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  1.  2
    No Joint Ownership! Shared Emotions Are Social-Relational Emotions.Vivian Bohl - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):111-135.
    There are cases of emotion that we readily describe as 'sharing emotions with other people.' How should we understand such cases? Joel Krueger has proposed the Joint Ownership Thesis : the view that two or more people can literally share the same emotional episode. His view is partly inspired by his reading of Merleau-Ponty -- arguably Merleau-Ponty advocates a version of JOT in his "The child's relations with others." My critical analysis demonstrates that JOT is flawed in several respects: 1) (...)
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  2.  6
    Pushmi-Pullyu Representations and Mindreading in Chimpanzees.Laura Danón - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):208-236.
    Lurz and Krachun propose a new experimental protocol designed to discriminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal goals to others. They suggest that chimpanzees' variety of "internal goal attribution" consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by Millikan as "pushmi-pullyu representations". Now, Millikan distinguishes what I propose to call 'pure' PPs from more complex varieties of PPs, which allow their owners to respond (...)
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  3.  5
    First-Person Folk Psychology: Mindreading or Mindshaping?Leon De Bruin - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):170-183.
    Proponents of mindshaping argue that third-person folk psychology is not primarily about "reading" mental states for the purpose of behavior prediction and explanation. Instead, they claim that third-person folk psychology is first and foremost a regulative practice -- one that "shapes" mental states in accordance with the norms of a shared folk psychological framework. This paper investigates to what extent the core assumptions behind the mindshaping hypothesis are compatible with an account of first-person folk psychology that is based on the (...)
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  4.  2
    Action Understanding in Infancy: Do Infant Interpreters Attribute Enduring Mental States or Track Relational Properties of Transient Bouts of Behavior?Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):237-257.
    We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false belief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most clearly worked out, minimalist versions of this idea, Butterfill and Apperly's "minimal theory of mind" framework, we defend an alternative characterization: the minimal theory of rational agency. On this view, rather than conceiving of social situations in terms of states of an enduring mental substance (...)
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  5.  1
    Folk Psychology Revisited: The Methodological Problem and the Autonomy of Psychology.Daniel F. Hartner - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):22-54.
    'Folk psychology' is a term that refers to the way that ordinary people think and talk about minds. But over roughly the last four decades the term has come to be used in rather different ways by philosophers and psychologists engaged in technical projects in analytic philosophy of mind and empirical psychology, many of which are only indirectly related to the question of how ordinary people actually think about minds. The result is a sometimes puzzling body of academic literature, cobbled (...)
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  6.  33
    Where is Your Pain? A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Concept of Pain in Americans and South Koreans.Hyo-eun Kim, Nina Poth, Kevin Reuter & Justin Sytsma - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):136-169.
    Philosophical orthodoxy holds that pains are mental states, taking this to reflect the ordinary conception of pain. Despite this, evidence is mounting that English speakers do not tend to conceptualize pains in this way; rather, they tend to treat pains as being bodily states. We hypothesize that this is driven by two primary factors -- the phenomenology of feeling pains and the surface grammar of pain reports. There is reason to expect that neither of these factors is culturally specific, however, (...)
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  7. Autonomy of Folk Psychology Reconsidered.Taavi Laanpere - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):55-78.
    It has been a recurring theme in the philosophy of mind that folk psychology is autonomous. This paper has three goals. First, it aims to clarify what the term 'folk psychology' could mean in different contexts. Four widespread senses of the term are distinguished and the one eligible for autonomy is picked out. Secondly, a classic argument for autonomy is introduced and motivated. This is the argument from the normativity of folk psychology, based on its constitutive rationality. According to this (...)
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  8. Mind and Folk Psychology: A Partial Introduction.Bruno Mölder - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):1-21.
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  9.  1
    Believe It or Not: On Multiplying Classes of Belief-Like States.Thompson James Robert - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):79-110.
    This paper explores whether it is justified to add any new taxa concerning informational states to our psychological taxonomy. Such exploration will not lead to a straightforward decision between remaining steadfast with the taxonomic _status quo_ and adding only one new taxon. A careful analysis of when one would be warranted in positing a new taxon for informational states will reveal similarly compelling reasons to posit all sorts of additional taxa. As an antidote to such proliferation, I suggest a reinforcement (...)
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  10. Mental State Attribution for Interactionism.Uku Tooming - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):184-207.
    Interactionists about folk psychology argue that embodied interactions constitute the primary way we understand one another and thus oppose more standard accounts according to which the understanding is mostly achieved through belief and desire attributions. However, also interactionists need to explain why people sometimes still resort to attitude ascription. In this paper, it is argued that this explanatory demand presents a genuine challenge for interactionism and that a popular proposal which claims that belief and desire attributions are needed to make (...)
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