6 found

Year:

  1.  2
    Theory of Custom, Dogmatics of Custom, Policy of Custom: On the Threefold Approach of Polish‐Russian Legal Realism.Edoardo Fittipaldi & Elena Timoshina - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):105-122.
    Proceeding from the insights of Petrażycki, Polish-Russian legal realists distinguished legal theory, legal dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  2
    From a Pluralism of Grounds to Proto‐Legal Relations: Accounting for the Grounds of Obligations of Justice.George Pavlakos - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):59-74.
    In this paper I discuss critically Mathias Risse's paper “Responsibility and Global Justice.” First, I argue that for Risse's pluralist account of the grounds of justice to hold together, there is need to presuppose a monist standpoint which ultimately contributes to grounding principles of justice. Second, I point out that Risse's understanding of obligations of accountability and justification is rather narrow in that it functions as an addendum to obligations of justice. Conversely, I will suggest that the obligation of accountability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  1
    Responsibility and Global Justice.Mathias Risse - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):41-58.
    The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states—the only distributions that can be just or unjust, strictly speaking, are within the state—or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend in On Global Justice rejects both of these approaches. Instead, my view, and thus my attempt at meeting the aforementioned challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. My purpose here is to explain what (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  3
    Realism About the Nature of Law.Torben Spaak - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):75-104.
    Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non-cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti-metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non-cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  4
    Necessary and Universal Truths About Law?Brian Z. Tamanaha - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):3-24.
    Prominent analytical jurisprudents assert that a theory of law consists of necessary, universal truths about the nature of law. This often-repeated claim, which has not been systematically established, is critically examined in this essay. I begin with the distinction between natural kinds and social artifacts, drawing on the philosophy of society to show that necessity claims about law require a fundamental reworking of basic understandings of ontology and epistemology, which legal philosophers have not undertaken. I show law is a poor (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  4
    Raz on Rights: Human Rights, Fundamental Rights, and Balancing.Zanghellini Aleardo - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (1):25-40.
    After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues