29 found

Year:

  1. Closing Gaps: Strength-Based Approaches to Research with Aboriginal Children with Neurodevelopmental Disorders.Nina Di Pietro & Judy Illes - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):243-252.
    There is substantial literature on fetal alcohol spectrum disorder research involving Aboriginal children, but little related literature on other common neurodevelopmental conditions such as autism spectrum disorder or cerebral palsy for this population. As part of our work in cross-cultural neuroethics, we examined this phenomenon as a case study in Canada. We conducted semi-structured interviews with health researchers working on the frontline with First Nation communities to obtain perspectives about: reasons for the lack of ASD and CP research within the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  6
    Moral Blindness – The Gift of the God Machine.John Harris - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):269-273.
    The continuing debate between Persson and Savulescu and myself over moral enhancement concerns two dimensions of a very large question. The large question is: what exactly makes something a moral enhancement? This large question needs a book length study and this I provide in my How to be Good, Oxford 2016.. In their latest paper Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason take my book as their point of departure and the first dimension of the big question they address is one that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  4
    Addiction, Compulsion, and Persistent Temptation.Robert Noggle - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):213-223.
    Addicts sometimes engage in such spectacularly self-destructive behavior that they seem to act under compulsion. I briefly review the claim that addiction is not compulsive at all. I then consider recent accounts of addiction by Holton and Schroeder, which characterize addiction in terms of abnormally strong motivations. However, this account can only explain the apparent compulsivity of addiction if we assume—contrary to what we know about addicts—that the desires are so strong as to be irresistible. I then consider accounts that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  10
    Enharrisment: A Reply to John Harris About Moral Enhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):275-277.
    In his reply to our response to his book How to be Good, John Harris accuses us of saying ‘two mutually contradictory things’ when in fact we talk about two different things. In this short response, we distinguish between moral enhancement and interventions which promote moral behaviour but undermine freedom. We argue that moral enhancement does not necessarily undermine freedom. Interventions, such as the God Machine, which do undermine freedom are not moral enhancements as we conceive of them. But they (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  9
    Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):263-268.
    In this paper we reply to the most important objections to our advocacy of moral enhancement by biomedical means – moral bioenhancement – that John Harris advances in his new book How to be Good. These objections are to effect that such moral enhancement undercuts both moral reasoning and freedom. The latter objection is directed more specifically at what we have called the God Machine, a super-duper computer which predicts our decisions and prevents decisions to perpertrate morally atrocious acts. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  4
    “A Light Switch in the #Brain”: Optogenetics on Social Media.Julie M. Robillard, Cody Lo, Tanya L. Feng & Craig A. Hennessey - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):279-288.
    Neuroscience communication is increasingly taking place on multidirectional social media platforms, creating new opportunities but also calling for critical ethical considerations. Twitter, one of the most popular social media applications in the world, is a leading platform for the dissemination of all information types, including emerging areas of neuroscience such as optogenetics, a technique aimed at the control of specific neurons. Since its discovery in 2005, optogenetics has been featured in the public eye and discussed extensively on social media, but (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  3
    Mind Perception and Willingness to Withdraw Life Support.Jeffrey M. Rudski, Benjamin Herbsman, Eric D. Quitter & Nicole Bilgram - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):235-242.
    Discussions of withdrawal of life support often revolve around a patient’s perceived level of suffering or lack of experience. Personhood, however, is often linked to personal agency. In the present study, 279 laypeople estimated the amount of agency and experience in hypothetical patients differing in degree of consciousness. Participants also indicated whether they would choose to maintain or terminate life support. Patients were more likely to terminate life support for a patient in a persistent vegetative state, followed by one with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  7
    My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists.John R. Shook - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):199-211.
    How should ethics help decide the morality of enhancing morality? The idea of morally enhancing the human brain quickly emerged when the promise of cognitive enhancement in general began to seem realizable. However, on reflection, achieving moral enhancement must be limited by the practical challenges to any sort of cognitive modification, along with obstacles particular to morality’s bases in social cognition. The objectivity offered by the brain sciences cannot ensure the technological achievement of moral bioenhancement for humanity-wide application. Additionally, any (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Ethical Theories Used by Neurosurgery Residents to Make Decisions in Challenging Cases of Medical Ethics.Sahar Sobhani, Anoosheh Ghasemian, Farshad Farzadfar, Hosein Mashhadinejad & Bahram Hejrani - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):253-261.
    Neurosurgeons have an especially high rate of exposure to serious ethical challenges in their line of work. The aim of this study was to assess the type and frequency of ethical theories used by neurosurgery residents to make extra- ethical decisions in challenging situations and their relation with the level of residency, and curricular training about medical ethics. A total of 12 neurosurgery residents in Mashhad University of Medical Sciences were interviewed; all the participants were male and aged 29–40 years (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  13
    Moral Intuition or Moral Disengagement? Cognitive Science Weighs in on the Animal Ethics Debate.Simon Christopher Timm - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):225-234.
    In this paper I problematize the use of appeals to the common intuitions people have about the morality of our society’s current treatment of animals in order to defend that treatment. I do so by looking at recent findings in the field of cognitive science. First I will examine the role that appeals to common intuition play in philosophical arguments about the moral worth of animals, focusing on the work of Carl Cohen and Richard Posner. After describing the theory of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  4
    The Movement of Research From the Laboratory to the Living Room: A Case Study of Public Engagement with Cognitive Science.Tineke Broer, Martyn Pickersgill & Ian J. Deary - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):159-171.
    Media reporting of science has consequences for public debates on the ethics of research. Accordingly, it is crucial to understand how the sciences of the brain and the mind are covered in the media, and how coverage is received and negotiated. The authors report here their sociological findings from a case study of media coverage and associated reader comments of an article from Annals of Neurology. The media attention attracted by the article was high for cognitive science; further, as associates/members (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  13
    Incarceration, Direct Brain Intervention, and the Right to Mental Integrity – a Reply to Thomas Douglas.Jared N. Craig - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):107-118.
    In recent years, direct brain interventions have shown increased success in manipulating neurobiological processes often associated with moral reasoning and decision-making. As current DBIs are refined, and new technologies are developed, the state will have an interest in administering DBIs to criminal offenders for rehabilitative purposes. However, it is generally assumed that the state is not justified in directly intruding in an offender’s brain without valid consent. Thomas Douglas challenges this view. The state already forces criminal offenders to go to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  5
    21 Selected Abstracts From the Montreal Neuroethics Conference for Young Researchers.Veljko Dubljević - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):137-145.
    The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  6
    The Bright Future of Neuroethics.Veljko Dubljević, Victoria H. Saigle & Eric Racine - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):103-105.
    Many new scholars have emerged and started to explore novel directions of research in neuroethics. Last year, we hosted the Montreal Neuroethics Conference for Young Researchers to highlight the development of these new scholars and to honour the evolving complexity of the field. As part of this conference, we invited young researchers involved in neuroethics all around the world to submit their work for consideration in an essay contest. Here, we proudly introduce the three best essays we received for this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  20
    A Defense of Brain Death.Nada Gligorov - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):119-127.
    In 1959 two French neurologists, Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon, coined the term coma dépassé to designate a state beyond coma. In this state, patients are not only permanently unconscious; they lack the endogenous drive to breathe, as well as brainstem reflexes, indicating that most of their brain has ceased to function. Although legally recognized in many countries as a criterion for death, brain death has not been universally accepted by bioethicists, by the medical community, or by the public. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  8
    LIS and BCIs: A Local, Pluralist, and Pragmatist Approach to 4E Cognition.Ruth Hibbert - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):187-198.
    Four previous papers in this journal have discussed the role of Brain-Computer Interfaces in the lives of Locked-In Syndrome patients in terms of the four “E” frameworks for cognition – extended, embedded, embodied, and enactive cognition. This paper argues that in the light of more recent literature on these 4E frameworks, none of the four papers has taken quite the right approach to deciding which, if any, of the E frameworks is the best one for the job. More specifically, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  17
    Irrationality and Pathology of Beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):147-157.
    Just as sadness is not always a symptom of mood disorder, irrational beliefs are not always symptoms of illness. Pathological irrational beliefs are distinguished from non-pathological ones by considering whether their existence is best explained by assuming some underlying dysfunctions. The features from which to infer the pathological nature of irrational beliefs are: un-understandability of their progression; uniqueness; coexistence with other psycho-physiological disturbances and/or concurrent decreased levels of functioning; bizarreness of content; preceding organic diseases known to be associated with irrational (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  5
    Deep Brain Stimulation, Historicism, and Moral Responsibility.Daniel Sharp & David Wasserman - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):173-185.
