Behaviorism

ISSN: 0090-4155

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  1. Philosophical functionalism-reply.R. Double - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
     
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  2. Reply to ward's philosophical functionalism.Richard Double - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
  3. Reply to ward.Richard Double - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
    In "Philosophical Functionalism" , Andrew Ward claims that my "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism" begs the question against philosophical functionalism by assuming that sensations possess nonrelational characteristics that cannot be explained in functional terms. In this reply I point out that my argument does not claim this, but only the much weaker premise that sensations appear to have such characteristics. I then show how the latter is strong enough to discredit philosophical functionalism.
     
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  4.  31
    Must intentional states be intensional?Kathleen Emmett - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):129-136.
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  5. Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology: A review of Alvin I. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Gerald W. Glaser - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
     
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  6. Minds, Machines and Evolution: Philosophical Studies.Christopher Hookway - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):171-175.
     
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  7.  31
    What is representation? A reply to Smythe.Dan Lloyd - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):151-154.
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  8.  19
    Egocentric phenomenalism and conservation in Piaget.Gareth B. Matthews - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):119-128.
  9.  32
    Concept acquisition and ostensive learning: A response to professor Stemmer.Ullin T. Place - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):141-145.
    The alternative offered by Professor Stemmer to cognitivist theories of the process whereby general terms acquire their meaning is criticised in its turn on the grounds that it presents an oversimplified view of the complex processes involved in the acquisition of word meanings.
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  10.  17
    Incommensurability: The scaling of mind-body theories as a counter example.Sam S. Rakover - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):103-118.
    An opponent thesis to that of incommensurability—the commensurability approach—is proposed. The new thesis is based on the delineation of an empirical comparative metatheory for comparing theories of different paradigms. The method of multidimensional scaling together with the proximity-predictability hypothesis instantiate and substantiate this metatheory. The scaling of mind body theories, and the confirmation of certain predictions derived from MDS and the PP hypothesis concerning the relations that exist among these theories, are brought as actual examples supporting the present paper's approach.
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  11.  62
    Intentionality, intensionality and representation.Alexander Rosenberg - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):137-140.
  12.  97
    What is psychological egoism?Elliott Sober - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):89-102.
    Egoism and altruism need not be characterized as single factor theories of motivation, according to which there is a single kind of preference that moves people to action. Rather, each asserts a claim of causal primacy—a claim as to which sort of preference is the more powerful influence on behavior. This paper shows that this idea of causal primacy can be clarified in a standard scientific way. This formulation explains why many observed behaviors fail to discriminate between the hypothesis that (...)
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  13.  21
    The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to professor place.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):147-149.
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  14. Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):177-179.
     
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  15.  26
    Philosophical functionalism: A reply to double.Andrew Ward - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):155-158.
    In his recent article "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism," Richard Double argues that there are some fairly forceful a priori arguments showing that Philosophical Functionalism cannot provide adequate explanations for phenomenal states, the nonphenomenal conscious states of common sense, and the theoretical states of cognitive psychology and linquistics. In this paper it is argued that none of Double's arguments are successful.
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  16.  47
    Freud and picoeconomics.George Ainslie - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):11-19.
    Freud was the first author to conceive internal motivational conflict in economic terms. Although behaviorists have often rejected his concepts because the findings that gave rise to them were based on subjective methods, they are largely compatible with behavioral data on motivation, and indeed predicted by Herrnstein's matching law. Psychoanalysis is much closer to behavioral than to cognitive psychology, which does not conceive self-contraditory behavior as a motivational problem.
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  17. In memory of Willard F. day.Marcia L. Bennett - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):6-6.
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  18. Sociobiology and Epistemology.James Fetzer - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):85-87.
     
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  19. Language and mentality: Computational, representational, and dispositional conceptions.James H. Fetzer - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):21-39.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore three alternative frameworks for understanding the nature of language and mentality, which accent syntactical, semantical, and pragmatical aspects of the phenomena with which they are concerned, respectively. Although the computational conception currently exerts considerable appeal, its defensibility appears to hinge upon an extremely implausible theory of the relation of form to content. Similarly, while the representational approach has much to recommend it, its range is essentially restricted to those units of language that (...)
     
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  20. Day, Willard, F.(1926-1989)-in memorial.T. Knapp - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):1-4.
     
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  21.  18
    Psychology in mid-stream: A reply to Bechtel.Robert N. Mccauley - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):75-77.
  22. Remembering day, Willard.M. Mccorkle - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):8-9.
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  23. In memory of Willard F. day, teacher.Eddie Mccoy - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):10-10.
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  24. Upon Further Reflection.B. F. Skinner - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):79-83.
  25.  33
    The case for cognitive conservatism: A critique of Dan Lloyd's approach to mental representation.William E. Smythe - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):63-73.
    A critique of the view of "cognitive liberalism," as articulated in recent papers by Dan Lloyd , is presented. The main arguments are directed at Lloyd's claim that representational capacities may be found in organisms as simple as marine mollusks and at his formal analysis of cognitive representation as a type of information-bearing conditional dependency. An alternative interpretation-based view of cognitive representation is then briefly sketched.
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  26.  23
    The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: The superiority of empiricist over cognitive theories.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (1):41-61.
  27. Ron Amundson J. Christopher Maloney.Robert Arr1ngton, Gareth Matthews, William Bechtel, Joseph C. Pitt, Jonathan Bennett, Ut Place, Alan Berger, Jond Ringen, Richard Creel & Alexander Rosenberg - 1989 - Behaviorism 17:85.
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  28. Ron Amundson.Robert Arrington, Robert Audi, Bruce Aune, William Bechtel, Jonathan Bennett, Alan Berger, Richard Creel, Kathleen Emmett, Edward Erwin & Owen Flanagan - 1989 - Behaviorism 17:85.
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