This article argues not only that Nietzsche saw reverence (Ehrfurcht) as a virtue to be included as part of a set of virtues for a particular type of individual, but also, and more radically, that Nietzsche took reverence to be a cardinal virtue—a virtue upon which all other virtues hinge—and that Nietzsche wanted to cultivate reverence, to one degree or another, in every type. The article examines the related textual and philosophical context in which it makes sense for Nietzsche to (...) elevate reverence in the way suggested. Then, reinforcing this claim, it traces the Sophist origin of Nietzsche’s thinking about reverence, showing how Nietzsche’s understanding resembles the mythological account of reverence given by the Sophist Protagoras. This ancient influence upon a central theme of Nietzsche’s work has not been recognized before. (shrink)

This article considers Max Minden Ribeiro’s critical examination of Mattia Riccardi’s Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology (2021). Minden Ribeiro claims that Riccardi’s development of this view involves a doubling both of instances of consciousness and of kinds of consciousness, and he advocates instead for a same-order interpretation of Nietzsche, which need invoke only a single instance and kind of consciousness. This article concedes several of Minden Ribeiro’s results, while taking issue with his interpretation of key points in Nietzsche’s texts. In the end, (...) the article argues, while Minden Ribeiro’s case constitutes a partial correction of Riccardi’s interpretation of Nietzsche on consciousness, its results are thinner than Minden Ribeiro intends. (shrink)

This article critically examines two claims Mattia Riccardi ascribes to Nietzsche in his 2021 book Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology. The first is that Nietzsche’s main notion of consciousness should be interpreted as Rconsciousness. Rconsciousness is an awareness of a mental state or process that is achieved when that state is linguistically interpreted by another state. This article finds that Riccardi’s account commits to two instances of states becoming conscious and to two kinds of consciousness. The second claim is that Nietzsche advances (...) a pluralism about consciousness, endorsing a perceptual form of consciousness, Pconsciousness, and a qualitative consciousness of sensations, Qconsciousness. As Riccardi’s account offers no criteria for what it takes to be conscious per se, it is unclear what the pluralism he ascribes to Nietzsche amounts to. Moreover, this article finds that Nietzsche offers no positive reason to conceive any candidate mental phenomena as conscious other than those that are linguistically-reflexively conscious. (shrink)

This article attempts a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s metaethics through a constitutivist lens. It examines the relationship between life’s meaningfulness and our distinctive way of valuing to offer a value-based version of constitutivism—a value constitutivism, as called in this article. For Nietzsche, valuing has a characteristic function or aim, namely, to give life meaning; good values are simply those that perform that function well. This version of Nietzschean constitutivism has both interpretive and substantive upshots. Mainly, it clarifies the general normative structure (...) of Nietzsche’s axiological theory and helps vindicate the kind of revaluation of values he envisioned—with power playing a central normative role. In sum, constitutivism remains a promising approach to Nietzsche, and Nietzsche’s writings continue to offer rich insights into the source and nature of normativity. (shrink)

This article replies to Max Minden Ribeiro’s critique of the view of consciousness I attribute to Nietzsche in my 2021 monograph, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, and to João Constâncio’s comments on that critique, in which he agrees with several of Minden Ribeiro’s conclusions and raises his own questions about my reading of Nietzsche on the social character of reflective consciousness. First, this article argues that Minden Ribeiro’s same-order self-representational reading lacks textual support. Hence, Nietzsche is more plausibly read as a higher-order (...) theorist. At the same time, this article defends my own hybrid higher-order reading by arguing that Nietzsche is committed—as Constâncio used to agree—not only to reflective consciousness but also to phenomenal consciousness. Second, by clarifying in which sense Nietzsche takes reflective consciousness to be social, this article responds to Constâncio’s complaint that my book neglects Nietzsche’s insights about the constitutive sociality of human mindedness. (shrink)

The doctrine of eternal recurrence (ER), understood as a cosmological theory, violates the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII): if cycles of events are supposed to recur qualitatively identically, then there is actually only one cycle. Given Nietzsche’s views about logical principles, this conflict may not be too worrisome—were it not for the fact that he does seem to apply the principle within cycles. This article suggests that this apparent conflict can be reconciled by applying a weakened version of (...) PII that has been proposed on independent grounds in more recent philosophy. It allows for the possibility of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct events by employing a special kind of (“weakly discerning”) relations. It turns out that Paul Loeb’s proposal of relations of “recurrence awareness” between cycles is of the kind required by the weakened PII and thus serves to reconcile ER with the principle. (shrink)