In the Philebus, Socrates argues that some anticipatory pleasures can be false. The main argument at 38b6-41a4 has perplexed readers, however, and scholars have developed several different ways to understand the falsity of false anticipatory pleasures. I argue that the anticipation argument should be read in conjunction with a later distinction in the Philebus between intense pleasures mixed with pain and pure pleasures free from pain. I suggest that anticipatory pleasures taken in intense pleasures are false because they misidentify an (...) intense pleasure as a genuine pleasure when in fact intense pleasures are inferior and non-genuine due to being mixed with pain. I contend that the example of a false anticipatory pleasure supports recognizing this kind of falsity, and that doing so helps to resolve several challenges that face existing interpretations. (shrink)

Suggesting a new reading of A74 in an exclusively physiological context and in combination with a new interpretation of B100, this article argues for a new reconstruction of Empedocles’ respiration theory, involving two complementary and parallel respiratory processes, where the pressure of the innate heat acts together with the movement of the blood to drive the air in and out and reach all body parts and organs.

Does Aristotle offer a definition of the soul? In fact, he rejects the possibility of defining the soul univocally. Because “life” is a homonymous concept, so too is “soul”. Given the specific causal role that Aristotle envisages for form and essence, the soul requires multiple different definitions to capture how it functions as a cause in each form of life. Aristotle suggests demonstrations can be given which express these causal definitions; I reconstruct these demonstrations.

Near the middle of his first discussion with Lysis, Socrates asks an odd question—he asks if Lysis’ mother lets him play with her loom or touch her woolworking tools (208d1-e2). It is one of many odd questions, of course, but it is odd nonetheless. Odd, and also funny: it is the one of just two comments in the book that makes Lysis laugh. This question, I argue, reveals the profound depth of Socrates’ inquiry about Lysis’ views about himself and his (...) loved ones. Indeed, the challenge is so profound that at first the only response is laughter. One aspect is a challenge to certain ideals of masculinity, and so I briefly discuss Athenian conceptions of gender and masculinity, along with some Platonic questioning of these conceptions. Reading the Lysis through the lens of gender reveals not only the continued relevance of such a lens, but also the intensity of Socrates’ work, which calls into question basic social structures and markers of identity, like gender, in its pursuit of a liberatory turn to philosophy. We gain insight into his challenge to Athenian understanding of masculinity by observing the way that Socrates’ argumentation undermines much of it, and we more fully appreciate Socrates’ arguments if we see that they intend to subvert gendered expectations. The setting of the dialogue, the questions Socrates asks, and the responses from Lysis all reinforce that what is at stake in the text is Lysis’ character, including his masculinity. (shrink)

Although our notion of induction stems from the Aristotelian epagoge, it was probably Cicero who first translated it into Latin as inductio. I argue that, despite occasional similarities, Aristotle’s epagoge is different from induction. In the first part, I point out the differences in epagoge’s function and nature. (1) Unlike induction, epagoge can proceed both from particulars to universals and the other way round, being an application of universals to particulars. (2) While induction is taken to be a means for (...) how to obtain universals, epagoge finds universals already at its disposal before starting to work. (3) Although, like induction, epagoge may in some contexts be considered a kind of logical inference, it is rather an intuitive or perception-like ability or capacity providing the connection between particulars and universals. In the second part, I deal with what Aristotle calls καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον. Although they are usually rendered as ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, on closer inspection, they turn out to be different from these modern terms. Their relationship is to be understood as that between a whole and parts. (shrink)

On three occasions Aristotle judges explanations by earlier thinkers to be simply ‘beyond us’ (ὑðὲñ ἡìᾶò), namely, at Meta. iii 4, GA i 18, and GA ii 8. What failure is Aristotle charging earlier scientists with when he says this? I argue that the phrase ‘beyond us’ introduces a carefully considered charge (as opposed to an empty dismissal): an explanation of fact p is ‘beyond us’ when and only when it posits an explainer q that is (i) empirically unverifiable and (...) (ii) will explain only this one fact p and no other facts. (shrink)

I examine the role of nature (φύσιs) in the argument of Plato’s Republic and demonstrate that the concept plays a more central role in advancing the dialogue’s philosophical aims than has been appreciated by scholars. Socrates carefully distinguishes between the nature with which one is born and the nature that one has at the end of education. The former is one’s “original nature,” and the latter is that same original nature brought to fulfillment, a “fulfilled nature”. Both of these are (...) referred to as φύσιs. Distinguishing them aids us in understanding the argument of the dialogue. (shrink)

The Laws x argument that the gods attend to humans has a surprising structure: the Athenian offers an argument that ‘forces’ the interlocutor to agree that he was wrong, then says he needs a myth in addition. I argue that the myth responds to the interlocutor’s motivation for thinking that the gods ignore human beings, and that although it is not an argument, it is a vehicle for rational persuasion.

I present a problem concerning the predication of elemental qualities in Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption: What is the subject of predication for the elemental qualities? The usual answer in the scholarship is either the elements themselves, or prime matter (traditionally conceived). I argue that neither can perform this role. Instead, I explore the possibility that the elemental qualities are individually predicated of their own material principle. I show that this solution fits the text and solves the problem of predication (...) of elemental qualities. I conclude by offering some comments on the status of the elemental contraries and demonstrate the benefits of my view in conjunction with some recent scholarship on the elemental contraries. (shrink)

In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates’ second account of ‘false’ pleasure (41d-42c) outlines a form of illusion: pleasures that appear greater than they are. I argue that these pleasures are perceptual misrepresentations. I then show that they are the grounds for a methodological critique of hedonism. Socrates identifies hedonism as a judgment about the value of pleasure based on a perceptual misrepresentation of size, witnessed paradigmatically in the ‘greatest pleasures’.

Does Seneca entirely reject the utility of dialectical study for moral improvement? No, I argue here. Focusing on Letter 87, I propose that Seneca raises and disarms objections to formal Stoic arguments to help moral progressors avoid backsliding and advance towards ethical knowledge. I trace this method back to Chrysippus and show that reading Letter 87 in this Chrysippean framework yields a satisfying explanation of its otherwise puzzling features.

I seek recurrent characteristics of ancient world maps from different cultures to gain insights into constant aspects of human perceptions and world views. Discussed is how circular horizons are introduced to delineate the far and unknown world, how the shapes of the known areas are idealised by being given regular shapes, and how the way from the rim to the centre often epitomises cosmogony or evolutionary progress.

Ancient critics reproached Xenocrates for beginning his work on the dialectic with a discussion of voice, and until now the question why he did so has never been systematically explored. Neither do we know why Xenocrates counted syllables, as Plutarch reports, and how he arrived at such an implausibly high number. In the first part of this paper, I show that Xenocrates’ interest in voice was suggested by Plato’s discussion of letters in his later dialogues, such as the Theatetus, the (...) Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus. Second, a fragment from Sextus attributed to Xenocrates confirms that Xenocrates allowed for various ‘levels’ of elements, and that explains why Theuth’s method, recommended in the Philebus, is applied to syllables. Finally, I address the very possibility of knowing the actual number of syllables and words, and address some of the problems connected to the reconstruction of the mathematical argument. (shrink)

This paper argues that Protagoras’ great myth depicts human nature as both Promethean and Epimethean: human foresight depends on the condition of oversight. If Protagoras’ praise of foresight betrays his desire to overcome this condition, Socrates embraces it. While Protagoras repeats Epimetheus’ mistake of forgetting his own nature by aiming to overcome the risks of oversight, Socrates’ foresight recognizes that oversight and perplexity are intrinsic to human nature.

Aristotle and Eudemus report a Speusippean argument to the effect that defining anything requires knowing everything. Scholars have failed to make sense of this argument. This paper argues that the main preoccupations to which the Puzzle is meant to respond are: (i) to ensure the co-extensiveness of the definition with the definiendum; (ii) to rule out a particular definitional mistake—underdivision. The implications of the Puzzle for Speusippus’ conception of knowledge are further explored.

A methodological statement that occurs at Nicomachean Ethics vii 1 and its implementation in the subsequent discussion has widely been called ‘the method of endoxa’. According to the received interpretation, this method follows some strict steps and epitomizes the dialectical method of inquiry. I question the received interpretation and argue for a deflationary and non-dialectical account which, I believe, conforms with Aristotle’s scientifically oriented general methodology.

This is an impressive and important book about perception in Plato’s Timaeus, but most of its readers will probably be researchers who are interested in much broader questions about the dialogue. There is nothing deficient or lacking about this treatment of perception, but this book should be put alongside Thomas Johansen’s Plato’s Natural Philosophy and Sarah Broadie’s Nature and Divinity in the sense that this is, for all intents and purposes, a monograph about the whole Timaeus, even though it is (...) pitched as being focused on perception. There are only a few topics missing, such as the nature of the cosmic receptacle and psychic diseases. Virtually everything else, including the status of Timaeus’ so-called likely story, the generation of the lower gods, and the nature of bone, is discussed at length. (shrink)

This article examines whether vision in Plato’s Timaeus can realize its primary function of permitting humans to stabilize their misaligned orbits of intelligence by getting to know the universe’s orbits as revealed through the heavenly bodies’ movements. I consider a concern that Timaeus, while seemingly requiring nocturnal vision for this purpose, appears to preclude its possibility, thereby threatening the dialogue’s internal coherence. I then argue that Timaeus has the resources to overcome this worry and to provide a philosophically cogent account (...) of nocturnal vision. (shrink)

I re-examine the starting point of the Philebus’ description of the ‘divine method’ and argue that the vexed phrase τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι at 16c9 refers to sensibles only. In doing so, I especially stress the significance of the phrase τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων at 16d1. The proposed interpretation fits the rest of the description of the ‘divine method’, preserves the Forms’ unmixed nature and the consistency of the Philebus.

Cicero distinguishes between two forms of divination: natural and artificial divination. Most contemporary scholars assume that Cicero presents a Stoic division and some even draw far-reaching conclusions about the scientific status of divination based on this distinction. However, his justification for the division is apparently contradictory and neither fits with Stoic nor Peripatetic claims that are found elsewhere. This paper examines the exact meaning of the division and sheds light on its Stoic and Peripatetic origin. In this way, we will (...) not only be able to better understand the overall argument of Cicero’s De divinatione, but also to assess his real achievement as a philosophical author. (shrink)

This paper examines Della Rocca’s critique of Aristotle’s conception of substance. The key point of the paper is that Aristotle’s homonymy principle and concept of enformed matter undermine Della Rocca’s claim that Aristotle is subject to a John Wayne moment. (To undergo a John Wayne moment is to propose an unilluminating or empty explanation, as in Wayne’s statement ‘A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do’.).

There have been several attempts to identify what Aristotle holds as distinctive to magnificence. The most common interpretation is that magnificence is generosity of large wealth. Irwin proposes an alternative where magnificence is generosity applied to complicated common-good projects while Curzer’s alternative is that magnificence is heroic generosity. My position is that these three positions misinterpret Aristotle’s magnificence by explicitly or implicitly rejecting some of the claims that Aristotle makes.

I critically examine developmental approaches to the notion of habituation in the Nicomachean Ethics. Such approaches conceive of habituation in terms of upbringing. I challenge this view. Developmental approaches provide a restrictive view of habituation. I argue that it is possible for the habituation of character to occur after upbringing. My interpretation avoids the charge that Aristotle only granted the possibility of virtue to those who have had a good upbringing.

This paper investigates the Democritean account of human nature and sociability. After briefly discussing what the claim that human beings are social animals means, the paper analyzes two culture stories, preserved in Diodorus of Sicily and John Tzetzes, that are typically taken to be Democritean, arguing that there are prima facie significant differences between the two accounts. The paper then concludes that human beings are not social animals by nature on the Democritean view, but rather that the Democritean account belongs (...) to a different, that is, non-Aristotelian and non-Stoic, tradition of social thought. (shrink)

In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates raises the question whether piety is coextensive with justice, or a part of it (11e4-12a2; cf. 12c10-d3). Euthyphro chooses the latter option, and seeks to determine the part of justice that piety happens to be. Scholars have debated fiercely about whether Socrates shares this view (Calef 1995a; McPherran 1995; Calef 1995b). This paper argues that, if Euthyphro is to remain consistent throughout the dialogue, coextensiveness must be favored over the part-of-justice view. If this is so, then (...) the Euthyphro is also consistent with Socrates’ defense of the unity of the virtues in Plato’s Protagoras. (shrink)