Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 245-269, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 358-380, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 219-225, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 314-336, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 337-357, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 290-313, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 382-411, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 412-430, June 2021.

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 270-289, June 2021.

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying (...) answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world. (shrink)

Political philosophers have long disagreed on the issue of whether churches should exercise restraint in the appeal to religious reasons in public discussion and political mobilization. Exclusivists defend the restraint, whereas inclusivists reject it. Both sides, however, assume the existence of a democratic government. In this essay, I discuss whether churches should exercise restraint in a non-democratic, authoritarian society. I defend inclusivism and believe that churches should not restrain themselves, especially when doing so can promote democracy and prevent severe injustices. (...) First, I argue that two exclusivist arguments which justify the restraint cannot be applied in an authoritarian society. Second, I defend inclusivism because religious reasons are effective in cultivating active citizens that strengthen the democratic movement. Finally, I use the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong as an example to show how inclusivism can enhance democratic movements under authoritarianism. (shrink)