desideratum of a philosophical definition of lying, empirical evidence plays an important role. A literature review reveals that studies employing a simple question-and-response format, such as “Did the speaker lie? [Yes/No]”, favour the subjective view of lying, according to which objective falsity is not required. However, it has recently been claimed that the rate of lie attributions found in those studies is artificially inflated due to perspective taking; (...) and that if measures are applied to avoid this problem, the results actually support the objective view of lying. This paper presents three experiments that challenge this claim by showing that the findings used to support the objective view have been misinterpreted. It is thus concluded that the folk concept of lying does not require objective falsity, which is consistent with the dominant view in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...) be mere epiphenomena, and self-verification and self-defeat lack the broader philosophical import often claimed for them. (shrink)

We introduce an expected-value theory of linguistic modality that makes reference to expected utility and a likelihood-based confirmation measure for deontics and epistemics, respectively. The account is a probabilistic semantics for deontics and epistemics, yet it proposes that deontics and epistemics share a common core modal semantics, as in traditional possible-worlds analysis of modality. We argue that this account is not only theoretically advantageous, but also has far-reaching empirical consequences. In particular, we predict modal versions of reasoning fallacies from the (...) heuristics and biases literature. Additionally, we derive the modal semantics in an entirely transparent manner, as it is based on the compositional semantics of Korean modal expressions that are morphosyntactically decomposed into a conditional and an evaluative predicate. (shrink)

In the philosophy of mathematical practice, the aim is to understand the various aspects of this practice. Even though definitions are a central element of mathematical practice, the study of this aspect of mathematical practice is still in its infancy. In particular, there is little empirical evidence to substantiate claims about definitions in practice. In this article, we address this gap by reporting on an empirical investigation on how mathematicians create definitions and which roles and properties they attribute to them. (...) On the basis of interviews with thirteen research mathematicians, we provide a broad range of relevant aspects of definitions. In particular, we address various roles of definitions and show that definitions are not just a product of mathematical factors, but also of social and contingent factors. Furthermore, we provide concrete examples of how mathematicians interact and think about definition. This broad empirical basis with a variety of examples provides an optimal starting point for future investigations into definitions in mathematical practice. (shrink)

Everyday (mis)uses of deepfakes define prevailing conceptualizations of what they are and the moral stakes in their deployment. But one complication in understanding deepfakes is that they are not photographic yet nonetheless manipulate lens-based recordings with the intent of mimicking photographs. The harmfulness of deepfakes, moreover, significantly depends on their potential to be mistaken for photographs and on the belief that photographs capture actual events, a tenet known as the transparency thesis, which scholars have somewhat ironically attacked by citing digital (...) imaging techniques as counterexamples. Combining these positions, this paper sets out two core points: (1) that conceptions about the nature of photography introduce imperatives about its uses; and (2) that popular cultural understandings of photography imply normative ideas that infuse our encounters with deepfakes. Within this, I further raise the question of what moral ground deepfakes occupy that allows them to have such a potentially devastating effect. I show that answering this question involves reinstating the notion that photographs are popularly conceived of as transparent. The rejoinder to this argument, however, is that to take the sting out of deepfakes we must, once again, become skeptical of the veracity of all images, including photoreal ones. This kind of critical mindedness was warranted before the invention of photography for both pictorial imprints and written accounts from various media sources. Given this, along with the fact that photographic trickery is nothing new, deepfakes need not push us into a post-truth epistemic abyss, for they imply a decidedly old turn. (shrink)

It is quite unequivocal that Kuhn was committed to (some version of) naturalism; that he defended, especially in his later work, the autonomy of scientific rationality; and that he rejected the correspondence theory of truth, i.e., the traditional realistic conception of the world’s mind-independence. In this paper, I argue that these three philosophical perspectives form an uneasy triangle, for while it is possible to coherently defend each of them separately or two of them combined, holding all three leads to incoherence. (...) Hence, the only option is to reject one of them in a way that is both compatible with Kuhnian historiography and philosophically fruitful. My purpose in this paper is not exegetical. My ambition is to sketch a coherent philosophical framework which does justice to Kuhn’s historiographical model for scientific change and avoids the philosophical costs of relativism and anti-naturalism. In particular, I argue in favor of the following interconnected positions: (1) Given the role of anomalies in Kuhn’s historiographical model, the latter satisfies the two fundamental conditions for acknowledging the mind-independence of the world: the ‘irreducibility condition’ and the ‘objectivity condition’, (2) Kuhn’s rejection of the notion of an ‘Archimedean platform’ does not entail that the truth-value of beliefs doesn’t play a role in the explanation of their change, (3) Adopting scientific realism is the only way to defend the autonomy of scientific rationality within a naturalistic philosophical framework. However, adopting realism leads to a liberal rather than an eliminative version of naturalism. (shrink)

The principle of least action (PLA) has often been cited as a counterexample to the dominant mode of causal explanation in physics. In particular, PLA seems to involve an appeal to final causes or some other teleological ideology. However, Ben-Menahem (Causation in science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018) argues that such implications no longer apply given that PLA can be recovered as limiting case from quantum theory. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical implications of PLA-based explanations are not (...) undermined by its status as derivative. However, I contend that PLA functions as a diachronic constraint that licenses explanations by constraint (Lange, Because without cause: non-casual explanations in science and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). PLA-based explanations, on this account, are non-causal but also differ from familiar cases of teleological explanations in several respects. (shrink)

By discussing a large number of different examples, this paper argues that the class of so-called generic statements is much more heterogeneous that is usually recognized in the contemporary debate. It is claimed that the theoretical tendency towards overgeneralization or homogenization makes it impossible to adequately understand how generic statements function in language and to handle the dangers involved in generics that express and promote social stereotypes and prejudices. It is also argued that such overgeneralization involves what J. L. Austin (...) described as the “fetishizing” of the true/false distinction. Several influential theories are criticized, including Sterken’s error theory, Leslie’s conception of weak generics, and the idea that generics involve loose talk. (shrink)

Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive (...) views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). Motivated by these developments, here we sketch a broad-ranging view of science, scientific practice and scientific knowledge in terms of ecological-enactive co-construction. The view we propose situates science in the biological, evolutionary context of human embodied cognitive activity aimed at addressing the demands of life. This motivates reframing theory as practice, and reconceptualizing scientific knowledge in ecological terms, as relational and world-involving. Our view also brings to the forefront of attention the fundamental link between ideas about the nature of mind, of science and of nature itself, which we explore by outlining how our proposal differs from more conservative, and narrower, conceptions of “cognitive niche construction.”. (shrink)

The use of algorithms to support prediction-based decision-making is becoming commonplace in a range of domains including health, criminal justice, education, social services, lending, and hiring. An assumption governing such decisions is that there is a property Y such that individual a should be allocated resource R by decision-maker D if a is Y. When there is uncertainty about whether a is Y, algorithms may provide valuable decision support by accurately predicting whether a is Y on the basis of known (...) features of a. Based on recent work on statistical evidence in epistemology this article presents an argument against relying exclusively on algorithmic predictions to allocate resources when they provide purely statistical evidence that a is Y. The article then responds to the objection that any evidence that will increase the proportion of correct decisions should be accepted as the basis for allocations regardless of its epistemic deficiency. Finally, some important practical aspects of the conclusion are considered. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the relationship between the necessity predicate and the truth predicate by comparing two possible-world interpretations. The first interpretation, proposed by Halbach et al. (J Philos Log 32(2):179–223, 2003), is for the necessity predicate, and the second, proposed by Hsiung (Stud Log 91(2):239–271, 2009), is for the truth predicate. To achieve this goal, we examine the connections and differences between paradoxical sentences that involve either the necessity predicate or the truth predicate. A primary connection is established (...) through two translations that change only one of the predicates to the other while keeping everything else unchanged. We prove that in bijective frames, a set of sentences that contains one of the two semantic predicates has the same paradoxicality as the corresponding set of sentences that contains the other predicate obtained through translation. However, there are substantial differences as well. First, the necessity predicate and the truth predicate, under the two interpretations, cannot be defined by each other. Moreover, for sentences that involve only the truth predicate, their paradoxicality is preserved under the homomorphisms of frames. For sentences containing the necessity predicate, their paradoxicality is preserved under bounded morphisms, but none of these sentences can have their paradoxicality preserved under the extension of frames. Finally, we also show that paradoxical sentences involving the necessity predicate and those involving the truth predicate differ significantly in terms of mirror symmetry, circularity dependence, and frame compactness. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of collective epistemic vices, which we call the “group identification account”. The group identification account attributes collective epistemic vices to the groups that are constituted by “group identification”, which is a primitive and non-doxastic self-understanding as a group member (Turner, 1982; Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Pacherie, 2013; Salice & Miyazono, 2020). The distinctive feature of the group identification account is that it enables us to attribute epistemic vices not just to established social groups (...) (e.g. committees, research teams, juries) but also to loose social groups (e.g. loosely connected people in an echo chamber) when they are constituted by group identification. The group identification account is contrasted with Fricker’s (2010, 2020) influential account, the “joint commitment account”, which focuses on established social groups, and has difficulty in making sense of collective epistemic vices of loose social groups. The group identification account is motivated by the fact that collective epistemic vices can be useful to diagnose not only the epistemic performance of established groups but also that of loose groups in real-life cases, such as echo chamber (Nguyen, 2020), implicit bias (Holroyd, 2020), group polarization (Broncano-Berrocal & Carter, 2021), etc. (shrink)

There are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the _ways_ are different truth-like properties. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view, the differences (...) reside in how a truth is made true, but not in its being true. I’ll discuss how these two understandings differ and what the potential advantages of the latter idea might be. (shrink)

In this paper, we explicate an underappreciated distinction between two conceptions of valuing. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioral, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. In contrast, the second conception, which we call the layer-account, posits that valuing is constituted by the presence of certain representational mental states underlying those dispositions. In the first part of the paper, we introduce the distinction in proper detail and show that the (...) accounts have different implications regarding the valuings of agents. In the second part, we situate the accounts within the extant philosophical literature. First, we relate them to the recent debate between so-called dispositionalists and representationalists about the nature of beliefs and point out that this debate can help anticipate some of the main dialectical fault lines to be expected between surface- and layer-theorists. Second, we examine the contemporary meta-ethical debate on conceptualizing valuing, indicate that scholars have largely ignored the distinction introduced here, and outline that this oversight has substantial theoretical costs: as we show, key arguments within the meta-ethical debate require thorough re-evaluation in light of the proposed distinction. The third part of the paper illustrates the theoretical leverage of the distinction for practical research by exploring its implications for behavioral welfare economics. (shrink)

Fear generalisation is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when fear that is elicited in response to a frightening stimulus spreads to similar or related stimuli. The practical harms of pathological fear generalisation related to trauma are well-documented, but little or no attention has been given so far to its epistemic harms. This paper fills this gap in the literature. It shows how the psychological phenomenon, when it becomes pathological, substantially curbs the epistemic agency of those who experience the fear that (...) generalizes, limiting their ability to respond to evidence, and substantially limiting their epistemic horizons. It is argued that when these epistemic harms are caused by wrongful actions and decisions of individuals or institutions, because the fear is elicited in response to a traumatic experience inflicted by them, the harms should be considered epistemic wrongs. The epistemic wrongs are closely akin to agential epistemic injustice, a variety of distributive epistemic injustice, and sometimes also involve epistemic exclusion. The paper thereby identifies a previously underexplored psychological mechanism that can be a vehicle through which both individuals and institutions can epistemically wrong others. The argument has implications for how both epistemic wrongs and epistemic injustice should be conceived, suggesting that both can occur without being caused by primarily epistemic flaws or errors, or a bad epistemic character. Finally, it highlights the advantage of taking a victim-centred approach to understanding epistemic harm. (shrink)

The relationship between topological explanation and mechanistic explanation is unclear. Most philosophers agree that at least some topological explanations are mechanistic explanations. The crucial question is how to make sense of this claim. Zednik (Philos Psychol 32(1):23–51, 2019) argues that topological explanations are mechanistic if they (i) describe mechanism sketches that (ii) pick out organizational properties of mechanisms. While we agree with Zednik’s conclusion, we critically discuss Zednik’s account and show that it fails as a general account of how and (...) when topological explanations are mechanistic. First, if topological explanations were just mechanism sketches, this implies that they could be enriched by replacing topological terms with mechanistic detail. This, however, conflicts how topological explanations are used in scientific practice. Second, Zednik’s account fails to show how topological properties can be organizational properties of mechanisms that have a place in mechanistic explanation. The core issue is that Zednik’s account ignores that topological properties often are _global_ properties while mechanistic explanantia refer to _local_ properties. We demonstrate how these problems can be solved by a recent account of mechanistic completeness (Craver and Kaplan in Br J Philos Sci 71(1):287–319, 2020; Kohár and Krickel in Calzavarini and Viola (eds) Neural mechanisms—new challenges in the philosophy of neuroscience, Springer, New York, 2021) and use a multilayer network model of Alzheimer’s Disease to illustrate this. (shrink)

Fichte’s Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre 1794 is one of the most fundamental books in classical German philosophy. The use of laws of thought to establish foundational principles of transcendental philosophy was groundbreaking in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and is still crucial for many areas of theoretical philosophy and logic in general today. Nevertheless, contemporaries have already noted that Fichte’s derivation of foundational principles from the law of identity is problematic, since Fichte lacked the tools to correctly (...) present the formal parts of Foundations. In this paper, however, we argue that Fichte’s approach intuitively offers an important contribution to transcendental philosophy, and especially to philosophy of logic. We first point out the difficulties of Fichte’s logic in the Foundations and improve it in a second part on the basis of a formal system in which both propositional logic and syllogistic are combined. (shrink)

As mathematics departments in the United States began to shift toward standards of original research at the end of the nineteenth century, many adopted journal clubs as forums to engage with new periodical literature. The Bryn Mawr Mathematics Journal Club, maintained episodically between 1896 and 1924, began as a supplement to the graduate course offerings. Each semester student and professor participants focused on a single disciplinary area or surveyed what had been published lately. The Notebooks containing these reports were stored (...) on the open shelves of the college library. These collectively composed documents record ways in which graduate students transcribed and interpreted contemporary literature from the front to the back of mathematics. This article will consider the entries of a single student in which published mathematics was rewritten for a local audience and how the process of relocation animated research at Bryn Mawr. (shrink)

An important divide in the free will literature—one that is arguably almost as common as the distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism—concerns the distinction between event and substance causation. As the story typically goes, event-causalists maintain that an action is free only if it is caused by appropriate mental events, and agent-causalists maintain that an action is free only if it is caused directly by a substance (the agent). This paper argues that this dichotomy is a false one. It does this (...) by introducing a new view called Causal Pluralism, which maintains that free will is compatible with both event and substance causation. Furthermore, it is argued that agent-causalists have good reason to adopt Causal Pluralism, and also that that the view has interesting implications for the free will dialectic. (shrink)

Reasons rationalize beliefs. Reasons, when all goes well, turn true beliefs into knowledge. I am interested in the relationship between these aspects of reasons. Without a proper understanding of their relationship, the theory of knowledge will be less illuminating than it ought to be. I hope to show that previous accounts have failed to account for this relationship. This has resulted in a tendency to focus on justification rather than knowledge. It has also resulted in many becoming skeptical about the (...) prospects for an analysis of knowledge. The skepticism is misplaced and the tendency can be fixed without sacrificing any insights. The solution is to see how good reasons (in a sense to be articulated) are apparent (in a sense to be articulated) to the knowing subject. Once this claim is unpacked, we see that it is an illuminating analysis of knowledge in terms of distinct but intimately related aspects of epistemic assessment. It helps us see the value of knowledge (over and above true belief) and it affords us a unified, “reasons-first” metaepistemology. The resulting picture is neither a familiar kind of internalism or externalism. (shrink)

We explore the relationship between evidence and knowledge when knowledge is described by a standard partition over a finite state space, and evidence is represented by a state-dependent collection of finite sets of messages. When the collection is measurable with respect to the partition, there is evidence for an event only if the event is self-evident—i.e., known at every one of its states. Thus, an event is commonly known in and only if there is _mutual_ evidence that implies that the (...) event has occurred, and all knowledge can be proved only when the agent is informed about the state or knows nothing. The existence of partial provability outside these two extremes hinges on the non monotonic nature of provability. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that Frege’s and Hilbert’s mutual disagreement results from different notions of Anschauung and their relation to axioms. In the first section of the paper, evidence is provided to support that Frege and Hilbert were influenced by the same developments of 19th-century geometry, in particular the work of Gauss, Plücker, and von Staudt. The second section of the paper shows that Frege and Hilbert take different approaches to deal with the problems that the developments in 19th-century (...) geometry posed for the traditional Kantian philosophy of mathematics. Frege maintains that Anschauung is a source of knowledge by which we acknowledge geometrical axioms as true. For Hilbert, in contrast, axioms provide one of several correct “pictures” of reality. Hilbert’s position is thereby deeply influenced by epistemological ideas from Hertz and Helmholtz, and, in turn, influenced the neo-Kantian Cassirer. (shrink)

What is the function of color vision? In this paper, I focus on perceptual phenomena studied in psychophysics and argue that the best explanation for these phenomena is that the color visual system is a perceptual enhancement system. I first introduce two rival conceptions of the function of color vision: that color vision aims to detect or track the fine-grained colors of distal objects and scenes (Seeing Color) and that it aims to help organisms discriminate, detect, track and/or recognize ecologically (...) important objects, properties, and relations more directly (Seeing with Color). I then discuss two kinds of systematic perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysicists: approximate color constancy and color induction. I argue from the premise that Seeing with Color better accommodates and explains these phenomena to the conclusion that it is the conception that an empirically-guided philosopher of color ought to adopt. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, the semantic reference of the uses of demonstratives is fixed, at least partly, by the speaker’s referential intention. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of the existence of a semantic convention of this sort. My argument is placed in the Lewisian framework of signaling games and consists of several steps that correspond to four anti-intentionalist arguments, already present in the literature, that have proven inconclusive when employed separately and without being set in the mentioned framework.

Computer simulations are widely used for surrogative reasoning in scientific research. They also play a crucial role in engineering, more specifically in the design of new robotic systems, yet the nature of this role has been little discussed so far in the philosophy of technology literature. The main claim made in this article is that the notion of surrogative reasoning is central to understanding how computer simulations can serve the purpose of designing new robots. More specifically, it is argued that (...) computer simulations can support two forms of surrogative reasoning, which are called model-oriented and prediction-oriented, whose inferential structure is reconstructed to some extent. And it is argued that, when computer simulations are used to design new robots, they are distinctively used in the model-oriented way. By unravelling the structure of the computer simulation-supported methods adopted in robotic design, this article may contribute to a finer-grained understanding of the epistemic processes involved in technological research. (shrink)

In the article I argue that intellectual arrogance can be an individual, collective and even corporate vice. I show that arrogance is in all these cases underpinned by defensive positive evaluations of epistemic features of the evaluator in the service of buttressing its illegitimate social dominance. Individual arrogance as superbia or as hubris stems from attitudes biased by the motive of self-enhancement. Collective arrogance is underpinned by positive defensive attitudes to a one’s social identity that seeks to maintain its unwarranted (...) social dominance. Finally, corporations are arrogant when their attitudes are the aggregation of the arrogant dispositions of its managers or when these corporations have inherited structures and policies that are defensive of its illegitimately dominant social status. (shrink)

According to a dominant understanding, the illocutionary domain is a bifurcated one, an amalgam containing both communicative speech acts (such as requesting and promising) and ceremonial speech acts (such as saying ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony and naming a ship). Bifurcating the domain in this manner is commonly taken to be a primary lesson of Austin’s “How To Do Things With Words’, alongside that of according communicative speech acts a far greater prominence in terms of our core understanding of (...) illocution. In contrast, we draw on the resources provided by Austin’s work to provide a more unified conception of the illocutionary domain, one in which differences between communicative and ceremonial acts are themselves understood to emerge from a broader understanding of the illocutionary character of speech. (shrink)

Climate models calibrated exclusively with observations from the 19th through 21st centuries are unsuitable for assessing many important hypotheses about the future. Many systems in the modern climate are expected to cross dynamic thresholds in the near future, requiring more than the instrumental record for adequate calibration. In this paper I argue that paleoclimate analogues from earth’s past can mitigate this threshold problem, even if the modern climate exhibits features that make it historically unique. While this requires that paleoclimatologists be (...) increasingly discriminate in the past systems they target for modern analogues, the upshot is a practice of climate model construction that improves the reliability of future projections. All of this is achieved by integrating features of past climate systems discovered by the study of earth deep in the past. My analysis synthesizes important empirical work done by climate modelers and paleoclimatologists with relevant philosophical work on analogical reasoning in science. (shrink)

The unification of grounding and causation has been proposed in the literature. Also, it has encountered many objections. In this paper, I argue that there is a strategy that enables us to reply to many of the objections to the unification. That is the ‘blame the relata strategy’ which claims that all the differences between grounding and causation come from relata rather than relation. I clarify this strategy by appealing to positionalism about relations, and present three arguments for this strategy. (...) Also, I argue that the difference between causal relata and grounding relata is that the former are distinct entities, while the latter are non-distinct. I suggest the ‘essential connections criterion’ to define ‘distinct’ and ‘non-distinct’, showing that grounding is partly grounded in essence in an indirect manner. Given the above strategy and criterion, we can see that there is no real objection to the unification of grounding and causation. (shrink)

Social phenomena—quite like mental states in the philosophy of mind—are often regarded as potential troublemakers from the start, particularly if they are approached with certain explanatory commitments, such as naturalism or social individualism, already in place. In this paper, we argue that such explanatory constraints should be at least initially bracketed if we are to arrive at an adequate non-biased description of social phenomena. Legitimate explanatory projects, or so we maintain, such as those of making the social world fit within (...) the natural world with the help of, e.g., collective intentionality, social individualism, and the like, should neither exclude nor influence the prior description of social phenomena. Just as we need a description of the mental that is not biased, for example, by (anti)physicalist constraints, we need a description of the social that is not biased, for example, by (anti)individualist or (anti)naturalist commitments. Descriptive social ontology, as we shall conceive of it, is not incompatible with the adoption of explanatory frameworks in social ontology; rather, the descriptive task, according to our conception, ought to be recognized as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. If social phenomena are, for example, to be reduced to nonsocial (e.g., psychological or physical) phenomena, we need first to understand clearly what the social candidates for the reduction in question are. While such descriptive or naive approaches have been influential in general metaphysics (see Fine 2017), they have so far not been prominent in analytic social ontology (though things are different outside of analytic philosophy, see esp. Reinach (1913). In what follows, we shall outline the contours of a descriptive approach by arguing, first, that description and explanation need to be distinguished as two distinct ways of engaging with social phenomena. Secondly, we defend the claim that the descriptive project ought to be regarded as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. We begin, in Section 2, by considering two different ways of engaging with mental phenomena: a descriptive approach taken by descriptive psychology and an explanatory approach utilized in analytic philosophy of mind. We take these two ways of approaching the study of the mind to be analogous to the distinction we want to draw in social ontology between a descriptive and an explanatory approach to the study of social phenomena. We consider next, in Section 3, how our approach compares to neighboring perspectives that are familiar to us from general metaphysics and philosophy more broadly, such as Aristotle’s emphasis on “saving the appearances”, Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, as well as Fine’s contrast between na¨ive and foundational metaphysics. In Section 4, we apply the proposed descriptive/explanatory distinction to the domain of social ontology and argue that descriptive social ontology ought to take precedence in the order of inquiry over explanatory social ontology. Finally, in Section 5, we consider and respond to several objections to which our account might seem to be susceptible. (shrink)

Dysmenorrhea, or menstrual pain, is regularly suffered by 45 to 95% of menstruating women. Despite its prevalence, and despite the philosophical importance of pain as a general phenomenon, dysmenorrhea has been all but completely overlooked in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. This paper aims at rectifying this situation. We single out three properties of what is often considered the paradigmatic case of painful experience, what we call injury-centered pains, and argue that dysmenorrhea does not have any of them, and hence (...) that it does not neatly conform to the injury-centered model of pain. This calls into question the centrality of the injury-centered model, and suggests novel research avenues within theoretical debates on affectivity. (shrink)

On the standard interpretation, if a person holds cyclical preferences, the person is prone to acting irrationally. I provide a different interpretation, tying cyclical preferences not to irrationality, but to indecision. According to this alternative understanding – coined the indecision interpretation – top cycles in a person’s preferences can be associated with a difficulty in justifying one’s choice. If an agent’s justificatory impasse persists despite attempts to resolve the cycle, the agent can be deemed undecided. The indecision interpretation is compatible (...) with the standard interpretation of such cycles as instances of irrationality. Yet indecision corresponds to a first-person, non-instrumental perspective on the problem, whereas irrationality usually corresponds to a third-person, instrumental perspective. Due to these differences, interpreting cycles in terms of indecision offers a novel conceptual perspective, pertinent both for explanatory purposes and for the aim of normative theorizing. (shrink)

Following Talia Mae Bettcher, many philosophers distinguish between ethical and epistemic conceptions of the first-person authority that we have over our gender identities. Rather than construing this authority as explained by our superior epistemic access to our own gender identities, many have argued that we should view this authority as explained by ethical obligations that we have towards others. But such views remain silent on what we ought to believe about others’ gender identities: when someone avows their gender identity, should (...) we believe them? Or is it enough to merely act as though we do? In this paper, I argue that mere action is not enough: we ought to believe what others say about their gender identities. I present several cases that motivate the claim that there is something distinctively wrong with merely ‘playing along’ with what another person says about their gender identity. I offer several answers for what explains why such cases involve wrongs. I argue that an adequate account of FPA cannot remain silent on belief but must instead take on an epistemic norm of FPA in addition to an ethical norm of FPA. (shrink)

Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, understanding the social obstacles to knowledge that epistemic vices can create. This is because responses to norm (...) violations are an important mechanism by which norms are upheld, and maintaining epistemic norms is crucial for our collective epistemic successes. This paper then identifies a new kind of vice, one which is bad precisely because of the way it undermines the epistemic norms that our blaming practices help maintain, and thus the benefits that said norms create. I call this vice epistemic evasiveness, and it concerns the attitude that one takes towards their own performance as an epistemic agent. Evasiveness is bad because it creates uncertainty about which agents are reliable, it prevents holders of this attitude from learning from their mistakes, and it signals to third parties that the norm is not being upheld, making them less likely to follow the norm. (shrink)

Those in the Gricean tradition take it that successful human communication features an audience who not only arrives at the intended content of the signal, but also recognizes the speaker’s intention that they do so. Some in this tradition have also argued that there are yet further conditions on communicative success, which rule out the possibility of communicating by luck. Supposing that both intention-recognition and some sort of anti-luck condition are correctly included in an analysis of human communication, this article (...) asks what the value of events satisfying these conditions is. I present a puzzle concerning the value of intention-recognition which is analogous to the Meno Problem in epistemology, but ultimately argue that this puzzle is solveable: the signaling-relevant value of intention recognition can be vindicated. However, I argue that the version of this puzzle that concerns the further proposed luck-proofing conditions on communication can not be answered. I argue therefore that communication, as analyzed by many, is no more valuable qua signal than a proper subset of its conditions. Human communication is thennot a uniquely valuable signaling event. (shrink)

The practice of scientific modelling often resorts to hypothetical, false, idealised, targetless, partial, generalised, and other types of modelling that appear to have at least partially non-actual targets. In this paper, I will argue that we can avoid a commitment to non-actual targets by sketching a framework where models are understood as having networks of possibilities as their targets. This raises a further question: what are the truthmakers for the modal claims that we can derive from models? I propose that (...) we can find truthmakers for the modal claims derived from models in actuality, even in the case of supposedly non-actual targets. I then put this framework to use by examining a case study concerning the modelling of superheavy elements. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider how the notion of metalinguistic negotiation interacts with various theories of generics. The notion of metalinguistic negotiation we discuss stems from previous work from two of us (Plunkett and Sundell). Metalinguistic negotiations are disputes in which speakers disagree about normative issues concerning language, such as issues about what a given word should mean in the relevant context, or which of a range of related concepts a word should express. In a metalinguistic negotiation, speakers argue about (...) such issues implicitly, via competing “metalinguistic” usages of terms. Here, we argue that some disputes involving generics are best thought of as metalinguistic negotiations, and that these cases can be illuminating for our more general theorizing about generics. Specifically, we argue that the “contextualist” theory of generics that one of us (Sterken) has developed in other work is best equipped to account for these metalinguistic negotiations, relative to other leading views of generics. We thus argue for a “package deal” view of generics: a view that combines Plunkett and Sundell’s account of metalinguistic negotiation with Sterken’s contextualist view of generics. (shrink)

Cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman and others have recently advanced an evolutionary debunking argument aimed at our perceptual beliefs in ordinary objects, based on the Interface Theory of Perception. In contrast with most recent criticisms of Interface Theory, which have targeted its characterizations of perception and veridicality, I raise a broad dialectical problem for Hoffman’s debunking argument. I show that the argument is self-defeating, and that responding to this problem by appealing to Universal Darwinism leads to a fatal dilemma for the (...) view. (shrink)

Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based (...) on evidence that a group can generate by performing internal promptings. Whereas these promptings are done mentally in individual self-knowledge, these promptings are done by interactions of group members in the collective case. The group can then acquire inferential self-knowledge of their vices based on the evidence generated by the interactions within the group. Groups thereby bring themselves into a position from which they can combat and change those vices intentionally. (shrink)

We argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or reject the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.

A sensibility is, on a rough first pass, an emotional orientation to the world. It shapes how things appear to us, evaluatively speaking. By transfiguring things’ evaluative appearances, a change in sensibility can profoundly alter one’s overall experience of the world. I argue that some forms of sensibility change entail (1) risking one’s knowledge of what experiences imbued with one’s prior sensibility were like, and (2) surrendering one’s grasp on the intelligibility of one’s prior emotional apprehensions. These costs have consequences (...) for Laurie Paul’s ‘problem of transformative experience.’ Paul has argued that when we are poised to become someone new, our inexperience generates problems for authentic choice about our own futures. By reckoning with the epistemic losses involved in sensibility change, I show that this problem must not be confined to novel transformations. Prior experience does not guarantee the knowledge or understanding necessary for choosing authentically (in Paul’s sense). If the problem Paul highlights is indeed a problem _at all,_ then, it is a still more pervasive and intractable one than it has been taken to be. (shrink)

Wilhelm (Forthcom Synth 199:6357–6369, 2021) has recently defended a criterion for comparing structure of mathematical objects, which he calls Subgroup. He argues that Subgroup is better than SYM \(^*\), another widely adopted criterion. We argue that this is mistaken; Subgroup is strictly worse than SYM \(^*\). We then formulate a new criterion that improves on both SYM \(^*\) and Subgroup, answering Wilhelm’s criticisms of SYM \(^*\) along the way. We conclude by arguing that no criterion that looks only to the (...) automorphisms of mathematical objects to compare their structure can be fully satisfactory. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam (Cassam, Extremism, Routledge, 2022a) and Paul Katsafanas (Katsafanas, Philosopher’s Imprint 19:1–20, 2019) have argued that fanaticism and extremism are morally and epistemically vicious. I suggest an alternative approach that: (i) explains what makes fanaticism and extremism vicious in the very many cases in which they are; but also (ii) allows for cases in which fanaticism and extremism aren’t vices and may even be liberatory-virtues. My hope is that this approach might serve as a resource for those in liberatory (...) struggles. (shrink)

The study of active matter systems demonstrates how interactions might co-constitute agential dynamics. Active matter systems are comprised of self-propelled independent entities which, en masse, take part in complex and interesting collective group behaviors at a far-from-equilibrium state (Menon, 2010 ; Takatori & Brady, 2015 ). These systems are modelled using very simple rules (Vicsek at al. 1995), which reveal the interactive nature of the collective behaviors seen from humble to highly complex entities. Here I show how the study of (...) active matter systems supports two related proposals regarding interaction and agency. First, I argue that the study of interactive dynamics in these systems evidences the utility of treating interaction as an ontological category (Longino, 2021 ) and challenges methodological individualism as the received explanatory primitive in the study of agency. Second, the methods used to research active matter systems demonstrate how a minimal approach to agency can scale up in studying interactive agential dynamics in more complex systems. The examples of coordination dynamics (Kelso, 2001 ) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007 ) are provided to show how understanding agency requires us to look beyond the individuals to the interactive agential dynamics that can guide, scaffold, or constrain their activity. (shrink)

Inductive reasoning aims at constructing rules and models of general applicability from a restricted set of observations. Induction is a keystone in natural sciences, and it influences diverse application fields such as engineering, medicine and economics. More generally, induction plays a major role in the way humans learn and operate in their everyday life. The level of reliability that a model achieves depends on how informative the observations are relative to the flexibility of the process by which the model is (...) constructed. When the process is articulated so that the model can incorporate descriptive details and subtleties, a large set of informative observations are required to reliably tune the model, whereas models obtained from simple procedures can be tuned with fewer observations. This article introduces the concept of “dominance”, which refers to the situation in which a reduced subset of observations suffices to reconstruct the model. A mathematical framework is presented to quantify the reliability of learning procedures as a function of the size of the subset of dominant observations. Although limited in scope, we believe that our study can contribute to the understanding of some fundamental mechanisms by which knowledge is generated from observations in inductive reasoning. (shrink)

This paper sets out to unpack the pragmatic structure of refusal—its illocutionary nature, success conditions, and normative effects. I argue that our ordinary concept of refusal captures a whole family of illocutions, comprising acts such as rejecting, declining, and the like, which share the property of being ‘negative second-turn illocutions’. Only _proper refusals_ (i.e. negative replies to permission requests), I submit, require speaker authority. I construe the ‘refusal family’ as a subclass of the directives-commissives intersection. After defending my view against (...) a number of potential objections, I highlight how a theoretically grounded analysis of refusal is not only of intrinsic value, but may also have significant moral and legal implications. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers have discussed the prospects for assessing values empirically, particularly given the ongoing threat of sexism and other oppressive values influencing science and society. Some advocates of such tests now champion a “values as evidence” approach, and they criticize Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism for not holding values to the same level of empirical scrutiny as other claims. In this paper, we defend contextual empiricism by arguing that many of these criticisms are based on mischaracterizations of Longino’s position, overstatements of (...) certain claims, and false dichotomies. Her contextual empiricism not only allows for the empirical support and disconfirmation of values, but Longino explicitly discusses when values can be empirically adjudicated and emphasizes the crucial role of the community for standards of evidence. We support contextual empiricism and elaborate a less direct account of “values as heuristics” by reviewing Longino’s theory of evidence and then using a case study from Elisabeth Lloyd on the biology of female orgasm, demonstrating the disconfirmation of androcentric values in evolutionary science. Within Longino’s and Lloyd’s contextual empiricism, values do not get treated as empirical evidence to be directly assessed by individuals, but rather values are heuristic tools to build models whose use can be validated or invalidated by communities based on their empirical fruitfulness in the logic and pragmatics of research questions in specific historical and cultural contexts. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam distinguishes between trivial and substantial cases of self-knowledge. At first sight, trivial cases are epistemically distinctive insofar as the agent needn't provide any sort of evidence to ground her claim to knowledge. Substantial cases of self-knowledge such as ‘I know I want to have a second child’ do not seem to bear this distinctive relation to evidence. I will argue, however, that substantial cases of self-knowledge are often epistemically distinctive and, to this end, I will challenge a crucial (...) assumption in the current debate about self-knowledge, namely: if a piece of self-knowledge is based on evidence, it must have been delivered by a detached, theoretical attitude toward oneself (_The Detachment Assumption_). My case against the Detachment Assumption combines a negative and a positive programme. Regarding the negative aspect, I will first present Cassam's case for Inferentialism; second, I will argue that this view about self-knowledge is at odds with the sort of self-improvement that he vindicates in his analysis of epistemic vices and, third, I will conclude that only by allowing for an engaged relation to evidence, can we make sense of that sort of self-improvement. Regarding the positive programme, I will first examine the sensitivity to the music that is specific of a graceful dancer and, on this basis, outline an attitude toward oneself that, despite involving evidence, is not detached or theoretical but engaged, so that it gives rise to a kind of substantial self-knowledge that is both transformative and epistemically distinctive. (shrink)

Naturalistic understandings that frame human experiences and differences as biological dysfunctions have been identified as a key source of epistemic injustice. Critics argue that those understandings are epistemically harmful because they obscure social factors that might be involved in people’s suffering; therefore, naturalistic understandings should be undermined. But those critics have overlooked the epistemic benefits such understandings can offer marginalised individuals. In this paper, I argue that the capacity of naturalistic understandings to obscure social factors does not necessarily cause epistemic (...) injustice and can even help people to avoid some epistemic injustice. I do this by considering how some individuals with bipolar disorder deploy the neurobiological understanding of their disorder, highlighting three functions it fills for them: explanation, disclamation, and decontestation. In performing these functions, the neurobiological understanding does marginalise alternative, social perspectives on bipolar disorder. However, this can be understood as a feature rather than a bug. By marginalising alternative explanations, the neurobiological understanding can help individuals with bipolar disorder resist epistemic injustice, including, for example, the trivialisation of their experiences. Given this, critics seeking to undermine naturalistic understandings of mental disorder and other experiences in the pursuit of epistemic justice themselves risk exacerbating epistemic injustice. (shrink)

In Prawitz’s semantics, the validity of an argument may be defined, either relatively to an atomic base which determines the meaning of the non-logical terminology, or relatively to the whole class of atomic bases, namely as logical validity. In the first case, which may be qualified as local, one has to choose whether validity of arguments is or not monotonic over expansions of bases, while in the second case, which may be qualified as global, one has to choose whether the (...) reduction functions which justify non-primitive inferences are or not base-depending. I claim that these oppositions enjoy some conceptual symmetries, and that these symmetries may be understood as putting restrictions on one’s choice both at the local and at the global level. This produces two different proof-theoretic semantics in line with Prawitz’s tenets. However, I also argue that the symmetries stem from a deeper interaction within Prawitz’s semantics, i.e. non-logical meanings vs interpretation of rules. This interaction is in turn based on some primitive ingredients which, when suitably combined, produce other two Prawitz-compatible readings. The four readings form a diagram where some order relations hold. I finally claim that this diagram is complete, namely that, if we combine the ingredients in ways other than those giving rise to the four readings above, we obtain nothing new, or nothing compatible with general semantic requirements. Thus, symmetries between the local and the global level, and interaction between non-logical meaning and interpretation of rules, produce a complete classification of potential Prawitzian semantics. (shrink)

In the 1940s, Gilbert Ryle argued that knowing how to do something is not just a matter of being well-regulated but also a matter of self-regulation. Ryle appears to have thought that know-how requires self-regulation in both a backward-looking and forward-looking sense, but both ideas run counter to ordinary intuitions about know-how. The basic idea behind self-regulation, undertaking trials and adjusting to feedback, is captured by the “law of effect.” Daniel Dennett has argued that the “law of effect will not (...) go away”. After updating Dennett’s “Tower of Generate-and-Test” through a broad survey of the empirical literature on learning, I identify a Rylean intuition about intelligence and argue that self-regulation in a forward-looking sense is necessary for know-how. (shrink)

In one of his meetings with members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein discusses Hermann Weyl’s brief conversion to intuitionism and criticizes his arguments against applying the law of the excluded middle to generalizations over the natural numbers. Like Weyl, however, Wittgenstein rejects the classical model theoretic conception of generality when it comes to infinite domains. Nonetheless, he disagrees with him about the reasons for doing so. This paper provides an account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Weyl that is based on his (...) differing understanding of what a general statement over infinite domains consists in. This difference in their conception of generality is argued to be central to the middle Wittgenstein’s overall stance on intuitionism as well. While Weyl (and other intuitionists) reject the law of the excluded middle on grounds of constructivity, Wittgenstein argues that general statements over infinite domains do not express propositions in the first place. The origin of this position as well as its consequences for contemporary debates on generality are further assessed. (shrink)

Common arguments for realism about phenomenal consciousness contend that this is a folk concept, with proponents expecting it to be lexicalised in ordinary language. In English, the word ‘experience’ is typically regarded as the best candidate. This predicts that ‘experience’ will be used to refer to mental states and episodes, not only in philosophical but also in ordinary discourse. We conduct a corpus study in order to assess this claim and to understand the actual use of the word in non-academic, (...) academic, and philosophical discourse. In non-academic discourse, uses that refer to knowledge or sources of knowledge, and to public events, are found to dominate. Uses that refer to mental states or episodes dominate only in the philosophy of mind (and not even in philosophy at large). (shrink)

It is argued that understanding is the norm of political discourse, and it is shown why political assertions can be epistemically problematic within a liberal democracy even when asserted knowledgeably.