    Although philosophers have explored several connections between neuroscience and moral responsibility, the issue of how real-world neurological modifications, such as Deep Brain Stimulation, impact moral responsibility has received little attention. In this article, we draw on debates about the relevance of history and manipulation to moral responsibility to argue that certain kinds of neurological modification can diminish the responsibility of the agents so modified. We argue for a historicist position - a version of the history-sensitive reflection view - and defend (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  31
    Psychopathy, Mental Time Travel, and Legal Responsibility.Andrew Vierra - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):129-136.
    Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel—episodic memory and episodic foresight. Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons. In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy’s view. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  7
    End-Of-Life Decisions in Chronic Disorders of Consciousness: Sacrality and Dignity as Factors.Rocco Salvatore Calabrò, Antonino Naro, Rosaria De Luca, Margherita Russo, Lory Caccamo, Alfredo Manuli, Bernardo Alagna, Angelo Aliquò & Placido Bramanti - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):85-102.
    The management of patients suffering from chronic disorders of consciousness inevitably raises important ethical questions about the end of life decisions. Some ethical positions claim respect of human life sacredness and the use of good medical practices require allowing DOC patients to live as long as possible, since no one can arbitrarily end either his/her or others’ life. On the other hand, some currents of thought claim respect of human life dignity, patients’ wishes, and the right of free choice entail (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  4
    Happiness, Cerebroscopes and Incorrigibility: Prospects for Neuroeudaimonia.Stephanie M. Hare & Nicole A. Vincent - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):69-84.
    Suppose you want to live a happy life. Who should you turn to for advice? We normally think that we know best about our own happiness. But recent work in psychology and neuroscience suggests that we are often mistaken about our own natures, and that sometimes scientists know us better than we know ourselves. Does this mean that to live a happy life we should ask scientists for advice rather than relying on our introspection? In what follows, we highlight ways (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  3
    Upgrading Discussions of Cognitive Enhancement.Susan B. Levin - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):53-67.
    Advocates of cognitive enhancement maintain that technological advances would augment autonomy indirectly by expanding the range of options available to individuals, while, in a recent article in this journal, Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu propose that cognitive enhancement would improve it more directly. Here, autonomy, construed in broad procedural terms, is at the fore. In contrast, when lauding the goodness of enhancement expressly, supporters’ line of argument is utilitarian, of an ideal variety. An inherent conflict results, for, within their utilitarian frame, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Is Deontology a Moral Confabulation?Emilian Mihailov - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):1-13.
    Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from "true" moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  17
    Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics.Assya Pascalev, Mario Pascalev & James Giordano - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):15-22.
    The possibility of a human head transplant poses unprecedented philosophical and neuroethical questions. Principal among them are the personal identity of the resultant individual, her metaphysical and social status: Who will she be and how should the “new” person be treated - morally, legally and socially - given that she incorporates characteristics of two distinct, previously unrelated individuals, and possess both old and new physical, psychological, and social experiences that would not have been available without the transplant? We contend that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  9
    Biocertification and Neurodiversity: The Role and Implications of Self-Diagnosis in Autistic Communities.Jennifer C. Sarrett - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):23-36.
    Neurodiversity, the advocacy position that autism and related conditions are natural variants of human neurological outcomes that should be neither cured nor normalized, is based on the assertion that autistic people have unique neurological differences. Membership in this community as an autistic person largely results from clinical identification, or biocertification. However, there are many autistic individuals who diagnose themselves. This practice is contentious among autistic communities. Using data gathered from Wrong Planet, an online autism community forum, this article describes the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  8
    Valuing Life as Necessary for Moral Status.Joshua Stein - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):45-51.
    Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual’s status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one’s own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health problems (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  4
    Valuing Life as Necessary for Moral Status: A Noteon Depression and Personhood.Joshua Stein - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):45-51.
    Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual's status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one's own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health problems (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  18
    Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):37-43.
    The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  5
    What is Wrong with the Brains of Addicts?".Edmund Henden & Olav Gjelsvik - 2016 - Neuroethics:1-8.
    In his target article and recent interesting book about addiction and the brain, Marc Lewis claims that the prevalent medical view of addiction as a brain disease or a disorder, is mistaken. In this commentary we critically examine his arguments for this claim. We find these arguments to rest on some problematical and largely undefended assumptions about notions of disease, disorder and the demarcation between them and good health. Even if addiction does seem to differ from some typical brain diseases, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues