19 found

Year:

  1.  5
    The Nature of the Scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus.Simon Fortier - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):449-476.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 4, pp 449 - 476 While we know that the interpretation of the ‘soul’s pilot’ found in Hermias’ _Scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus_ differs considerably from that of Syrianus and Proclus, this difference has not shifted the prevailing opinion that the _Scholia_ are a faithful transcript of Syrianus’ lectures on the _Phaedrus_. I argue, however, that the difference over the soul’s pilot is only the first in a series of elements which are difficult, if not impossible, (...)
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  2.  7
    The Razor Argument of Metaphysics A.9.José Edgar González-Varela - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):408-448.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 4, pp 408 - 448 I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.
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  3.  3
    Dividing Plato’s Kinds.Fernando Muniz & George Rudebusch - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):392-407.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 4, pp 392 - 407 A dilemma has stymied interpretations of the Stranger’s method of dividing kinds into subkinds in Plato’s _Sophist_ and _Statesman_. The dilemma assumes that the kinds are either extensions or intensions. Now kinds divide like extensions, not intensions. But extensions cannot explain the distinct identities of kinds that possess the very same members. We propose understanding a kind as like an animal body—the Stranger’s simile for division—possessing both an extension and an (...)
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  4. Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1.Tamer Nawar - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):359-391.
    In defending the view that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus puzzlingly claims that rulers never err and that any practitioner of a skill or expertise (τέχνη) is infallible. In what follows, Socrates offers a number of arguments directed against Thrasymachus’ views concerning the nature of skill, ruling, and justice. Commentators typically take a dim view of both Thrasymachus’ claims about skill (which are dismissed as an ungrounded and purely ad hoc response to Socrates’ initial criticisms) and Socrates’ (...)
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  5.  3
    Late Antiquity.James Wilberding - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):477-490.
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  6.  20
    Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):229-256.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 229 - 256 I argue that, for Aristotle, akratic actions are against one’s general commitment to act in accordance with one’s correct conception of one’s ends overall. Only some akratic actions are also against one’s correct decision to perform a particular action. This thesis explains Aristotle’s views on impetuous _akrasia_, weak _akrasia_, stubborn opinionated action and inverse _akrasia_. In addition, it sheds light on Aristotle’s account of practical rationality. Rational actions are coherent primarily (...)
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  7.  12
    Socrates and Plato.Alex Long - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):351-358.
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  8.  8
    Nature and Utopia in Epictetus’ Theory of Oikeiōsis.Sara Magrin - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):293-350.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 293 - 350 It is widely agreed that there is a gap between the personal and the social ethics of the Stoics due to the difficulty of harmonizing personal and social _oikeiōsis_. By reconstructing Epictetus’ theory of _oikeiōsis_, this paper aims to show that, in his ethics, there is no such gap, and this for two reasons: first, his account of social _oikeiōsis_ is not meant to ground his social ethics; second, his theory (...)
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  9.  16
    Aristotle on Perceptual Discrimination.Mika Perälä - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):257-292.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 257 - 292 It is commonly assumed that Aristotle defines a sense by reference to its ability to perceive the items that are proper to that sense, and that he explains perceptions of unities of these items, and discriminations between them, by reference to what is called the ‘common sense’. This paper argues in contrast that Aristotle defines a sense by reference, not only to its ability to perceive the proper items, but also (...)
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  10.  9
    Plato’s Geach Talks to Socrates: Definition by Example-and-Exemplar in the Hippias Major.Vasilis Politis - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):223-228.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 223 - 228 The paper argues that Plato, in the _Hippias Major_ gives due consideration to the question whether, for some qualities F, such as beauty, it is possible to give an account of what F is by pointing to an example-and-exemplar. He takes seriously, and gives cogent reasons in defense of, an affirmative answer to this question in a manner comparable to Geach—although he argues that these reasons lead to inconsistency, if combined (...)
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  11.  11
    Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy.Christopher Gill - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):211-222.
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  12.  12
    Color, Transparency, and Light in Aristotle.Sean Kelsey - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):209-210.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 209 - 210 Aristotle says that it is in the nature of color to impart movement to transparent media. Typically this is interpreted as implying that these media must be transparent before color moves them. I argue that this is a mistake.
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  13.  3
    Affect and Sensation: Plato’s Embodied Cognition.Ian McCready-Flora - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):117-147.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 117 - 147 I argue that Plato, in the _Timaeus_, draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation is both ‘fine-grained’ and ‘immediate’. Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained but, in a range of important cases, immediate. The _Theaetetus_ assimilates affect to sensation in a way the _Timaeus_ does not. Smell frustrates Timaeus because it is coarse-grained, although unlike pleasure (...)
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  14. Practical and Productive Thinking in Aristotle.Jozef Müller - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):148-175.
    I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...)
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  15.  2
    The Actions of Spirit and Appetite: Voluntary Motion in Galen.Julia Trompeter - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):176-207.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 176 - 207 Galen is criticized for combining Plato’s tripartition-_cum_-trilocation of the soul, in which each part constitutes its own source of motivation, with the demand that the faculty of voluntary motion is limited to the rational part, being the only one located in the brain and having access to the relevant nerves. While scholars have concentrated on small nerves as connective organs, this paper focuses on the _pneuma_, blood and innate heat. When (...)
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  16.  20
    Does the Soul Weave? Reconsidering De Anima 1.4, 408a29-B18.Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):25-63.
    In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
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  17.  22
    Two Ways of Being for an End.Jessica Gelber - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):64-86.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 64 - 86 Five times in the extant corpus, Aristotle refers to a distinction between two ways of being a ‘that for the sake of which’ that he sometimes marks by using genitive and dative pronouns. Commentators almost universally say that this is the distinction between an aim and beneficiary. I propose that Aristotle had a quite different distinction in mind, namely: that which holds between something and the aim or objective it is (...)
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  18.  20
    Hierocles and the Stoic Theory of Blending.Reier Helle - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):87-116.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 87 - 116 In Stoic physics, blending is the relation between active pneuma and passive matter; natural bodies from rocks and logs to plants, animals and the cosmos itself are blends of pneuma and matter. Blending structures the Stoic cosmos. I develop a new interpretation of the Stoic theory of blending, based on passages from Hierocles. The theory of blending, I argue, has been misunderstood. Hierocles allows us to see in detail how the (...)
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  19.  6
    Air as Noēsis and Soul in Diogenes of Apollonia.Rhodes Pinto - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):1-24.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 1 - 24 This article examines Diogenes of Apollonia’s doctrines of intellection and soul in relation to his material principle, air. It argues that for Diogenes both intellection and soul are not, as commonly thought, some sort of air, even though both intellection and soul are to be understood in terms of air and the system of τρόποι of air that he has set up. These new interpretations of intellection and soul yield insight (...)
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