I argue for the viability of one neglected way of developing supervenience-based objections to metaethical non-naturalism. This way goes through a principle known as ‘Hume’s Dictum’, according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. I challenge several objections to the Hume’s Dictum-based argument. In the course of doing so, I formulate and motivate modest and precise versions of Hume’s Dictum, illustrate how arguments employing these principles might proceed, and argue that the Hume’s Dictum argument enjoys some advantages (...) relative to other supervenience-based objections to non-naturalism. (shrink)

This paper argues against a particular version of the inference from the success of a scientific theory to the claim that the theory must be approximately true to some extent. The kind of success at issue is comparative, where one theory is more empirically successful than its rival if that theory predicts phenomena that are inexplicable or anomalous according to its rival. A theory that exhibits this kind of comparative success can be seen as thereby achieving empirical progress over its (...) rival. David Harker has developed a form of selective scientific realism based on the idea that this kind of success is evidence for the approximate truth of the parts of theories responsible for such success. Counterexamples to Harker’s position are cases in which a theory is more successful than its rival in virtue of containing parts that are not even approximately true. In order to identify some counterexamples to Harker’s position, this paper considers four historical cases that Greg Frost-Arnold has recently used to motivate a novel historical challenge to realism called the Problem of Misleading Evidence. This paper argues that these four cases are counterexamples to Harker’s position, and that they provide a strong reason to doubt his position and the kind of success-to-truth inference that he defends. (shrink)

This paper examines racial discrimination and algorithmic bias in predictive policing algorithms (PPAs), an emerging technology designed to predict threats and suggest solutions in law enforcement. We first describe what discrimination is in a case study of Chicago’s PPA. We then explain their causes with Broadbent’s contrastive model of causation and causal diagrams. Based on the cognitive science literature, we also explain why fairness is not an objective truth discoverable in laboratories but has context-sensitive social meanings that need to be (...) negotiated through democratic processes. With the above analysis, we next predict why some recommendations given in the bias reduction literature are not as effective as expected. Unlike the cliché highlighting equal participation for all stakeholders in predictive policing, we emphasize power structures to avoid hermeneutical lacunae. Finally, we aim to control PPA discrimination by proposing a governance solution—a framework of a social safety net. (shrink)

Naturalized metaphysics aims to establish justified metaphysical claims, where metaphysics is meant to carry its usual significance, while avoiding the traditional methods of metaphysics—a priori reasoning, conceptual analysis, intuitions, and common sense—which naturalized metaphysics argues are not epistemically probative. After offering an explication of what it means to do metaphysics, this paper argues that naturalized metaphysics, at the outset, is hospitable to doing metaphysics. The underdetermination of metaphysics by science, however, changes the picture. Naturalized metaphysics has to break this underdetermination, (...) but the criticism of the traditional methods of metaphysics leaves no resources with which to do so. Naturalized metaphysics must therefore be more restrictive than originally intended to ensure that some metaphysical features avoid underdetermination. In this restrictive naturalized metaphysics, however, metaphysicians are only left the task of surveying the opinions of scientists which, it is argued, does not qualify as doing metaphysics. Thus, to fulfill its promise to save metaphysics, naturalized metaphysics displaces the metaphysician. Furthermore, the attempt to re-employ them via the principle of naturalistic closure is argued to fail. Metaphysicians should therefore not be happier with naturalized metaphysics than they are with the more explicitly eliminative trends in contemporary metametaphysics, such as neo-Carnapian deflationism, despite the promise of naturalized metaphysics, likely to Carnap’s dismay, to deliver justified claims about ultimate reality. (shrink)

Uncontroversially, individuals exercise agency in acting; can we say the same about believing? This paper argues that subjects do indeed exercise agency over their beliefs and provides an account by which this is possible. On my picture, self-awareness is fundamental to the nature of doxastic agency. Drawing on work in the philosophy of action, I argue that subjects exercise agency in performing mental actions that form and sustain their beliefs, where they are aware of these actions as part of reasoning (...) and exercising agency over their beliefs. (shrink)

The omnipresence of the same basic equations, function forms, algorithms, and quantitative methods is one of the most spectacular characteristics of contemporary modeling practice. Recently, the emergence of the discussion of templates and template transfer has addressed this striking cross-disciplinary reach of certain mathematical forms and computational algorithms. In this paper, we develop a notion of a model template, consisting of its mathematical structure, ontology, prototypical properties and behaviors, focal conceptualizations, and the paradigmatic questions it addresses. We apply this notion (...) to three widely disseminated and powerful model templates: the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses, scale-free networks, and the Kuramoto model of synchronization. We argue that what appears to be an interdisciplinary model transfer between different domains turns out, from a broader perspective, to be the application of transdisciplinary model templates across a multitude of domains. We also point out a further feature of template-based modeling that so far has not been discussed: template entanglement. Such entanglement enhances and makes manifest the conceptual side of model templates. (shrink)

Several recent accounts of modeling have focused on the modal dimension of scientific inquiry. More precisely, it has been suggested that there are specific models and modeling practices that are best understood as being geared towards possibilities, a view recently dubbed modal modeling. But modalities encompass much more than mere possibility claims. Besides possibilities, modal modeling can also be used to investigate contingencies, necessities or impossibilities. Although these modal concepts are logically connected to the notion of possibility, not all models (...) are equal in their affordances for these richer modal inferences. This paper investigates the modal extent of selected models and argues that analyzing singular model-target pairings by themselves is typically not enough to explain their modal aptness or to identify the kinds of modalities they can be used to reason about. Furthermore, it is argued that some important concepts that are not explicitly modal - like biological robustness - can be understood modally through their relational nature to a background space of possibilities. In conclusion, it is suggested that the strategy of modal modeling is contrastive, situating particular possibilities in larger modal spaces and studying the structural relations within them. (shrink)

In a series of papers published in the sixties and seventies, Jaakko Hintikka, drawing upon Kant’s conception, defines an argument to be analytic whenever it does not introduce new individuals into the discussion and argues that there exists a class of arguments in polyadic first-order logic that are to be synthetic according to this sense. His work has been utterly overlooked in the literature. In this paper, I claim that the value of Hintikka’s contribution has been obscured by his formalisation (...) of the original definition. Therefore, I provide (i) a brief reconstruction of the historical framework of the problem and the revolutionary import of Hintikka’s contribution, (ii) a clarification of the most complicated steps of Hintikka’s elaboration of his insight, (iii) a criticism of several features that play a fundamental role in Hintikka’s formalisation and (iv) a selection from Hintikka’s own material of some valuable suggestions towards a clear and workable formalisation. As for the pars construens, I isolate in the approach of depth-bounded first-order logics (D'Agostino et al. 2021) an alternative formalisation of the notion of syntheticity as the introduction of new individuals in the reasoning, and I show that it is not affected by the same difficulties as Hintikka’s proposal. In so doing, I hope to have contributed to the realisation of the project of rehabilitating Kant’s analytic–synthetic distinction in the context of modern first-order logic with the purpose of showing, against the logical empiricist movement, that logic is not analytic. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss the problem of evaluating dynamic properties of the procedural rules that govern science. I will propose a novel framework for evaluating dynamic properties of such rules. This framework is based upon an analogy from New Institutional Economics. I will argue that the concept of ‘adaptive efficiency’, as it has been developed by Douglass North, solves a problem in economics that is analogous to the problem of evaluating dynamic properties of the procedural rules that govern (...) science. I will propose to apply the main ideas underlying this concept to Chrysostomos Mantzavinos’s theory of Explanatory Games. Based on these ideas, I will develop the concept of ‘explanatory efficiency’. This concept is meant to provide the means to evaluate the dynamic properties of Explanatory Games. I will argue that the proposed analogy also motivates more general applications of New Institutional Economics to traditional problems of philosophy of science. (shrink)

Trust and monitoring are traditionally antithetical concepts. Describing trust as a property of a relationship of reliance, we introduce a theory of trust and monitoring, which uses mathematical models based on two classes of functions, including _q_-exponentials, and relates the levels of trust to the costs of monitoring. As opposed to several accounts of trust that attempt to identify the special ingredient of reliance and trust relationships, our theory characterizes trust as a quantitative property of certain relations of reliance that (...) can be quantified and expressed as a scalar quantity. Our theory is applicable to both human–human and human–artificial agent interactions, as it is agnostic with respect to the concrete realization of trustworthiness properties, and is compatible with many views differing on which properties contribute to trust and trustworthiness. Finally, as our mathematical models make the quantitative features of trust measurable, they provide empirical studies on trust with a rigorous methodology for its measurement. (shrink)

Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...) _Pace_ Beck and Phillips, however, I argue a function of stimulus-control is insufficient for perceptual as opposed to cognitive status. One consideration in favour of such insufficiency, noted but (I argue) not convincingly rebutted by these theorists, concerns perpetually grounded demonstrative thought. Two other considerations trade on the fact that a function of stimulus-control can arise not from blind nature but intentional design or social institutions, where so-functioning processes may but need not be perceptual. I offer two cases where such processes are cognitive, viz. skilful play-by-play announcing of ongoing events, and voluntary visualizing of ongoing events under the guidance of apt play-by-play announcements, dubbed announcement-driven visualizing (ADV). The cognitive status of these three diverse phenomena cannot be explained by an absence of a perception-like representational format or content (for ADV has such) or by a presence of personal-level mental states causally mediating between stimuli and outputs (for perception has such). A bettter explanation invokes, I argue, the non-modular character of the generating process. (shrink)

Intuitively, proper referential extensions of psychological and moral terms exclude artifacts. Yet ordinary speakers commonly treat AI robots as moral patients and use psychological terms to explain their behavior. This paper examines whether this referential shift from the human domain to the AI domain entails semantic changes: do ordinary speakers literally consider AI robots to be psychological or moral beings? Three non-literalist accounts for semantic changes concerning psychological and moral terms used in the AI domain will be discussed: the technical (...) view (ordinary speakers express technical senses), the habit view (ordinary speakers subconsciously express ingrained social habits), and the emotion view (ordinary speakers express their own affective empathetic emotional states). I discuss whether these non-literalist accounts accommodate the results of relevant empirical experiments. The non-literalist accounts are shown to be implausible with respect to the ordinary use of agency-terms (e.g., “believe,” “know,” “decide,” etc.), and therefore I conclude that the concepts ordinary speakers express by agency-terms in reference to AI robots are similar to the concepts they express when applying the same terms to humans. When ordinary speakers extend emotion-terms and/or moral-patiency-terms to AI robots, however, I argue that semantic changes have taken place because ordinary speakers are in fact referring to their own affective empathetic emotional states rather than AI robots. This argument suggests that the judgments made by ordinary speakers regarding the proper referential extensions of emotion-terms and moral-patiency-terms are fallacious. (shrink)

There is a standard story told about the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy: it was a widespread, if not dominant, approach to philosophy in Great Britain in the aftermath of World War II up until the early 1960s, but with the development of systematic approaches to the study of language—formal semantic theories on one hand and Gricean pragmatics on the other—ordinary language philosophy more or less disappeared. In this paper we present quantitative evidence to evaluate the standard story (...) of the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy, building on the topic model of over 30,000 philosophy articles in Weatherson (2022). Using a combination of qualitative judgment and a topic-model-based measurement of similarity between individual articles, we find evidence that supports the first part of the standard story, according to which ordinary language philosophy arises in the 1940s, peaks between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, and then rapidly declines. But we argue that there is also evidence of a "new wave" of ordinary language philosophy in the early 21st century that defies the second part of the standard story. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity is strongly promoted in science policy across the world. It is seen as a necessary condition for providing practical solutions to many pressing complex problems for which no single disciplinary approach is adequate alone. In this article we model multi- and interdisciplinary research as an instance of collective problem solving. Our goal is to provide a basic representation of this type of problem solving and chart the epistemic benefits and costs of researchers engaging in different forms of cognitive coordination. (...) Our findings suggest that typical forms of interdisciplinary collaboration are unlikely to find optimal solutions to complex problems within short time frames and can lead to methodological conservatism. This provides some grounds for both reflecting on current science policy and envisioning more effective scientific practices with respect to interdisciplinary problem solving. (shrink)

Influence theory is a systematic study of formal models of the communicative influence of one person or group of people on another person or group. In that sense influence theory is an overarching philosophical discipline that includes aspects of decision theory and game theory as sub-disciplines as well as established models of de facto segregation, cultural change, opinion polarization, and epistemic networks. What we offer here is a structured outline of formal results that have been scattered across a range of (...) disciplinary contexts from mathematics, physics and computer science to economics and political science, supplemented with a number of new models, emphasizing their place within the philosophical framework of a general theory of influence. What such an outline offers, we propose, is the prospect of new and important cross-fertilizations and expansions in formal attempts to model the diverse patterns of communicative influence. (shrink)

Critical social ontology is any study of social ontology that is done in order to critique ideology or end social injustice. The goal of this paper is to outline what I call the fundamentality approach to critical social ontology. On the fundamentality approach, social ontologists are in the business of distinguishing between appearances and (fundamental) reality. Social reality is often obscured by the acceptance of ideology, where an ideology is a distorted system of beliefs that leads people to promote or (...) accept widespread social injustices. Social reality is also obscured in cases where ordinary thought and language simply is not perspicuous enough to represent the social objects, kinds, and structures that are central to understanding social injustice. In both cases, I argue that the critical social ontologist will benefit from using the tools and concepts of fundamental metaphysics. (shrink)

Expressions of emotion pose a serious challenge to the view that we perceive other people’s emotions directly. If we must perceive expressions in order to perceive emotions, then it is only ever the expressions that we are directly aware of, not emotions themselves. This paper develops a new response to this challenge by drawing an analogy between expressions of emotion and perceptual media. It is through illumination and sound, the paradigmatic examples of perceptual media, that we can see and hear (...) objects around us. Instead of screening these objects from view, however, they enable our perception while being transparent to us. With reference to perceptual constancy and transparency, I show how expressions show up in our experience of emotions in a surprisingly similar way. Given this, we can understand expressions as the media _through_ which we perceive emotions and overcome the above challenge to an otherwise attractive view. (shrink)

The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that _prima facie_ look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conception by suggesting that the existing analyses of the (...) phenomenon overlook a non-obvious category of hearers whom the speakers of bald-faced lies intend to deceive. Those hearers are institutions represented by the people involved, such as courts or secret police. We also criticize two recent rival accounts (Jessica Keiser’s and Daniel Harris’s) that attempt to save the traditional conception by saying that some bald-faced lies are not assertions, because they are conventional—rather than illocutionary—speech acts. (shrink)

In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in _Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik_ (1884) and the status of cross-sortal identity claims with side glances at _Grundgesetze der Arithmetik_ (vol. I 1893, vol. II 1903). As far as I can see, this topic has not yet been discussed in the context of _Grundlagen_. I show why Frege’s strategy in the case of the projected definitions of real and complex numbers in (...) _Grundlagen_ is modelled on his definitional introduction of cardinal numbers in two steps, tentatively via a contextual definition and finally and definitively via an explicit definition. I argue that the strategy leaves a few important questions open, in particular one relating to the status of the envisioned abstraction principles for the real and complex numbers and another concerning the proper handling of cross-sortal identity claims. (shrink)

A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in recourse to the possibility of demonstrative concepts, his reply has engendered a plethora of further objections and is widely considered inadequate. I believe that McDowell’s critics underestimate the true force of his reply because they tend to read unrecognized empiricist (...) presuppositions into his account of experience. To show this, I introduce a new hylomorphic reading of McDowell’s account of experience and argue that the objections to his reply all rest on a specific empiricist assumption, which is untenable because it conflates the form of experience with its content. Consequently, conceptualism so understood can resist all of these objections, as I attempt to show by systematizing and answering them. (shrink)

Philosophy of Medicine has for a long time been preoccupied with analyzing the concepts of health, disease and illness. Relatively speaking, the concept of medicine itself has received very little attention. This paper is a contribution to the relatively neglected debate about the nature of medicine. Building on the work of Alex Broadbent (Broadbent, 2018a, b), Chadwin Harris (Harris, 2018) and Thaddeus Metz (Metz, 2018), in this paper I question the persuasiveness of Broadbent’s account of the “core business” of medicine, (...) The Inquiry Thesis, and propose an alternative: a revised version of The Curative Thesis, which I coin The Best Available Intervention Thesis. Crudely, this suggests that Medicine is the sustained and organised effort to determine and prescribe the best available treatment (curative or preventative) for patients. (shrink)

Longtermists claim that what we ought to do is mainly determined by how our actions might affect the very long-run future. A natural objection to longtermism is that these effects may be nearly impossible to predict — perhaps so close to impossible that, despite the astronomical importance of the far future, the expected value of our present actions is mainly determined by near-term considerations. This paper aims to precisify and evaluate one version of this epistemic objection to longtermism. To that (...) end, I develop two simple models for comparing ‘longtermist’ and ‘neartermist’ interventions, incorporating the idea that it is harder to make a predictable difference to the further future. These models yield mixed conclusions: if we simply aim to maximize expected value, and don’t mind premising our choices on minuscule probabilities of astronomical payoffs, the case for longtermism looks robust. But on some prima facie plausible empirical worldviews, the expectational superiority of longtermist interventions depends heavily on these ‘Pascalian’ probabilities. So the case for longtermism may depend either on plausible but non-obvious empirical claims or on a tolerance for Pascalian fanaticism. (shrink)

We investigate the impact of informal arguments on judgments about thought experiment cases in light of Deutsch and Cappelen’s mischaracterization view, which claims that philosophers’ case judgments are primarily based on arguments and not intuitions. If arguments had no influence on case judgments, this would seriously challenge whether they are, or should be, based on arguments at all—and not on other cognitive sources instead, such as intuition. In Experiment 1, we replicated Wysocki’s (Rev Philos Psychol 8(2):477–499, 2017) pioneering study on (...) a Gettier-style case, and we confirmed that the informal arguments used by him had no significant effect. However, we also included an improved argument for ascribing knowledge, which did have a significant effect even in Wysocki’s original design. We therefore followed up with Experiment 2 on three Gettier-style cases, where we used a more natural dialogical format for presenting both case descriptions and informal arguments. Overall, we found a clear impact of prima facie good pro and con arguments on case judgments. The issue of argument impact is thus no obstacle to arguing about thought experiments. (shrink)

Incorporating normality ascriptions into counterfactual theories of causation was supposed to handle isomorphs. It doesn’t—conjoining isomorphs can produce cases that such ascriptions cannot resolve.

In this article we set out to understand the significance of the process matrix formalism and the quantum causal modelling programme for ongoing disputes about the role of causation in fundamental physics. We argue that the process matrix programme has correctly identified a notion of ‘causal order’ which plays an important role in fundamental physics, but this notion is weaker than the common-sense conception of causation because it does not involve asymmetry. We argue that causal order plays an important role (...) in grounding more familiar causal phenomena. Then we apply these conclusions to the causal modelling programme within quantum foundations, arguing that since no-signalling quantum correlations cannot exhibit causal order, they should not be analysed using classical causal models. This resolves an open question about how to interpret fine-tuning in classical causal models of no-signalling correlations. Finally we observe that a quantum generalization of causal modelling can play a similar functional role to standard causal reasoning, but we emphasize that this functional characterisation does not entail that quantum causal models offer novel explanations of quantum processes. (shrink)

The austere view of nonsense says that the source of nonsense is not a violation of the rules of logical syntax, but nonsense is always due to a lack of meaning in one of the components of a sentence. In other words, the necessary and sufficient condition for nonsensicality is that no meaning has been assigned to a constituent in a sentence. The austere conception is the key ingredient of the resolute reading of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that presents a therapeutical interpretation (...) of the work, and rejects a possibility of conveying some ineffable truths by means of nonsensical sentences. In this paper, I defend the austere view against the most important objections. Firstly, I discuss textual sources for ascribing to Wittgenstein the austere view that have not been sufficiently thoroughly discussed yet. Next, I indicate that the apparent occurrence of words out of the context of a sentence on lists of verbs and in definitions is not in conflict with the version of the context principle recommended by austere theorists, since this argument does not sufficiently take into account the distinction between sign and symbol. Furthermore, I argue that the austere conception and the principle of compositionality are jointly tenable, for the former view does not exclude the existence of syntactic and semantic rules, but only shows that they are recognizable conditionally. Finally, I indicate that the austere view of nonsense should be seen as a viable option by a contemporary theorist of nonsense, for it helps us to avoid making controversial assumptions about the nature of meaning and content. (shrink)

When we see or hear a spontaneous emotional expression, we usually immediately, effortlessly, and often correctly interpret it to mean happiness, sadness, or some other emotion as well as what this emotion is about. How do we do that? In this article, I evaluate how useful the concepts of natural meaning and probabilistic meaning are when it comes to explaining how we and other animals interpret emotional signs displayed without communicative intentions. I argue that Grice’s notion of natural meaning, because (...) it is a factive relation, is too restrictive for this purpose. I then present the notion of probabilistic meaning. The latter seems adequate for analyzing our ability to interpret non-communicative emotional signs, but it faces several difficulties when it comes to analyzing how we and other animals interpret emotional _signals_, i.e. signs that have the function to communicate emotional information. I present three of these difficulties. En passant, I suggest that a teleosemantic notion may be better suited for these challenges. (shrink)

We define two maps, one map from the set of conditional probability systems (CPS’s) onto the set of lexicographic probability systems (LPS’s), and another map from the set of LPS’s with full support onto the set of CPS’s. We use these maps to establish a relationship between strong belief (defined on CPS’s) and assumption (defined on LPS’s). This establishes a relationship at the abstract level between these two widely used notions of belief in an extended probability-theoretic setting.

In his “Common knowledge” (2016) and _The Transmission of Knowledge_ (2021), John Greco proposes a novel account of hinge propositions. Central to it is the idea that they are items of common knowledge – that is, of knowledge that is already present in the system, freely available to anyone, without having to figure it out by oneself or having to be taught it by others. As such, they are not subject to any quality control at all. Furthermore, they figure in (...) a subject’s cognitive economy as items of procedural, mostly tacit knowledge, which is operative in the execution of actions and various cognitive tasks. After introducing the basics of Greco’s account, I consider it from a systematic and historical perspective and argue that, while instructive, it is wanting in several respects. Whereas some, among the myriad hinges Wittgenstein considers in _On Certainty_ (1969), may be known, there is no need to make them the content of a different kind of knowledge. Furthermore, we cannot have (evidential) justification and, _a fortiori_, knowledge of at least some other propositions that Wittgenstein considered as hinges. In passing, I also show that Greco’s account aligns much more with G. E. Moore’s ideas about the epistemic status of his truisms in “A defence of common sense” (1925) and the premises of his celebrated “Proof of an external world” (1939), than with Wittgenstein’s account of hinges and their epistemic significance in _On Certainty_. (shrink)

Counterfactual reasoning has been used to account for many aspects of scientific reasoning. More recently, it has also been used to account for the scientific practice of modeling. Truth in a model is truth in a situation considered as counterfactual. When we reason with models, we reason with counterfactuals. Focusing on selected models like Bohr’s atom model or models of population dynamics, I present an account of how the imaginative development of a counterfactual supposition leads us from reality to interesting (...) model assumptions; how it guides our reasoning from these assumptions to interesting consequences for the model scenario via counterfactual entailment; and how it leads us back to conclusions on real target phenomena. (shrink)

As an object of philosophical study, language is typically considered as an abstract object rather than a lived phenomenon that comes with rich and varied phenomenology. And yet our modes of engaging with language are complex and many. The first goal of this paper is to illustrate this variety by looking at some of the linguistic modalities and forms of communication. The second goal is to suggest that at least in some specific philosophical debates, language and communication should be investigated (...) in the context of the various linguistic modalities and forms of communication. This will be done by considering how attention to some of the linguistic modalities and forms of communication may affect philosophical debates concerning: the nature of words, language and linguistic understanding, as well as the relation between linguistic utterances and their sources. (shrink)

The standard principle of expert deference says that conditional on the expert’s credence in a proposition _A_ being _x_, your credence in _A_ ought to be _x_. The so-called Adams conditionalization is an attractive update rule in situations when learning experience prompts a shift in your conditional credences. In this paper, I show that, except in some trivial situations, when your prior conditional credence in _A_ obeys the standard principle of expert deference and then is revised by Adams conditionalization in (...) response to a shift in your conditional credence for a proposition _B_ given _A_, your posterior conditional credence in _A_ cannot continue to obey that principle, on pain of inconsistency. I explain why this tension between Adams conditionalization and the standard principle of expert deference is puzzling and why the option of rejecting the update rule appears problematic. Finally, I suggest that in order to avoid this inconsistency, we should abandon the standard principle of expert deference and think of an expert’s probabilistic opinion as a constraint on your posterior credence distribution rather than your prior one. (shrink)

The paper proposes a dialectical approach to our understanding of the relation between teleology and mechanism. This approach is dialectical both in form and content. In _form_, it proposes a contemporary interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysical account of teleology. This account is grounded in a dialectical methodology, which consists in scrutinizing the inherent limitations of a theoretical position that lead it to suppress itself and evolve into a better one. I apply the same methodology to the function debate. For Hegel, teleology (...) can be understood in three main variants, which can be fruitfully mapped onto the three main positions in the function debate, the key conceptual distinction being whether teleological principles are understood as extrinsic or intrinsic. When it comes to autonomous systems, i.e. systems that embody the regime of _Geist_, extrinsic functionality must be grounded in intrinsic functionality. My approach is dialectical also in _content_, insofar as it concludes that intrinsic functional ascriptions rely on the relation of co-determination between the parts and the whole of a system, as well as between the system and its environment. (shrink)

This is the introduction of the Synthese Topical Collection Epistemological Issues in Neurodivergence and Atypical Cognition written by the guest editors. In order to justify the relevance of the topic, a minimum context is given on the notions of neurodivergence as well as some brief remarks on the neurodiversity advocacy movement. This serves as a basis to establish the importance of increasing the scope of epistemology to include issues that do not fit in the descriptions of typical subjects and cognitive (...) processes. (shrink)

I argue that ontologies of words should engage with the emergence of lexical communication in the deep history of our line. It may seem that the evolutionary origins of words are orthogonal to the analytical project of establishing the defining features of wordhood, and that an adequate ontology of words requires nothing more than an observation of the properties of modern languages. I suggest instead that models of the initial stages of language evolution can offer valuable insights into the matter. (...) There is consensus that lexical communication was an early achievement in the phylogeny of our language capacities, and that words became available to our ancestors before the maturation of other components of the grammar. At the beginning of their evolutionary trajectory, words are thus likely to have been significantly different from the vocabulary items of contemporary languages. Careful appreciation of such differences could be instrumental to a complete theory of the hallmarks of wordhood. (shrink)

Capacitism is the view that capacities come first in epistemological theorising: they are explanatorily basic and key epistemic phenomena are to be analysed in terms of capacities. This paper develops a problem for capacitism and outlines a motivated way of solving it.

The paper defends an account of the context-sensitivity of norms that draws on the resources of counterfactual conditionals. The account combines two assumptions: the assumption that permission is rule-abiding performance in some contextually relevant situations; and the assumption that the contextually relevant situations are picked out by the mechanism that selects the possible worlds relevant for the evaluation of counterfactual conditionals. The account explains the non-monotonicity of permissions and solves a puzzle, raised by Timothy Williamson, about the seeming failure of (...) permissions to distribute over conjunction. In the domain of epistemic norms, the account solves an analogous puzzle and deals successfully with so-called blindspot propositions. (shrink)

Moral realism is often taken to have common sense and initial appearances on its side. Indeed, by some lights, common sense and initial appearances underlie all the central positive arguments for moral realism. We offer a kind of debunking argument, taking aim at realism’s common sense standing. Our argument differs from familiar debunking moves both in its empirical assumptions and in how it targets the realist position. We argue that if natural selection explains the objective phenomenology of moral deliberation and (...) judgement, then this undermines arguments from that phenomenology. This results in a simpler, and in some ways more direct, challenge to realism. It is also less vulnerable to the main objections that have been leveled against such arguments. If accepted, our conclusion should make a real difference to the dialectic in this area. It means that neither realism nor its denial is the default, to-be-refuted, position. (shrink)

Ad hoc concepts feature prominently in lexical pragmatics. A speaker can use a word or phrase to communicate an ad hoc concept that is different from the lexically encoded concept and the hearer can construct the intended ad hoc concept pragmatically during utterance comprehension. I argue that some philosophical concepts have origins as ad hoc concepts, and such concepts pose a challenge for experimental philosophy regarding these concepts. To illustrate this, I consider philosophers’ ‘what-it’s-like’-concepts and experimental philosophy of consciousness.

The conventional wisdom declares that evolution is not goal directed, that teleological considerations play no part in our understanding of evolutionary trends. Here I argue that, to the contrary, under a current view of teleology, field theory, most evolutionary trends would have to be considered goal directed to some degree. Further, this view is consistent with a modern scientific outlook, and more particularly with evolutionary theory today. Field theory argues that goal directedness is produced by higher-level fields that direct entities (...) contained within them to behave persistently and plastically, that is, returning them to a goal-directed trajectory following perturbations (persistence) and directing them to a goal-directed trajectory from a large range of alternative starting points (plasticity). The behavior of a bacterium climbing a chemical food gradient is persistent and plastic, with guidance provided by the external “food field,” the chemical gradient. Likewise, an evolutionary trend that is produced by natural selection is a lineage behaving persistently and plastically under the direction of its local ecology, an “ecological field.” Trends directed by selection-generated boundaries, thermodynamic gradients, and certain internal constraints, would also count as goal directed. In other words, most of the causes of evolutionary trends that have been proposed imply goal directedness. However, under field theory, not all trends are goal directed. Examples are discussed. Importantly, nothing in this view suggests that evolution is guided by intentionality, at least none at the level of animal intentionality. Finally, possible implications for our thinking about evolutionary directionality in the history of life are discussed. (shrink)

Vice epistemology studies the qualities of individuals and collectives that undermine the creation, sharing, and storing of knowledge. There is no settled understanding of which epistemic vices exist at the collective level. Yet understanding which collective epistemic vices exist is important, both to facilitate research on the antecedents and effects of collective epistemic vice, and to advance philosophical discussions such as whether some collective epistemic vices are genuinely collective. I propose an empirical approach to identifying epistemic vices in corporations, analyzing (...) a large dataset of online employee reviews. The approach has parallels to the methodology for identifying the big-five personality traits. It surfaces epistemic vices that are attributed to corporations by its own members and reduces the number of vices to the minimum required to describe differences between corporations. This approach yields a new taxonomy of epistemic vices for corporations. While two vices identified have close correlates in the existing literature, four others have not been identified at all or only in aspects. Two of these vices are ‘genuinely’ collective in the sense that they can only be attributed to collectives. (shrink)

John Greco (2020) sets out to create a unified virtue-theoretic account of knowledge generation and transmission in his book The Transmission of Knowledge. One of the advantages of his view is that it can defend the achievement view from a known strand of counterexamples. To accomplish that, he relies on joint agency being essential to knowledge transmission. Joint agency can be characterized as a sort of interdependent and interactive cooperation between speaker and hearer that share an intention to transmit knowledge. (...) This paper introduces the phenomenon of unwanted knowledge transmission which shows that joint agency, as Greco presents it, is not essential to knowledge transmission. Four types of unwanted knowledge transmissions will be introduced that pose threats to Greco’s account by showing that shared intention, a key characteristic of joint agency, is not present in all instances of knowledge transmission. Finally, some potential ways to defend Greco’s view will be considered and discussed. (shrink)

Recalcitrant emotions, such as fear of flying, are emotions that persist even though they are in tension with the emoter’s considered belief. A widely accepted argument against cognitivist theories of emotion holds that recalcitrant emotions show that emotions are more like sensory states than like thoughts or beliefs. I show that this argument does not succeed: Emotions are usually sensitive to our changing beliefs in a way that is more akin to cognitive states than to sensations. Moreover, empirical evidence strongly (...) suggests that beliefs sometimes behave much like recalcitrant emotions do. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have argued that epistemic diversity is an asset for the production of scientific knowledge, guarding against the effects of biases, among other advantages. The growing privatization of scientific research, on the contrary, has raised important concerns for philosophers of science, especially with respect to the growing sources of biases in research that it seems to promote. Recently, Holman and Bruner ( 2017 ) have shown, using a modified version of Zollman ( 2010 ) social network model, that (...) an industrial selection bias can emerge in a scientific community, without corrupting any individual scientist, if the community is epistemically diverse. In this paper, we examine the strength of industrial selection using a reinforcement learning model, which simulates the process of industrial decision-making when allocating funding to scientific projects. Contrary to Holman and Bruner’s model, in which the probability of success of the agents when performing an action is given a priori, in our model the industry learns about the success rate of individual scientists and updates the probability of success on each round. The results of our simulations show that even without previous knowledge of the probability of success of an individual scientist, the industry is still able to disrupt scientific consensus. In fact, the more epistemically diverse the scientific community, the easier it is for the industry to move scientific consensus to the opposite conclusion. Interestingly, our model also shows that having a random funding agent seems to effectively counteract industrial selection bias. Accordingly, we consider the random allocation of funding for research projects as a strategy to counteract industrial selection bias, avoiding commercial exploitation of epistemically diverse communities. (shrink)

Scoring rules measure the deviation between a credence assignment and reality. Probabilism holds that only those credence assignments that satisfy the axioms of probability are rationally admissible. Accuracy-based arguments for probabilism observe that given certain conditions on a scoring rule, the score of any non-probability is dominated by the score of a probability. The conditions in the arguments we will consider include propriety: the claim that the expected accuracy of _p_ is not beaten by the expected accuracy of any other (...) credence _c_ by the lights of _p_ if _p_ is a probability. I argue that if we think through how a non-probabilist can respond to pragmatic arguments for probabilism, we will expect the non-probabilist to accept a condition _stronger_ than propriety for the same reasons that the probabilist gives for propriety, but this stronger condition is incompatible with the other conditions that the probabilist needs to run the accuracy argument. This makes it unlikely for the probabilist’s argument to be compelling. (shrink)

Reasoning about equilibria in normal form games involves the study of players’ incentives to deviate unilaterally from any profile. In the case of large anonymous games, the pattern of reasoning is different. Payoffs are determined by strategy distributions rather than strategy profiles. In such a game each player would strategise based on expectations of what fraction of the population makes some choice, rather than respond to individual choices by other players. A player may not even know how many players there (...) are in the game. Logicising such strategisation involves many challenges as the set of players is potentially unbounded. This suggests a logic of quantification over player variables and modalities for player deviation, but such a logic is easily seen to be undecidable. Instead, we propose a propositional modal logic using player types as names and implicit quantification over players. With modalities for player deviation and transitive closure, the logic can be used to specify game equilibrium and interesting patterns of reasoning in large games. We show that the logic is decidable and present a complete axiomatisation of the valid formulas. (shrink)

Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version of the One Object View (...) that is not couched in terms of Numerical Identity and, consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case is based on a sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the very same things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly) under the mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of sensory intuition are appearances; presented under the (possible) mode of intellectual intuition are things in themselves. This way of construing appearances and things in themselves preserves the core insight of the One Object View. At the same time, as it does not entail any isomorphism between appearances and things in themselves, it does not clash against Noumenal Ignorance. (shrink)

In his paper ‘The logic of temporal discourse’, Pavel Tichý pointed out that contemporary systems of logic were unable to sufficiently formalise tenses. He therefore suggested temporal specification in transparent intensional logic (TIL), a system of logic that he developed. Discussing contemporary systems of logic, Tichý also took into account the system of Arthur N. Prior, who developed the first systems of modern temporal logic, and his criticism was also addressed to Prior. Tichý only focused, however, on Prior’s early systems (...) of temporal logic. Patrick Blackburn recently raised the awareness that Prior also developed systems of hybrid logic in his latest periods. From the point of view of temporal specification, this system is particularly interesting as the system has greater expressive power than Prior’s early systems of temporal logic. It could also consequently deal with the problematic specifications of tenses that Pavel Tichý pointed out. It is not only the formal criterion that make Tichý and Prior’s approach suitable for comparison. Both logicians shared similar views on time and logic. All these convictions also influenced their systems of logic. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the temporal propositions that Tichý introduced as problematic could be formalised in Prior’s hybrid temporal logic. I will also compare formalisations in TIL and hybrid logic and Tichý and Prior’s views that influenced their systems of logic. (shrink)

Prima facie, accounts of scientific representation should illuminate how models support justified surrogative reasoning while remaining neutral on the nature of inductive inference. We argue that doing both at once is harder than it first appears. Accounts like “DEKI,” which distinguish justified and unjustified surrogative inferences by appealing to a distinction between derivational and factual correctness, cannot accommodate non-formal, non-rule-based accounts of inference such as John Norton’s material theory of induction. In contrast, a recent expressivist-inferentialist account appears compatible with material (...) inference, but at the cost of abandoning inductive neutrality. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal Duncan Pritchard responds to an objection to the modal account of risk pressed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach ( 2020 ). In this paper, I expand upon the objection and argue that it still stands. I go on to consider a more general question raised by this exchange – whether risk is ‘objective’, or whether it is something that varies from one perspective to another.

Two recent contributions have discussed, and disagreed, over whether so-called toy models that attempt to represent dispositions have the power to explain. In this paper, I argue that neither of these positions is completely correct. Toy models may accurately represent, satisfy the veridicality condition, yet fail to provide how-actually explanations. This is because some dispositions remain unmanifested. Instead, the models provide how-possibly explanations; they _possibly_ explain.

Empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM) has become a dominant research style in the twenty-first century. EIPM relies on empirical results in various ways. However, the extant literature lacks an empirical description of how EIPM philosophers rely on empirical results. Moreover, though EIPM is essentially a form of cross-disciplinary research, it has not been analyzed as cross-disciplinary research so far. We aim to fill the above two gaps in the literature by producing quantitative and qualitative descriptions of EIPM as a kind (...) of cross-disciplinary research. Our descriptions aim to enable metaphilosophers to evaluate EIPM methodologically and epistemically. Our analyses use co-citation and categorization analyses informed by the literature on interdisciplinarity. We present five sets of descriptions and identify the three most common types of cross-disciplinary interactions in EIPM. The resulting descriptions enable us to locate two metaphilosophical challenges for EIPM philosophers. One concerns how they should incorporate empirical results in different disciplinary contexts, and the other concerns which theoretical virtue(s) they should aim for when tinkering with scientific theories. (shrink)

There’s a general assumption that teleology and function do not exist in inanimate nature. Throughout biology, it is generally taken as granted that teleology (or teleonomy) and functions are not only unique to life, but perhaps even a defining quality of life. For many, it’s obvious that rocks, water, and the like, are not teleological, nor could they possibly have stand-alone functions. This idea - that teleology and function are unique to life - is the target of this paper. I (...) begin with an overview of McShea’s field theoretic account of teleology. I start with the field theoretic account because it presents a promising analysis of teleological systems. It is promising because, in not making any assumptions about life’s special status in teleological systems, it avoids counterexamples that have problematized other accounts. I then consider some of the prominent efforts that have been made to attempt to avoid ascribing functions or teleology to some form of inanimate nature. In my assessment, none of the efforts are successful. I conclude by offering mineral evolution as a case study to show how inanimate nature can be both teleological and functional. The evolution of mineral species reveals that teleology and function extend to inanimate nature, and that teleology and function come in degrees. (shrink)

The bridges of Königsberg case has been widely cited in recent philosophical discussions on scientific explanation as a potential example of a structural explanation of a physical phenomenon. However, when discussing this case, different authors have focused on two different versions, depending on what they take the explanandum to be. In one version, the explanandum is the _failure_ of a given individual in performing an Eulerian walk over the bridge system. In the other version, the explanandum is the _impossibility_ of (...) performing an Eulerian walk over the bridges. The goal of this paper is to show that only the latter version amounts to a real case of a structural explanation. I will also suggest how to fix the first version, and show how my remarks apply to other purported cases of structural explanations. (shrink)

This essay tackles head on the argument that sees an inherent paradox in the autonomy of the will as the ground for the authority of the fundamental practical norms. It points out that only on reductive understandings of the autonomy of the will can this idea be qualified as paradoxical, thereby yielding outcomes that either contradict their premises or present autonomy under a false guise. With that done, it will proceed to offer a conception of the autonomy of the will (...) which is not vulnerable to the paradox, and which may therefore be equipped to rest the fundamental practical norms on solid ground. Throughout this discussion, I will rely on constitutivism about practical reasons to specifically defend the twofold conclusion that (a) the paradox of autonomy can be avoided and that, relatedly, (b) if autonomy is properly conceptualised, it is fully equipped and well positioned to ground the authority of the fundamental practical norms. (shrink)