18 found

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  1.  15
    Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2).
    The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to (...)
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  2.  1
    Schmidtz on Moral Recognition Rules: A Critique.Thomas M. Besch - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):138-153.
    David Schmidtz's reconstruction of morality advances Hart-type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart-type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his reconstruction with an unresolved problem of parochiality. He reconstructs morality as (...)
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  3. McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey Test.John Cantwell, Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):154-168.
    Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p, then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue (...)
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  4.  3
    Who Should Be Author?Sven Ove Hansson - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):99-102.
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  5.  2
    Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
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  6.  42
    Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.
    The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences.
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  7. Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2).
    Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant, namely, “entitlement”, which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as “epistemic conservatism”. It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard truth-conducive justification, (...)
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  8.  4
    Why Do Irrational Beliefs Mimic Science? The Cultural Evolution of Pseudoscience.Stefaan Blancke, Maarten Boudry & Massimo Pigliucci - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):78-97.
    Why do irrational beliefs adopt the trappings of science, to become what is known as “pseudoscience”? Here, we develop and extend an epidemiological framework to map the factors that explain the form and the popularity of irrational beliefs in scientific garb. These factors include the exploitation of epistemic vigilance, the misunderstanding of the authority of science, the use of the honorific title of “science” as an explicit argument for belief, and the phenomenon of epistemic negligence. We conclude by integrating the (...)
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  9.  6
    Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):29-52.
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...)
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  10.  2
    The Paradox of Useful Research.Sven Ove Hansson - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):1-3.
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  11.  2
    The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):4-28.
    We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes (...)
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  12.  17
    From Falsemakers to Negative Properties.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):53-77.
    I shall argue in this article that, if we need to admit of negative facts in our ontology as falsemakers of false propositions, then it is plausible to accept that there are also negative properties conceived of as modes. After having briefly recalled the falsemaker argument, I shall explore five different alternative interpretations of negative facts and I shall demonstrate that each alternative – except for the one involving negative properties – is affected by some problems. Later on, I shall (...)
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  13. Liberty Through Political Representation and Rights Recognition.Christopher J. Allsobrook - 2017 - Theoria 64 (150).
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  14. Apartheid of Thought.Camilla Boisen & Matthew C. Murray - 2017 - Theoria 64 (150).
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  15. ’Tis but a Habit in an Unconsolidated Democracy.Anthony Lawrence A. Borja - 2017 - Theoria 64 (150).
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  16.  1
    Review Essay.Marta Nunes da Costa - 2017 - Theoria 64 (150).
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  17.  1
    Ideas, Powers and Politics.Hamilton Lawrence - 2017 - Theoria 64 (150).
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  18. The Unfeasibly Narrow Rawlsian Interpretation of Fraternity.Joan Vergés-Gifra - 2017 - Theoria 64 (150):1-18.
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