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  1. What is Partial Ambiguity?Loïc Berger - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):206-220.
    This paper reflects on the notion of partial ambiguity. Using a framework decomposing ambiguity into distinct layers of analysis, among which are risk and model uncertainty, and allowing for different attitudes toward these layers, I show that partial ambiguity may prove less desirable than full ambiguity, even under ambiguity aversion. This observation poses difficulties for interpreting the notion of partial ambiguity in relation to the partial information available to determine the potential compositions of an ambiguous urn. Two Ellsberg-style thought experiments (...)
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  2.  94
    Review of Stephanie Kelton's The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy (New York, Public Affairs, 2020). [REVIEW]Gabriele Contessa - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):315-320.
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  3.  26
    Should Market Harms Be an Exception to the Harm Principle?Richard Endörfer - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):221-241.
    Many proponents of the Harm Principle seem to implicitly assume that the principle is compatible with permitting the free exchange of goods and services, even if such exchanges generate so-called market harms. I argue that, as a result, proponents of the Harm Principle face a dilemma: either the Harm Principle’s domain cannot include a large number of non-market harm cases or market harms must be treated on par with non-market harms. I then go on to discuss three alternative arguments defending (...)
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  4.  2
    Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values: Revisiting the History of Welfare Economics, Roger E. Backhouse, Antoinette Baujard and Tamotsu Nishizawa (Eds). Cambridge University Press, 2021, Ix + 338 Pages. [REVIEW]Cyril Hédoin - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):326-332.
  5.  85
    Enough is Too Much: The Excessiveness Objection to Sufficientarianism.Carl Knight - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):275-299.
    The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.
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  6.  3
    Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making, José Luis Bermúdez. Cambridge University Press, 2020, X + 330 Pages. [REVIEW]Fay Niker - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):320-326.
  7.  12
    Rational Responses to Risk, Paul Weirich. Oxford University Press, 2020, Xi + 269 Pages. [REVIEW]Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):309-314.
  8. Life as a Trust Game: A Comment on The Option Value of Life.Gregory Ponthiere - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):300-308.
    According to Burri, a major reason why suicide is often irrational lies in the option value of life. Remaining alive is valuable because this allows for a larger menu of options, and the possibility of committing suicide in the future adds further value to the act of remaining alive now. In this note, I represent life as a trust game played by two selves – the young self and the old self – and I argue that the possibility to commit (...)
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  9.  3
    Unravelling Into War: Trust and Social Preferences in Hobbes’s State of Nature.Alexander Schaefer & Jin-Yeong Sohn - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):171-205.
    According to Hobbes, individuals care about their relative standing in a way that shapes their social interactions. To model this aspect of Hobbesian psychology, this paper supposes that agents have social preferences, that is, preferences about their comparative resource holdings. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unravelling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. This Trust-unravelling Model incorporates important features of Hobbes’s argument that past models ignore.
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  10.  4
    Equality or Priority About Competing Claims?Shlomi Segall - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):242-265.
    According to the Competing Claims View we decide between alternatives by looking at the competing claims held by affected individuals. The strength of these claims is a function of two features: how much they stand to benefit by each alternative, and how badly off they would be in its absence. The view can be, and is, endorsed by both egalitarians and prioritarians. For the former the second condition will concern looking at how badly off the person is relative to others, (...)
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  11. Continuity and Catastrophic Risk.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):266-274.
    Suppose that a decision-maker's aim, under certainty, is to maximise some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called "continuity for easy cases" while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is "no": given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity (...)
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  12.  1
    What’s in, What’s Out? Towards a Rigorous Definition of the Boundaries of Benefit-Cost Analysis.Daniel Acland - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):34-50.
    Benefit-cost analysis is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay. This definition is incompatible with the exclusion of impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, for which individuals do have WTP. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only impacts for which consumer sovereignty should govern. This is because WTP implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only appropriate for ‘sovereignty-warranting’ impacts. I compare (...)
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  13.  1
    The Samaritan’s Curse: Moral Individuals and Immoral Groups.Kaushik Basu - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):132-151.
    In this paper, I revisit the question of how and in what sense can individuals comprising a group be held responsible for morally reprehensible behaviour by that group. The question is tackled by posing a counterfactual: what would happen if selfish individuals became moral creatures? A game called the Samaritan’s Curse is developed, which sheds light on the dilemma of group moral responsibility, and raises new questions concerning ‘conferred morality’ and self-fulfilling morals, and also forces us to question some implicit (...)
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  14.  2
    Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency, Sergio Tenenbaum. Oxford University Press, 2020, Xii + 245 Pages. [REVIEW]Seamus Bradley - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):164-169.
  15.  1
    Social Choice Problems with Public Reason Proceduralism.Henrik D. Kugelberg - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):51-70.
    Most political liberals argue that only rules, policies and institutions that are part of society’s basic structure need to be justified with so-called public reasons. Laws enacted outside this set are legitimate if and when public reasons can justify the procedure that selects them. I argue that this view is susceptible to known problems from social choice theory. However, there are resources within political liberalism that could address them. If the scope of public reason is extended beyond the basic structure (...)
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  16.  2
    Global Health Impact: Extending Access to Essential Medicines, Nicole Hassoun. Oxford University Press, 2020, Xv + 301 Pages. [REVIEW]Erik Malmqvist - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):158-164.
  17.  2
    The Half Life of Economic Injustice.David Miles - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):71-107.
    This paper addresses a question which is fundamental to the perceived legitimacy of the distribution of resources today: to what extent does unfairness in how assets came to be acquired in the past affect incomes and wealth now? To answer that question requires two things: first, a principle to determine what is, and what is not, a just acquisition of wealth or a just source of income; second, a means of using that principle to estimate what fraction of wealth and (...)
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  18.  6
    Moral Uncertainty, by William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist and Toby Ord. Oxford University Press, 2020, Viii + 226 Pages. [REVIEW]Marcus Pivato - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):152-158.
  19.  1
    Biased Preferences Equilibrium.Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinksy - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):24-33.
    We model economic environments in which individual choice sets are fixed and the level of a specific parameter that systematically modifies the preferences of all agents is determined endogenously to achieve equilibrium. The equilibrium concept, Biased Preferences Equilibrium, is reminiscent of competitive equilibrium: agents’ choice sets and their preferences are independent of the behaviour of other agents, the combined choices must satisfy overall feasibility constraints and the endogenous adjustment of the equilibrating preference parameter is analogous to equilibrating price adjustment. The (...)
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  20.  3
    Good Reasons for Losers: Lottery Justification and Social Risk.Kai Spiekermann - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):108-131.
    Many goods are distributed by processes that involve randomness. In lotteries, randomness is used to promote fairness. When taking social risks, randomness is a feature of the process. The losers of such decisions ought to be given a reason why they should accept the outcome. Surprisingly, good reasons demand more than merely equal ex ante chances. What is also required is a true statement of the form: ‘the result could easily have gone the other way and you could have been (...)
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  21.  20
    The Principle of Merit and the Capital-Labour Split.Jeppe von Platz - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):1-23.
    Some meritocratic defenders of capitalism rely on the principle that cooperators should receive a share of the product commensurate with their contribution. However, such defences of capitalism fail due to a dilemma. Either they rely on an understanding of contribution that arguably will be reflected by the capital-labour split in suitably idealized capitalist economies, but cannot serve as a plausible standard of merit; or they rely on an interpretation of contribution that is a plausible standard of merit, but which won’t (...)
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