Although Herder is critical of the Enlightenment, I show that his philosophy of history commits him to the claim that the age and culture shaped by the Enlightenment in some way makes a distinctive contribution to the development of humanity. Yet this contribution cannot make this age and culture superior to earlier ones, for this would violate Herder’s commitment to the principle that each age and culture ought to be accorded an equal status because of the equal value of its (...) contribution to the full development of humanity. I argue that an abstract way of thinking and a hostility to prejudice are integral elements of Herder’s attempt to situate the Enlightenment in his philosophy of history, despite how he otherwise criticizes the Enlightenment for its abstract thinking and its hostility to prejudice. (shrink)

This article exams the philosophy of history of the now mostly-forgotten 19th Century philosopher, Eduard von Hartmann. Hartmann inverts Hegel’s rational teleology by his reliance on a notion of ‘unconscious ideas’. Purposes are a species of idea. All natural things, including unintelligent natural things, will purposes of which they are often not conscious. These unconscious ideas cannot be held by natural beings that lack intellect, so there must be some supra-naturalistic being, which Hartmann names the Metaphysical Unconscious, that imposes purposes (...) on unconsciously-acting agents. The course of human history is the gradual becoming-conscious of the ends posited by the Metaphysical Unconscious. Insofar as nature always achieves the purposes of the Metaphysical Unconscious this is the best of all possible worlds. Insofar as those purposes are realized irrespective of human happiness, historical progress becomes the gradual assurance of human misery. (shrink)

The paper presents a realist perspective on the recent exchange in the Journal of the Philosophy of History between Adrian Currie and Daniel Swaim on the one side and Paul Roth and Fons Dewulf on the other. The first part presents a critique of Currie and Swaim’s view that the past is not determinate and can be changed. The second part states a series of arguments against Roth’s view that events exist only under description. The third part discusses the ontological (...) problems that Roth’s irrealism about the past fails to address. (shrink)

This book is a collection of papers published in English by the best internationally known Polish writer in metahistory during the last three decades of the past century. Expanded by translation of selected fragments from Polish, it provides international readers for the first time a synoptic picture of Jerzy Topolski’s contributions to theoretical self-reflection of historical studies. During his lifetime, Topolski presented himself and was perceived as an exponent of the “idealizational theory of science” (ITS) of the Poznań school of (...) methodology, applying this theory to historical studies. After locating his work in this context, the broader view of Topolski’s contribution is advanced, locating it in the tradition of attempts of internal self-explication of historical studies, going back to Droysen (Historik) and Lelewel (historyka), and opposing themselves to philosophical metatheories of history. Ironically, Topolski’s methodological work gained international recognition because it was perceived as a philosophical contribution. However, in Poland itself, Topolski’s work was uniquely successful among historians and it has been a nearly obligatory part in the academic socialization of new generations of Polish historians since the 1970s. (shrink)

Philosophers’ attitudes toward the history of philosophy are mixed. Regardless, likely all philosophers interact with the history of philosophy through research, teaching, or professional life. How should they approach it? I answer by analyzing the notion of ‘history of philosophy’. I then consider prominent recent answers given by others converging with mine. I conclude that philosophers should be guided by preference and project to approach the history of philosophy by emphasizing history, philosophy, something intermediate, or both.

In our article, “Past Facts and The Nature of History”, we unpack a broadly realist view of the nature of history and historical narratives. Paul Roth’s The Philosophical Structure of Historical Explanation serves as our primary foil. Fons DeWulf and Roth have replied, and this is our response to their response.