Economics and Philosophy

ISSN: 0266-2671

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  1.  18
    Reply to Spears’s ‘The Asymmetry of Population Ethics’.Jonas H. Aaron - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):507-513.
    Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More generally, I show how one might come to adopt the procreation asymmetry for the wrong reasons by misinterpreting one’s intuitions.
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  2.  9
    The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification.Lukas Beck - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):423-445.
    Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational (...)
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  3.  17
    The Tragic Science: How Economists Cause Harm (even as They Aspire to Do Good). George F. DeMartino. University of Chicago Press. xi + 265 pages. [REVIEW]Lukas Beck - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):522-527.
  4.  10
    Revisiting variable-value population principles.Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato & Kohei Kamaga - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):468-484.
    We examine a general class of variable-value population principles. Our particular focus is on the extent to which such principles can avoid the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. We show that if a mild limit property is imposed, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion implies the sadistic conclusion. This result generalizes earlier observations by showing that they apply to a substantially larger class of principles. Our second theorem states that, under the limit property, the axiom of mere addition also conflicts with avoidance (...)
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  5.  23
    Why we need future generations: a defence of direct intergenerational reciprocity.Fausto Corvino - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):395-422.
    In this article I argue that the non-reciprocity problem does not apply to intergenerational justice. Future generations impact, here and now, on the well-being of people now living. I firstly illustrate the economic-synchronic model of direct intergenerational reciprocity (DIR): future generations allow people now living to maintain the economic system future-oriented and capital-preserving. The rational choice for people now living is to guarantee transgenerational sufficiency to future generations. I then analyse the axiological-synchronic model of DIR: future generations give meaning and (...)
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  6.  15
    A Theory of Subjective Well-Being, Mark Fabian. Oxford University Press, 2022, x + 305 pages. [REVIEW]Gil Hersch - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):528-532.
  7.  17
    Is luxury tax justifiable?Hyunseop Kim - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):446-467.
    This paper examines whether, and if so when, luxury tax is justifiable. After a characterization of luxury tax, I critically examine several arguments that have been or can be made in defence of luxury tax, including Ng’s diamond good argument and a variation of Frank’s positional good argument. I put forward an alternative, expressive argument, according to which luxury tax can help to create and sustain social norms that discourage conspicuous luxury consumption and display of wealth. I explain several ways (...)
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  8.  21
    Vote markets, democracy and relational egalitarianism.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):373-394.
    This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they result in inequality in opportunity for political influence across rich (...)
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  9.  7
    The utility of goods or actions? A neurophilosophical assessment of a recent neuroeconomic controversy.Enrico Petracca - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):351-372.
    The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical assumptions, showing that action-based assumptions are necessary to explain real-world value-based decisions. Second, we show that the good-based model’s presumption of introducing a normative (...)
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  10. Being Good in a World of Need, Larry S. Temkin. Oxford University Press, 2022, 432 pages. [REVIEW]Marcos Picchio - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):516-521.
  11.  9
    Reply to Aaron: How people respond to the Asymmetry is an empirical question.Dean Spears - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):514-515.
  12.  6
    Continuity and catastrophic risk – CORRIGENDUM.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):533-534.
  13. Weighted sufficientarianisms: Carl Knight on the excessiveness objection.Dick Timmer - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):494-506.
    Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian view that meets the excessiveness objection and is preferable to both Knight’s proposal and prioritarianism. More specifically, I defend a multi-threshold view which gives weighted priority to benefits directly above (...)
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  14.  34
    Comparing Rubin and Pearl’s causal modelling frameworks: a commentary on Markus (2021).Naftali Weinberger - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):485-493.
    Markus (2021) argues that the causal modelling frameworks of Pearl and Rubin are not ‘strongly equivalent’, in the sense of saying ‘the same thing in different ways’. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic modelling choices.
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  15. Relative priority.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):199-229.
    The good of those who are worse off matters more to the overall good than the good of those who are better off does. But being worse off than one’s fellows is not itself bad; nor is inequality itself bad; nor do differences in well-being matter more when well-being is lower in an absolute sense. Instead, the good of the relatively worse-off weighs more heavily in the overall good than the good of the relatively better-off does, in virtue of the (...)
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  16.  22
    When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position.Hun Chung - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):308-333.
    The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls’s two principles of justice. It will be shown that when (...)
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  17.  9
    The Profit Paradox: How Thriving Firms Threaten the Future of Work, Jan Eeckhout. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021, viii + 327 pages. [REVIEW]Joaquín Paseyro Mayol & Edoardo Peruzzi - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):338-343.
  18.  22
    On environmental justice, Part I: an intuitive conservation dilemma.Joseph Mazor - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):230-255.
    This article introduces an intuitive conservation dilemma called the Canyon Dilemma: Is it possible to condemn the mining of the Grand Canyon, even by a poor generation, while also permitting this generation’s mining of an unremarkable small canyon? It then argues that not one of several prominent theories of environmental justice, including various forms of egalitarianism, welfarism, deep-ecological theories, communitarianism and free-market environmentalism, can navigate this dilemma. The article concludes by highlighting the dilemma-navigating potential of the equal-claims idea – the (...)
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  19.  18
    On environmental justice, Part II: non-absolute equal division of rights to the natural world.Joseph Mazor - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):256-284.
    This article considers whether any interpretation of the idea of equal claims to the natural world can resolve the Canyon Dilemma (i.e. can justify protecting the Grand Canyon but not a small canyon from mining by a poor generation). It first considers and ultimately rejects the idea of subjecting natural resource rights to an intergenerational equal division. It then demonstrates that a pluralist theory of environmental justice committed to both respect for the separateness of persons and to the collective good (...)
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  20. Sources of transitivity.Daniel Muñoz - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):285-306.
    Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modelled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.
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  21.  14
    Sources of transitivity – CORRIGENDUM.Daniel Muñoz - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):307-307.
  22.  6
    Theory and Credibility, Scott Ashworth, Christopher Berry and Ethan Buena de Mesquito. Princeton University Press, 2021, 280 pages. [REVIEW]Kirun Sankaran - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):343-349.
  23.  7
    The problem of low expectations and the principled politician.Sam Schmitt - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):177-198.
    Nobel laureate James Buchanan downplays any theory of ethical politicians, focusing instead on rules which economize personal restraint, setting lower moral expectations. Through a constructive critique of James Buchanan’s work, I argue these lowered expectations come at a cost: degraded character in politicians, leading to constitutional decay. Buchanan lacks a theory to address choices between (a) action which furthers the politician’s self-interest and (b) action which protects some already accepted, good rule, but which does not further their self-interest. I generate (...)
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  24.  7
    Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is, and What It Should Be, Diane Coyle. Princeton University Press, 2021, 257 pages. [REVIEW]Jack Wright - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):334-338.
  25. Better vaguely right than precisely wrong in effective altruism: the problem of marginalism.Nicolas Côté & Bastian Steuwer - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):152-169.
    Effective altruism (EA) requires that when we donate to charity, we maximize the beneficial impact of our donations. While we are in broad sympathy with EA, we raise a practical problem for EA, which is that there is a crucial empirical presupposition implicit in its charity assessment methods which is false in many contexts. This is the presupposition that the magnitude of the benefits (or harms) generated by some charity vary continuously in the scale of the intervention performed. We characterize (...)
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  26.  5
    Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare.João V. Ferreira - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):124-151.
    Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based oncontext-independent choicesand the other based onreason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of (...)
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  27. A dilemma for reasons additivity.Geoff Keeling - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):20-42.
    This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model (...)
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  28. Eliminating Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):43-66.
    Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their (...)
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  29. Calibration dilemmas in the ethics of distribution.Jacob M. Nebel & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):67-98.
    This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several “calibration dilemmas,” in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed family of egalitarian views and show that they are subject to even more forceful calibration dilemmas than prioritarian theories. Finally, (...)
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  30.  30
    The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy.Christoph Schamberger - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):1-19.
    Epistemic democracy aims to show, often by appeal to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that democracy has a high chance of reaching correct decisions. It has been argued that epistemic democracy is compatible with various metaethical accounts, such as moral realism, conventionalism and majoritarianism. This paper casts doubt on that thesis and reveals the following metaethical dilemma: if we adopt moral realism, it is doubtful that voters are, on average, more than 0.5 likely to track moral facts and identify the correct (...)
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  31.  8
    Happiness – Concept, Measurement and Promotion, Yew-Kwang Ng, Springer, 2022, v + 183 pages. [REVIEW]Willem van der Deijl - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):170-176.
  32.  23
    The marketplace of rationalizations.Daniel Williams - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):99-123.
    Recent work in economics has rediscovered the importance of belief-based utility for understanding human behaviour. Belief ‘choice’ is subject to an important constraint, however: people can only bring themselves to believe things for which they can find rationalizations. When preferences for similar beliefs are widespread, this constraint generates rationalization markets, social structures in which agents compete to produce rationalizations in exchange for money and social rewards. I explore the nature of such markets, I draw on political media to illustrate their (...)
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  33.  85
    Wealth and Power: Philosophical Perspectives, Michael Bennett, Huub Brouwer, and Rutger Claassen, eds. [REVIEW]Adam Lovett - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 1:1-6.
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