The Procreation Asymmetry, in strongest form, states (roughly) that while we have no reason to create happy people, we do have reason not to create unhappy people. Despite its popularity among non-utilitarian philosophers, it has been surprisingly difficult to give an adequate theoretical defense of this asymmetry. However, in a recent paper, Johann Frick attempts to provide a unified account of the asymmetry that avoids the problems with previous attempts. One of Frick’s novel claims is that a certain wide-scope conditional (...) reasons principle, together with two plausible inference rules, serves to capture both conjuncts of the asymmetry. We argue that while Frick’s account is more plausible than previous accounts, it can explain the asymmetry only by appealing to a unexplained further asymmetry that in effect reaffirms the asymmetry, and that the wide-scope conditional reasons principle does not help to provide a satisfactory explanation of the asymmetry. (shrink)

Attachment is deeply important to human life. When one person becomes ‘attached’ to another, their sense of security turns on their emotional, social, and physical engagement with that person. This kind of security-based attachment has been extensively studied in psychology. Yet attachment theory (in the specific sense studied by psychologists) has not received adequate attention in analytic theories of social justice. In this paper, we conceptualize attachment’s nature and value, addressing when and why attachments place justice-based claims on individuals and (...) institutions, in an attempt to establish the centrality of attachment theory to liberal political philosophy. We first characterize security-based attachment and differentiate it from related phenomena (§1). We then explore its value, theorizing the connection between attachment, care, and companionship, drawing on the ethics of care (§2). We explain when and why security-based attachment generates claims of justice within liberal theory, noting some important difficulties (§3). Finally, we sketch some implications in three domains: the rights of those who have suffered pregnancy loss, the rights of grandparents vis-à-vis grandchildren, and the rights of attached friends to social and political recognition (§4). (shrink)

In his Philosophy of Devotion, Paul Katsafanas argues that some of our deepest, most identity-defining commitments are marked by “dialectical invulnerability” – that is, they are recalcitrant in the face of reflection that reveals them to be unjustified. If Katsafanas is right about this, it appears to undermine an account of identification offered by Richard Moran, since for Moran such recalcitrance is a mark of the attitude’s alienation. In these comments, I attempt to show what I think is right in (...) Katsafanas’ account, while still defending the fundamental Moranian insight regarding the nature of identification and alienation. (shrink)

In this critical commentary, we assess Theron Pummer’s attempt in The Rules of Rescue to reconcile the idea that the numbers matter when it comes to deciding who to save from harm, with the rejection of unfettered aggregation. We conclude that the task of reconciling individualist permitting reasons and the partial aggregation of requiring reasons with each other and with the overall account is more extensive than Pummer suggests. Further, we argue that while individualist permitting reasons are an interesting and (...) potentially very constructive contribution to the non-consequentialist discussion of our duties to assist, more must be done to establish their plausibility. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe in improvement: they think that the world is a better place than it used to be, and that future generations will fare even better. Others see decline: they claim that the condition of humanity has deteriorated and will continue to do so. Much ink has also been spilt over what explains these historical patterns. These two disagreements about the shape of history concern largely descriptive issues. But there is also a third, purely normative question that has been (...) neglected: is it better if a history features a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, holding other things equal? This paper develops an answer to this normative question and explores some of its implications for matters related to the future of humanity. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with Theron Pummer’s excellent book Rules of Rescue. As expected, we focus on the parts of the book that we are not fully persuaded by. In particular, we raise questions about Pummer’s methodology and his attempts to distinguish our duties to donate to charitable organizations from our duties of rescue, and we raise challenges to his main argument for effective altruism.