Journal of Indian Philosophy

ISSNs: 0022-1791, 1573-0395

28 found

View year:

  1.  14
    Vedānta: A Survey of Recent Scholarship (I).Michael S. Allen - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):731-759.
    This article surveys recent work on Vedānta, focusing on English-language secondary scholarship since the year 2000. The article consists of two parts. The first part (published here) identifies trends within recent scholarship, highlighting several promising areas of new research: the social history of Vedānta, Vedānta in the early modern period, vernacular Vedānta, Persian Vedānta, colonial and post-colonial Vedānta, and pedagogy and practice. It also covers edited volumes, special journal issues, and ongoing collaborative research projects. The second part (published separately) provides (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  8
    “Madhyamakanising” Tantric Yogācāra: The Reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s Explanation of maṇḍala Visualisation in the Works of Śūnyasamādhivajra, Abhayākaragupta and Tsong Kha Pa.Daisy S. Y. Cheung - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):611-643.
    The eleventh-century Indian Buddhist master Ratnākaraśānti presents a unique Yogācāra interpretation of tantric _maṇḍala_ visualisation in the _*Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā_. In this text, he employs the neither-one-nor-many argument to assert that the qualities of the mind represented by the deities in the _maṇḍala_ are neither the same nor different from the mind itself. He also provides five scenarios of meditation to explain the necessity of practising both the perfection method (_pāramitānaya_) and the mantra method (_mantranaya_) together in Mahāyāna. Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation exerts a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  20
    The Problem of Yogācāra Idealism.Fabien Muller - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):707-730.
    Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  3
    Defining a Me th=11pt ṇḍ th aka Question in the Questions of Milinda and Its Commentarial Texts.Eng Jin Ooi, Andrew Schumann & Natchapol Sirisawad - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):567-589.
    The word _meṇḍaka_, a derivative of _meṇḍa_ (“ram”), is generally translated as “made of the ram” or “about the ram” or “horned.” However, in the Pāli _Milindapañha_ (_Questions of Milinda_), the word _meṇḍakapañha_, literally, a question about the ram, is also rendered as a logical conclusion that refutes an imaginary dilemma. Hence, in this treatise, the word _meṇḍaka_ is a special logical term which means an imaginary dilemma that can be logically refuted. This raises the question as to why the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  2
    Who Identifies with the Aggregates? Philosophical Implications of the Selected Khandha Passages in the Nikāyas.Grzegorz Polak - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):663-685.
    In this paper, I discuss some philosophical problems connected with the notion of regarding the aggregates (_khandha_) as self in the Nikāyas. In particular, I focus on the attitude represented by the formula “I am this” (_esohamasmi_) which may be labeled as that of identifying with the aggregates. In the first part of the paper, I point out and analyze certain similes contained in the Nikāyas which may be read as implying the existence of a distinction between the aggregates and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  5
    The Conundrum of Kundakunda’s Status in the Digambara Tradition.Jayandra Soni - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):645-662.
    Kundakunda’s handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. Sy_āt/siya, syādvāda_ or _saptabhaṅgī_. 2. _Nayas_, _vyavahāra_ and _niścaya nayas_ and _naya_vāda. 3. _Sapta_ and _Nava tattvas/padārtha_ and 4. _Anekāntavāda_. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  6
    Yāska’s Theory of Meaning: An Overlooked Episode in the History of Semantics in India.Paolo Visigalli - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (5):687-706.
    This paper aims to recover the ideas about semantics that are contained in Yāska’s _Nirukta_ (c. 6–3 century BCE), the seminal work of the Indian tradition of _nirvacana_ or etymology. It argues that, within the framework of his etymological project, Yāska developed consistent and sophisticated ideas relating to semantics—what I call his theory of meaning. It shows that this theory assumes the form of explicit and implicit reflections pertaining to the relation between three categories: denoting names (_nāman_/_nāmadheya_), denoted objects (_sattva_/_artha_), (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  4
    What are the “Purposes” of Buddhist Sūtras? From Vasubandhu’s Logic of Exegesis (Vyākhyāyukti).Toshio Horiuchi - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):539-566.
    As its name implies, Vasubandhu’s _Vyākhyāyukti_ (VyY) explains the logic or methodology (_yukti_) of exegesis or sūtra interpretation (_vyākhyā_) and only survives in a Tibetan translation. In recent years, research on this treatise has been gradually accumulating. However, due to the difficulty of the Tibetan translation, some of the arguments therein have been misunderstood. In this article, after reviewing the general framework of Vasubandhu’s method of interpreting the sūtras, I will present a newly discovered parallel regarding his discussion of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Candrakīrti on the Use and Misuse of the Chariot Argument.Dhivan Thomas Jones - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):1-20.
    The publication in 2015 (ed. Li) of Chap. 6 of the rediscovered Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) allows us to witness more directly Candrakīrti’s careful and deliberate critique of the ‘chariot argument’ for the merely conventional existence of the self in Indian Abhidharmic thought. I argue that in MA 6.140–141, Candrakīrti alludes to the use of the chariot argument in the Milindapañha as negating only the view of a permanent self (compared to an elephant), rather than negating ego-identification (compared (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  15
    The Meaning of Identity Between Nirvān.ṇa and Samṁsāra in Nāgārjuna.Taesoo Kim - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):409-430.
    This research attempts to evaluate the hermeneutic characteristics of catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) in the ‘Nirvāṇa’ Chapter of the _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (Ch. 25), focusing on the identity thesis between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Regarding the structure of the tetralemma posited by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-ca. 250), this study criticizes the dialectical interpretation of Robinson and Kajiyama from the perspective of Siderits and Katsura’s semantic approach to the extent that it does not deny ultimate truth. This sets it apart from the semantic view presented by Siderits (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  6
    Candrakīrti’s Epistemology: A Re-examination of Jamyang Zhepa’s Interpretation.Tsering Nurboo - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):515-537.
    Candrakīrti deals with epistemological problems in his works, but he has not propounded a systematic theory of knowledge. Candrakīrti thoroughly discusses Madhyamaka’s ontological view in his explication of Nāgārjuna’s view on two truths (_dve satye_). Most of his Tibetan commentators and contemporary interpreters engage in explaining Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka ontology. However, Jamyang Zhepa reconstructs Candrakīrti’s theory of knowledge in his _magnum opus_, _Tshig gsal stong thun gyi tshad ma’i rnam bshad_ (A commentary on epistemological exposition in _Prasannapadā_). Although Jamyang Zhepa’s work (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  10
    Silence and Contradiction in the Jaina Saptabha th=11pt ṅ th gī.Chris Rahlwes - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):473-513.
    The Jaina _saptabhaṅgī_ (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and _avaktavya_ (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the _saptabhaṅgī_ appears as: (i) in a certain sense, _P_; (ii) in a certain sense, not _P_; (iii) in a certain sense, _P_ and not _P_; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of _P_; (v) in a certain sense, _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vi) in a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  8
    Insight and Ascertainment: The Meditation of Vipaśyanā in Kamalaśīla’s Philosophy of Mind.Karl Schmid - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):431-452.
    In a triad of practice manuals collectively titled _The Process of Meditation_ (_Bhāvanākrama I, II, III_), the eight century Indian Buddhist philosopher Kamalaśīla singles out _vipaśyanā_ (insight meditation) to be of particular importance on the early stages of the Buddhist path. This paper provides a reconstruction of _vipaśyanā_ based on how it is depicted in that work. I make two primary claims. First, _vipaśyanā_ is a technique for facilitating the direct perceptual ascertainment of a select set of properties, and second, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  14
    Reevaluating Dignāga’s Apoha Theory: As Revealed by Bhāviveka’s Critique.Long Yin Sin - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (4):391-407.
    Pramāṇavādins are antirealists on the problem of universals by virtue of the fact that they deny the existence of real universals. Dignāga, therefore, offered apoha theory to explain how the denotation of objects is possible without postulating real universals. According to Apohavāda, a word, for instance “cow”, denotes a cow not by referring to a real universal “cowness,” but by excluding it from those which are non-cows, such as horses. In recent years, there is a discussion about what the genuine (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Śālikanātha on Absence in the Pramāṇapārāyaṇa: An Introduction and Translation.Jack Beaulieu - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):215-238.
    This is a brief philosophical introduction to, and an annotated translation of, the section on absence from Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa (Study of the Instruments of Knowledge), a foundational work of Prābhākara epistemology. In this section, which focuses on the epistemology of absence, Śālikanātha argues against the Bhāṭṭa view that there is a sui generis instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which we learn of absence (abhāva). He does so by arguing for a subjective reductionist thesis about absence, according to which the absence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  14
    Jaina Narrative Refutations of Kumārila: Relative Chronology and the History of Jaina-Mīmām.sā Dialogues.Seema K. Chauhan - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):239-261.
    Assigning a date to Kumārila is notoriously difficult. Kumārila’s dates are usually assigned through a relative chronology of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers with whom Kumārila engages or is engaged. This is a precarious method because the dates of these interlocutors are equally unstable. But what if in considering systematic dialogues (_śāstra_) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate we have missed a source that does engage with Kumārila, and that can be reliably dated? In this article, I turn (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  9
    Confronting the Truth: Epistemological Conflicts between Early Buddhists and Jains.J. Noel Hubler - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):263-281.
    The lay follower Citta’s debate with Mahāvīra in the _Nigaṇṭha Sutta_ reflects not just simple polemic, but a fundamental epistemological division between Early Jains and Buddhists. A close reading of the _Ācārāṅga Sūtra_ shows that the Jains see the truth as a property of the self-knowing purified soul that knows all things. For the Buddhists, consciousness is conditioned and dependent. If truth is a property or relation of consciousness, then it too is conditioned and dependent. In order to maintain that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  12
    Six Verses from Nāgārjuna’s Lost Treatise Establishing the Transactional.Sara McClintock - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):319-341.
    The Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (2nd c. CE) is best known for his works on emptiness in which he advances a program for the relinquishing of all philosophical views (_dṛṣṭi_) in light of the impossibility of establishing the true existence of any kind of entity. At the same time, he is famous also for his theory of two truths, according to which conventional or transactional language is both a legitimate and a necessary factor on the path to the ultimate abandonment (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  15
    A Critical Examination of Nāgārjuna’s Argument on Motion.Mainak Pal - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):283-318.
    If an object changes its spatial position over time, or moves from one place to another, we say that the object is in motion. But in Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy reality of motion has been questioned. Nāgārjuna, the renowned philosopher in Mādhyamika school, has argued that motion is an absurd concept—it is _empty_. In the second chapter of _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (_Gatāgata-parikṣā_) Nāgārjuna examined the notion of motion and showed that motion exists neither in past, nor in present, and nor in future—the notion (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  3
    Abhiniveśa.Frederick M. Smith - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):343-363.
    _Abhiniveśa_ appears in _Yogasūtras_ (YS) 2.9 as the designation of the last of the five _kleśa_s or afflictions listed in YS 2.3. This paper will examine four questions: What is the deep history of the word _abhiniveśa_? What were the historical sources of Patañjali’s term? Does it have a meaning in the YS distinct from the explanation given by Vyāsa in his commentary on this _sūtra_, which is followed with very little deviation by legions of translators? And, does looking at (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  7
    Sām.ṃkhya’s Challenge to the Buddhist Claim of the Identity of a Pramān.ṇa and Its Result.Ołena Łucyszyna - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):365-389.
    Sāṃkhya, in its commentary Yuktidīpikā, responds to the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and a valid cognition (pramā), its result (phala), are identical. The response of Sāṃkhya was pioneering: it is one of the two earliest responses to the Buddhists in the lively polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result. (The other of these two earliest responses is in the Ślokavārttika by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.) Sāṃkhya’s voice in this polemic is earlier than that of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  65
    The Search for Definitions in Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):133-196.
    The search for definitions is ubiquitous in Sanskrit philosophy. In many texts across traditions, we find philosophers presenting their theories by laying down definitions of key theoretical categories, by testing those definitions, and by refuting competing definitions of the same theoretical categories. Call this the method of definitions. The aim of this essay is to explore a challenge that arises for this method: the paradox of definitions. It arises from the claim that the method of definitions is either (i) redundant (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  17
    Flowers Perfume Sesame: On the Contextual Shift of Perfuming from Abhidharma to Yogācāra.Mingyuan Gao - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):1-23.
    In the Abhidharma texts, that flowers perfume sesame is used as a simile describing the mechanism of perfuming (_vāsanā_/_paribhāvanā_) in the context of meditative cultivation. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the meditative perfuming requires the co-existence of the perfumer and the perfumed. In comparison, the Yogācāra-vijñānavādins employ the same simile to explain their doctrine of the perfuming of all _dharma_s in _ālayavijñāna_, which demands the _bīja_ as the perfumed and the manifested _dharma_s as the perfumer to be simultaneous. My hypothesis is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  9
    Notes on the satipat.t.hānas in the Vibhan.ga Mūlat.īkā.Giuliano Giustarini - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):77-95.
    The Vibhaṅga Mūlaṭīkā, attributed to Ānanda, is a sub-commentary of one of the seven books of the Pāli Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the Vibhaṅga, and the direct commentary of its commentary, Buddhaghosa’s Sammohavinodanī. In the section on the _satipaṭṭhāna_ method, Ānanda proposes exegetical strategies to solve some seeming contradiction between Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the Vibhaṅga and the Sutta’s framework that the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga refers to. An examination of exemplary passages from the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga of the Vibhaṅga Mūlaṭīkā will shed light upon the originality of Ānanda’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  9
    A Grammarian’s View of Negation: Nāgeśa’s Paramalaghumañjūs.ā on Nañartha.John J. Lowe & James W. Benson - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):49-75.
    The theory of negation developed in the grammatical-philosophical system of later Vyākaraṇa remains almost entirely unstudied, despite its close links with the (widely studied) approaches to negation found in other philosophical schools such as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and despite its consequent importance for a comprehensive understanding of the theory of negation in ancient India. In this paper we present an edition, translation and commentary of the relevant sections of Nāgeśa’s _Paramalaghumañjūṣā_, a concise presentation by the final authority of the Pāṇinian (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  7
    The jāti in the Mādhyamika – Different Approaches between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti.Motoi Ono - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):97-131.
    Kajiyama has argued that the basis for the concept of _jāti_ (false rejoinder) as described in the _Nyāyasūtra_ is the concept _xiang ying_ (相応) as found in the _Fangbian xin lun_ (方便心論). Kajiyama has also shown that the sophistic arguments called _xiang ying_ are very similar to the _prasaṅga_ arguments of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school. It thus seems worthwhile to investigate how later Mādhyamika philosophers treated the concept of _jāti_ that originally appeared as the result of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  5
    Why is Every Living Being a Tathāgatagarbha? A Translation of the Twenty-Seventh Verse of the First Chapter in the Ratnagotravibhāga.Jeson Woo - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):197-213.
    In modern Buddhist scholarship, J. Takasaki’s English and Japanese translations of the Ratnagotravibhāga in 1966 and 1989 have been read as an exemplary one until now without any meaningful revision. This paper critically reviews his translations of the twenty-seventh verse in the first chapter of the work, which explicates the key doctrine in the Tathāgatagarbha thought that every living being is a tathāgatagarbha. The method is to clarify the ambiguity of expressions appeared in the verse by changing its nominal style (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Dharmakīrtian Inference.Szymon Bogacz & Koji Tanaka - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51:591-609.
    Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues