Theory and Decision

ISSNs: 0040-5833, 1573-7187

6 found

View year:

  1.  1
    Asymmetric guessing games.Zafer Akin - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):637-676.
    This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the behavior of asymmetric players in guessing games. The asymmetry is created by introducing r>1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$r>1$$\end{document} replicas of one of the players. Two-player and restricted N-player cases are examined in detail. Based on the model parameters, the equilibrium is either unique in which all players choose zero or mixed in which the weak player (r=1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$r=1$$\end{document}) imitates the strong (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  5
    On stability of economic networks.Hamid Beladi, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi & Nicholas S. P. Tay - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):677-691.
    In the spirit of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944), we introduce a notion of network stability. We study the structure of stable economic networks and their associated stable payoff allocations by analyzing the conditions under which complete networks and star networks (both with desirable property of inclusiveness) are stable. We also address conditions for existence and uniqueness of stable set of networks.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  2
    Prospect theory in multiple price list experiments: further insights on behaviour in the loss domain.Géraldine Bocquého, Julien Jacob & Marielle Brunette - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):593-636.
    In the theoretical description of prospect theory, distinct sets of parameters can control the curvature of the value function and the shape of the probability weighting function. There is one for the gain domain and one for the loss domain. However, in most estimations, behaviour over losses is assumed to perfectly reflect behaviour over gains, through a unique set of parameters. We examine the consequences of relaxing this simplifying assumption in the context of Tanaka et al.’s (Am Econ Rev 100(1):557–571, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  8
    Rationality applied: resolving the two envelopes problem.Christian Hugo Hoffmann - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):555-573.
    The Two Envelopes Problem is a beautiful and quite confusing problem in decision theory which is ca. 35 years old and has provoked at least 150 papers directly addressing the problem and displaying a surprising variety of different responses. This paper finds decisive progress in an approach of Priest and Restall in 2003, contends that the recent papers having appeared since did not really go beyond that paper, argues further that Priest’s and Restall’s solution is still not complete, and proposes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  1
    Hold-up induced by demand for fairness: theory and experimental evidence.Raghabendra Pratap Kc, Dominique Olié Lauga & Vincent Mak - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):721-750.
    Research in recent years suggests that fairness concerns could mitigate hold-up problems. In this study, we report theoretical analysis and experimental evidence on an opposite possibility: that fairness concerns could also induce hold-up problems. In our setup, hold-up problems will not occur with purely self-interested agents, but theoretically could be induced by demand for distributional fairness among agents without sufficiently strong counteracting factors such as intention-based reciprocity. We observe a widespread occurrence of hold-up in our experiment. Relationship-specific investments occurred less (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  1
    A Misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality.Karl Sörenson - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):575-591.
    Contemporary theories of deterrence place a strong emphasis on coherency between model and theory. Schelling’s contention of irrational threats for successful deterrence abandons the rationality assumption to explain how a player can deter, thereby departing from the standard game theoretic solution concepts. It is a misfit model in relation to a deterrence theory and, therefore, excluded. The article defends and remodels Schelling’s intuition by employing the level-k model. It is shown that an unsophisticated player that randomizes over its strategies brings (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues