Organismal death is foundational to the evolution of life, and many biological concepts such as natural selection and life history strategy are so fashioned only because individuals are mortal. Organisms, irrespective of their organization, are composed of basic functional units—cells—and it is our understanding of cell death that lies at the heart of most general explanatory frameworks for organismal mortality. Cell death can be exogenous, arising from transmissible diseases, predation, or other misfortunes, but there are also endogenous forms of death (...) that are sometimes the result of adaptive evolution. These endogenous forms of death—often labeled programmed cell death, PCD—originated in the earliest cells and are maintained across the tree of life. Here, we consider two problematic issues related to PCD (and cell mortality generally). First, we trace the original discoveries of cell death from the nineteenth century and place current conceptions of PCD in their historical context. Revisions of our understanding of PCD demand a reassessment of its origin. Our second aim is thus to structure the proposed origin explanations of PCD into coherent arguments. In our analysis we argue for the evolutionary concept of PCD and the viral defense-immunity hypothesis for the origin of PCD. We suggest that this framework offers a plausible account of PCD early in the history of life, and also provides an epistemic basis for the future development of a general evolutionary account of mortality. (shrink)

Originating in the work of Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Preyer, and advanced by a Prussian embryologist, Wilhelm Roux, the idea of struggle for existence between body parts helped to establish a framework, in which population cell dynamics rather than a predefined harmony guides adaptive changes in an organism. Intended to provide a causal-mechanical view of functional adjustments in body parts, this framework was also embraced later by early pioneers of immunology to address the question of vaccine effectiveness and pathogen resistance. (...) As an extension of these early efforts, Elie Metchnikoff established an evolutionary vision of immunity, development, pathology, and senescence, in which phagocyte-driven selection and struggle promote adaptive changes in an organism. Despite its promising start, the idea of somatic evolution lost its appeal at the turn of the twentieth century giving way to a vision, in which an organism operates as a genetically uniform, harmonious entity. (shrink)

The neuron doctrine, according to which nerves consist of discontinuous neurons, presented investigators with the challenge of determining what activities occurred between them or between them and muscles. One group of researchers, dubbed the sparks, viewed the electrical current in one neuron as inducing a current in the next neuron or in muscles. For them there was no gap between the activities of neurons or neurons and muscles that required filling with a new type of activity. A competing group, the (...) soups, came to argue for chemicals, subsequently referred to neurotransmitters, as carrying out the activities between neurons or between neurons and muscles. But even for them the conclusion that chemicals performed this activity was only arrived over time. I examine the prolonged period in which proponents of chemical transmission developed their account and challenged the sparks. My goal is to illuminate the epistemic processes that led to the discovery of a new scientific phenomenon—chemical transmission between neurons. (shrink)

This paper describes the scientific practices of the anatomists from the Société Anatomique de Paris (1803–1873) who were collecting anatomical and pathological specimens in Nineteenth-Century Paris and which led to the building of the anatomy and pathology Musée Dupuytren (1835–2016). The framework introduced by Robert Kohler to describe collecting sciences (2007) is useful as a tool to identify the set of diverse practices within pathological anatomy in nineteenth-century Paris. However, I will argue that anatomy and pathology collecting had specific features (...) compared to most collecting sciences. Two main collecting practices could be distinguished: first, “finding” anatomical specimens and second, keeping these specimens. The first kind of practices were at least rhetorically and explicitly motivated by Auguste Comte’s positive philosophy. But “finding” an anatomy or pathology specimen could not be completely compared to finding an object or making a simple observation, as dissecting as well as some experimental practices were also involved. Heterogeneous practices thus coexisted within collecting in anatomy and pathology. Epistemological as well as pragmatic tensions arose. On top of Kohler’s framework, I introduce Sabina Leonelli’s concept of “data journey” to offer a narrative of the diversity of collecting practices involved in the Société Anatomique de Paris and the Musée Dupuytren. I use the concept to analyse how this diversity of practices impacted knowledge production. (shrink)

Advances in technology have increased our knowledge of the processes that effect genomic changes and of the roles of RNA networks in biocommunication, functionality, and evolution of genomes. Natural genetic engineering and genomic inscription occur at all levels of life: cell cycles, development, and evolution. This has implications for phylogenetic studies and for biogeography, particularly given the general acceptance of using molecular clocks as arbiters between vicariance and dispersal explanations in biogeography. Léon Croizat’s development of panbiogeography and his explanation for (...) the distribution patterns of organisms are based on concepts of dispersal, differential form-making, and ancestor that differ from concepts of descent used broadly in phylogenetic and biogeographic studies. Croizat’s differential form-making is consistent with the extensive roles ascribed to RNAs in development and evolution and recent discoveries of genome studies. Evolutionary-developmental biology (evo-devo), including epigenetics, and the role of RNAs should be incorporated into biogeography. (shrink)

Faced with the charge of value-ladenness in their theories, researchers in evolutionary psychology (EP) argue that their science is entirely free of values; their hypotheses only concern scientific facts, without any socio-cultural value judgments. Lynn Hankinson Nelson, a renowned feminist scholar of science, denies this. In her book and papers, Nelson finds that their hypotheses do contain evaluative components. One such example is the fear of snakes. While this fear was adaptive to the environment in the past, evolutionary psychologists argue (...) that this trait is now “maladaptive” because city-dwellers would rarely encounter snakes in their environment. However, Nelson argues that labeling this trait “maladaptive” implies that this fear is irrational since this claim cannot be understood otherwise. This paper argues that this and other arguments made by Nelson for demonstrating the value-ladenness in EP’s hypotheses have serious flaws. For instance, we argue that investigating the psychological mechanisms behind the fear and their developmental and energy costs would allow for proper interpretation of evolutionary psychologists’ claims for the maladaptive fear of snakes without any normative implication. We also maintain that some of her arguments fail to demonstrate their connection to the point at the center of the debates between EP and feminism. While Nelson may be right in stating that EP’s hypotheses have evaluative components, she does not prove their strong political or normative implications, which is central to the debate over EP. (shrink)

This article addresses some crucial assumptions that are rarely acknowledged when organisms and machines are compared. We begin by presenting a short historical reconstruction of the concept of “machine.” We show that there has never been a unique and widely accepted definition of “machine” and that the extant definitions are based on specific technologies. Then we argue that, despite the concept's ambiguity, we can still defend a more robust, specific, and useful notion of machine analogy that accounts for successful strategies (...) in connecting specific devices (or mechanisms) with particular living phenomena. For that purpose, we distinguish between what we call “generic identity” and proper “machine analogy.” We suggest that “generic identity”—which, roughly stated, presumes that some sort of vague similarity might exist between organisms and machines—is a source of the confusion haunting many persistent disagreements and that, accordingly, it should be dismissed. Instead, we endorse a particular form of “machine analogy” where the relation between organic phenomena and mechanical devices is not generic but specific and grounded on the identification of shared “invariants.” We propose that the machine analogy is a kind of analogy as proportion and we elucidate how this is used or might be used in scientific practices. We finally argue that while organisms are not machines in a generic sense, they might share many robust “invariants,” which justify the scientists' use of machine analogies for grasping living phenomena. (shrink)

Alan Hodgkin’s and Andrew Huxley’s mid-20th century work on the ionic currents generating neuron action potentials stands among that century’s great scientific achievements. Unsurprisingly, that case has attracted widespread attention from neuroscientists, historians and philosophers of science. In this paper, I do not propose to add any new insights into the vast historical treatment of Hodgkin’s and Huxley’s scientific discoveries in that much- discussed episode. Instead, I focus on an aspect of it that hasn’t received much attention: Hodgkin’s and Huxley’s (...) own assessments about what their famous “quantitative description” accomplished. The “Hodgkin-Huxley model” is now widely recognized as a foundation of contemporary computational neuroscience. Yet Hodgkin and Huxley expressed serious caveats about their model and what it added to their scientific discoveries, as far back as their (1952d), in which they first presented their model. They were even more critical of its accomplishments in their Nobel Prize addresses a decade later. Most notably, as I argue here, some worries they raised about their quantitative description seem still to be relevant to current work in ongoing computational neuroscience. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain why, while Charles Darwin was well recognized as a scientific leader of his time, Claude Bernard never really regarded Darwinism as a scientific theory. The lukewarm reception of Darwin at the Académie des Sciences of Paris and his nomination to a chair only after 8 years contrasts with his prominence, and Bernard’s attitude towards Darwin’s theory of species evolution belongs to this French context. Yet we argue that Bernard rejects the scientific value (...) of Darwinian principles mainly for epistemological reasons. Like Darwin, Bernard was interested in hereditary processes, and planned to conduct experiments on these processes that could lead to species transformation. But the potential creation of new forms of life would not vindicate Darwinism since biologists can only explain the origin of morphotypes and morphological laws by the means of untestable analogies. Because it can be the object neither of experiments nor of any empirical observation, phylogeny remains out of science’s scope. Around 1878 Bernard foresaw a new general physiology based on the study of protoplasm, which he saw as the agent of all basic living phenomena. We will analyze why Bernard regarded Darwinism as part of metaphysics, yet still referred to Darwinians in his latter works in 1878. Basically, the absence of a scientific reception of Darwinism in Bernard's work should not obscure its philosophical reception, which highlights the main principles of Bernard’s epistemology. (shrink)

This article examines crop varietal standardization in the United States. Numerous committees formed in the early twentieth century to address the problem of nomenclatural rules in the horticultural and agricultural industries. Making shared reference to a varietal name proved a difficult proposition for seed-borne crops because plant conformity tended to change in the hands of different breeders. Moreover, scientific and commercial opinions diverged on the value of deviations within crop varieties. I review the function of descriptive difference in the seed (...) trade and in the framework of evolutionary theory before examining the institutional history of varietal standardization. Pimento peppers are used to represent how vegetables were treated differently than cereals. Lack of stability within a popular pimento variety caused problems for food packers in middle Georgia, which public breeders addressed by releasing new peppers. To conclude, the article questions the role of taxonomy in intellectual property, as breeding history and yield became defining attributes for making varietal distinctions. (shrink)

We performed a critical review of the historiographical studies on biogeography. We began with the pioneering works of Augustin and Alphonse de Candolle. Then, we analyzed the historical accounts of biogeography developed by (1) Martin Fichman and his history on the extensionism-permanentism debate; (2) Gareth Nelson and his critique of the Neo-Darwinian historiography of biogeography; (3) Ernst Mayr, with his dispersalist viewpoint; (4) Alan Richardson, who wrote a microhistory on the biogeographic model constructed by Darwin; (5) Michael Paul Kinch and (...) the ideas discussed in the 19th century about the geographical distribution of living beings; (6) Janet Browne, who highlighted the importance of the pre-Darwinian naturalists; (7) Peter Bowler, who focused mainly on the influence of paleontology on biogeography; (8) James Larson, who looked into the practices of the naturalists of Northern Europe in the late 18th century; and (9) Malte Ebach, who like Larson, was more interested in analysing the practices rather than the ideas of naturalists who studied the geographical distribution of organisms. Finally, these works are compared with each other. There has not been a dominant paradigm in the construction of historical narratives of biogeography; however, they provide a useful context for understanding problems of biogeography that continue to be debated to this day. (shrink)

The ancient, interlinked questions about the role of chance in the living world and the origins of life, gained new relevance with the development of molecular biology in the twentieth century. In 1970, French molecular biologist Jacques Monod, joint winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, devoted a popular book on modern biology and its philosophical implications to these questions, which was quickly translated into English as _Chance and Necessity_. Nine years later, Belgian thermodynamicist Ilya Prigogine, 1977 (...) winner of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, published a popular book on the history and philosophy of natural sciences with Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers. Translated into English under the title _Order out of Chaos_ and widely discussed, the whole book can be seen as a response to Monod on these biological and philosophical questions. This study will trace this intellectual controversy between two Nobel Prize winners defending two opposing scientific and philosophical visions of the living world, rooted in two different scientific disciplines. (shrink)

Organoids and organs-on-a-chip are currently the two major families of 3D advanced organotypic in vitro culture systems, aimed at reconstituting miniaturized models of physiological and pathological states of human organs. Both share the tenets of the so-called “three-dimensional thinking”, a Systems Physiology approach focused on recapitulating the dynamic interactions between cells and their microenvironment. We first review the arguments underlying the “paradigm shift” toward three-dimensional thinking in the in vitro culture community. Then, through a historically informed account of the technical (...) affordances and the epistemic commitments of these two approaches, we highlight how they embody two distinct experimental cultures. We finally argue that the current systematic effort for their integration requires not only innovative “synergistic” engineering solutions, but also conceptual integration between different perspectives on biological causality. (shrink)

Claude Bernard (1813–1878) and Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896) rank as two of the most influential scientists of the nineteenth century. Renowned for their experiments, lectures, and writing, Bernard and du Bois-Reymond earned great prestige as professors of physiology in a time when Paris and Berlin reigned as capitals of science. Yet even though they were equals in every way, du Bois-Reymond’s reputation has fallen far more than Bernard’s. This essay compares aspects of the two men’s attitudes to philosophy, history, and (...) biology in an attempt to explain why Bernard remains the better known. The answer lies less in the value of du Bois-Reymond’s contributions than in the way that science is remembered in France and Germany. (shrink)

In the middle of the twentieth century, physiologists interested in human biological rhythms undertook a series of field experiments in natural spaces that they believed could closely approximate conditions of biological timelessness. With the field of rhythms research was still largely on the fringes of the life sciences, natural spaces seemed to offer unique research opportunities beyond what was available to physiologists in laboratory spaces. In particular, subterranean caves and the High Arctic became archetypal ‘natural laboratories’ for the study of (...) human circadian (daily) rhythms. This paper is explores the field experiments which occurred in these ‘timeless spaces’. It considers how scientists understood these natural spaces as suitably ‘timeless’ for studying circadian rhythms and what their experimental practices can tell us about contemporary physiological notions of biological time, especially its relationship to ‘environmentality’ (Formosinho et al. in Stud History Philos Sci 91:148–158, 2022). In so doing, this paper adds to a growing literature on the interrelationship of field sites by demonstrating the ways that caves and the Arctic were connected by rhythms scientists. Finally, it will explore how the use of these particular spaces were not just scientific but also political – leveraging growing Cold War anxieties about nuclear fallout and the space race to bring greater prestige and funding to the study of circadian rhythms in its early years. (shrink)

Masui Kiyoshi (1887–1981), a prominent Japanese geneticist, is best known for inventing the sex-sorting method of chicks and his contributions to experimental genetics in Japan. Masui drew inspiration from Goldschmidt’s sex determination theory and used chickens, transplantation techniques, and his own “chick sexing” methods in his scientific work. This paper examines the intersection of genetics and industrial breeding by tracing the evolution of Masui’s experimental systems. During the early 20th century, poultry farming emerged as a significant industry in Japan, resulting (...) in the development of standardized organisms and techniques for chicken farming. Masui, a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, collaborated with the Imperial Zootechnical Experimental Station to use these organisms as models for sex determination theory while exploring their further industrial possibilities. First, the paper show how Masui viewed chickens as epistemological objects and transformed his anatomical discoveries into standardized industrial practices. Next, it describes how Masui’s collaboration with German geneticist Richard Goldschmidt led to new academic questions about sex determination mechanisms and how he integrated his knowledge of chicken physiology into his research on “experimental gynandromorphs” to elaborate the theories. Lastly, the paper discusses the biotechnological ideals that Masui aimed to achieve and how they were co-constructed with his mass-production method of intersex chickens from the early 1930s. The trajectory of Masui’s experimental systems highlights the dynamic relationship between agroindustry and genetics in the early twentieth century and demonstrates the ‘biology of history’ in which the biological processes of organisms intertwine with their epistemological history. (shrink)

Since the practice turn, the role technologies play in the production of scientific knowledge has become a prominent topic in science studies. Much existing scholarship, however, either limits technology to merely mechanical instrumentation or uses the term for a wide variety of items. This article argues that technologies in scientific practice can be understood as a result of past scientific knowledge becoming sedimented in materials, like model organisms, synthetic reagents or mechanical instruments, through the routine use of these materials in (...) subsequent research practice. The proposed theoretical interpretation of technology is examined through a case where a model organism—Drosophila melanogaster—acted as a technology for investigating a contested biological effect of a mechanical instrument: Hermann J. Muller’s experiments on X-ray mutagenicity in the 1920s. The article reconstructs how Muller employed two synthetic Drosophila stocks as tests for measuring X-rays’ capacity to cause genetic aberration. It argues that past scientific knowledge sedimented in the Drosophila stocks influenced Muller’s perception of X-ray-induced mutation. It further describes how Muller’s concept of X-ray mutagenicity sedimented through the adoption of X-ray machines as a ready-made resource for producing mutants by other geneticists, for instance George Beadle and Edward Tatum in their experiments on Neurospora crassa, despite ongoing disputes surrounding Muller’s conclusions. Technological sedimentation is proposed as a potential explanation why sedimentation and disputation may often coexist in the history of science. (shrink)

Decision makers addressing the ecological crisis face the challenge of considering complex ecosystems in their socioeconomic decisions. Complementary to ecological sciences, other scientific frameworks, grouped under the umbrella term environmental sciences, offer decision makers the opportunity to pursue sustainable paths. Because the environmental sciences are drawn from different branches of science, environmental ethics must go beyond the legacy of ecology and the life sciences to describe the contribution of scientific knowledge to addressing the ecological crisis. In this regard, I analyze (...) and compare three environmental sciences based on their seminal articles: Conservation Biology, Sustainability Science, and Sustainability Economics. My analysis shows that conservation biology and sustainability economics share strong similarities despite their different disciplinary backgrounds (life _versus_ social sciences). Both seek to contrast a biocentric and an anthropocentric perspective. The goal of sustainability is therefore understood as a balance that must be found between these two perspectives. If the issue of balancing human and non-human interests is still relevant to sustainable science, it is more likely to take place in an ecocentric perspective based on alternative ontological and normative prescriptions. Based on this analysis, I distinguish between ‘proscriptive value-based’ scientific work that cannot be used for policy advice but is flexible to different value systems, and ‘prescriptive value-based’ scientific work that can be used for policy advice but is fixed within a given value system. Conflicting recommendations from environmental scientists therefore result from the coexistence of multiple ‘prescriptive value-based’ scientific approaches based on different conceptions of the relationship between humans and nature. (shrink)

Much has been written on Claude Bernard as a relentless promoter of the experimental method in physiology. Although the paper will touch Bernard’s experimental intuitions and his experimental practice as well, its focus is slightly different. It will address the laboratory, that is, the space in which experimentation in the life sciences takes place, and it will analyze the scattered remarks that Bernard made on the topic both in his books and in his posthumously published writings. The paper is divided (...) into four parts. The introduction briefly sketches the coming into being of the physiological laboratory in the first half of the nineteenth century. The second section will give an overview of Claude Bernard’s own itinerary in physiology and his personal laboratory experience. The third part of the paper will have a look at the image of the laboratory that Claude depicted in his Introduction to Experimental Medicine. In the subsequent section and by contrast, the image of the laboratory will come into focus as it can be reconstructed from Bernard’s notebook that he kept between 1850 and 1860, the Cahier rouge. Finally, the fifth part of the paper will spotlight Claude Bernard’s comparison of the sciences and the arts and their respective practices. A brief concluding statement tries to summarize Bernard’s epistemological position toward experimentally practiced science. (shrink)

Many historical studies tend to underline two central Kantian themes frequently emerging in Georges Canguilhem’s works: (1) a conception of activity, primarily stemming from the Critique of Pure Reason, as a mental and abstract synthesis of judgment; and (2) a notion of organism, inspired by the Critique of Judgment, as an integral totality of parts. Canguilhem was particularly faithful to the first theme from the 1920s to the first half of the 1930s, whereas the second theme became important in the (...) early 1940s. With this article, I will attempt to show that a third important theme of technique arose in the second half of the 30s also in the wake of Kant’s philosophy, especially Sect. 43 of the Critique of Judgment. This section, which states that technical ability is distinguished from a theoretical faculty, led Canguilhem to a more concrete and practical conception of activity. I will then suggest that it was by considering technique that the concept of normativity, which characterizes Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of life, also took shape. (shrink)

Ayurveda is a traditional system of healthcare that is native to India and has a rich documented literature of its own. Most of the historians agree that the documentation of core Ayurveda literature took place approximately in between 400 BCE and 200 CE, while acknowledging that the roots of its theoretical framework can be traced back to a much earlier period. For multiple reasons many significant contributions of Ayurveda literature to various streams of biological and medical sciences have remained under-recognized (...) while recounting the historical milestones of development. This is true in the context of the physiology of digestion and metabolism too. In this communication we try to reconstruct a picture of the processes of digestion and metabolism as had been understood by ancient Ayurveda scholars. Though this understanding was primitive and insufficient in many ways, we argue that this deserves to be documented and acknowledged. To help with grasping the importance of these contributions, we juxtapose them with the corresponding insights pertaining to this subject reported by prominent western scientists. The major contributions of Ayurveda that have been recounted in this paper are those related to the description of three distinct phases of digestion (Avasthapaka), multiple sets of transformative entities acting at different levels of metabolism (Agni), and the roles ascribed to various internal and external factors in executing these physiological functions. (shrink)

Are psychiatric disorders natural kinds? This question has received a lot of attention within present-day philosophy of psychiatry, where many authors debate the ontology and nature of mental disorders. Similarly, historians of psychiatry, dating back to Foucault, have debated whether psychiatric researchers conceived of mental disorders as natural kinds or not. However, historians of psychiatry have paid little to no attention to the influence of (a) theories within logic, and (b) theories within metaphysics on psychiatric accounts of proper method, and (...) on accounts of the nature and classification of mental disorders. Historically, however, logic and metaphysics have extensively shaped methods and interpretations of classifications in the natural sciences. This paper corrects this lacuna in the history of psychiatry, and demonstrates that theories within logic and metaphysics, articulated by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), have significantly shaped the conception of medical method and (psychiatric) nosology of the influential nosologist Boissier De Sauvages (1706-1767). After treating Sauvages, I discuss the method of the influential nosologist William Cullen (1710-1790), and demonstrate the continuity between the classificatory methods of Sauvages and Cullen. I show that both Sauvages and Cullen were essentialists concerning medical diseases in general and psychiatric disorders in particular, contributing to the history of conceptions of the ontology and nature of mental disorders. (shrink)

Italian Life sciences in post-WWII faced important challenges: the reconstruction of a scientific panorama suffering heavily after two decades of Fascism and the damages of war. Modernization was not only a matter of recreating a favorable environment for research, by modernizing Italian biomedical institutions and connecting the Italian scientists with the new ideas coming from abroad. The introduction of new genetics required a new array of concepts and instruments, but also, the ability to connect to international networks and to become (...) active members of a broader scientific community. Because of the several socio-cultural issues involved (eugenics, racism, religion, politics), human genetics is a good case study in order to analyze how Italian life sciences managed the transition towards a new research system, and the influences Italian human geneticists received. The paper focuses primarily on the development of the early career of Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, probably the most prominent scientist in post-WWII human genetics in Italy, and his friend and colleague Ruggero Ceppellini. In following their path, a healthy mix of local traditions and international stimuli emerges, allowing for the establishment—within and beyond national borders—of the discipline. (shrink)

Decisions regarding the end-of-life of minor patients are amongst the most difficult areas of decision-making in pediatric health care. In this field of medicine, such decisions inevitably occur early in human life, which makes one aware of the fact that any life—young or old—cannot escape its temporal nature. Belgium and the Netherlands have adopted domestic regulations, which conditionally permit euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in minors who experience hopeless and unbearable suffering. One of these conditions states that the minor involved must (...) be legally competent and able to express an authentic and lasting wish to die. This contribution is different from other legal texts on end-of-life decisions in modern health care. Foremost, it deals with the role time-bound components play in our views on the permissibility of such decisions with regard to minor patients. While other disciplines provide profound reflections on this issue, from a legal point of view this side has hardly been explored, let alone examined with regard to its relevance for the legal permissibility of end-of-life decisions in pediatrics. Therefore, the manuscript inquires whether there are legal lessons to be learned if we look more closely to temporality-related aspects of these end-of-life decisions, particularly in connection to a minor patient’s assumable ability to choose death over an agonizing existence. (shrink)

Heredity has been dismissed as an insignificant object in Claude Bernard’s physiology, and the topic is usually ignored by historians. Yet, thirty years ago, Jean Gayon demonstrated that Bernard did elaborate on the subject. The present paper aims at reassessing the issue of heredity in Claude Bernard’s project of a “general physiology”. My first claim is that Bernard’s interest in heredity was linked to his ambitious goal of redefining general physiology in relation to morphology. In 1867, not only was morphology (...) included within experimental physiology, but it also theoretically grounded physiological investigations. By 1878, morphology and physiology were considered as completely independent sciences, and only the latter was perceived as suitable to experimentation. My second claim is that this reversal reflected the existence of two opposite attitudes towards heredity. In the late 1860s, Bernard was convinced that heredity would soon be accessible to experimental manipulation and that new species would be produced in the laboratory exactly like organic chemistry succeeded to do for raw bodies. Ten years later, he ascertained that this was impossible. My third claim is that Bernard was epistemologically ill-equipped to address the issue of heredity. Bernard was strongly committed to a general reasoning scheme that acknowledged only three categories: determining conditions, constant laws and phenomena. This scheme was a key factor in his successes as a physiologist who was able to capture new mechanisms in living bodies. Nonetheless, it also prevented him from understanding how time and history could be endowed with a causal action that cannot be reduced to timeless parameters. (shrink)

We analyze the relationship between evolutionary theory and classification of higher taxa in the work of three ichthyologists: Albert C.L.G. Günther (1830–1914), Edward Drinker Cope (1840–1897), and Theodore Gill (1837–1914). The progress of ichthyology in the early years following the Origin has received little attention from historians, and offers an opportunity to further evaluate the extent to which evolutionary theorizing influenced published views on systematic methodology. These three ichthyologists held radically different theoretical views. The apparent commensurability of claims about relationships (...) among groups of fishes belies differences in what the relationships actually were supposed to be. As well, interpreting classification as genealogical did not lead to agreement about taxonomic methodology; instead, applying evolutionary theory raised new axes of disagreement. (shrink)

Bringing together scholars from philosophy, bioethics, law, sociology, and anthropology, this topical collection explores how innovations in the field of biomedicine and the life sciences are challenging and transforming traditional understandings of human temporality and of the temporal duration, extension and structure of human life. The contributions aim to expand the theoretical debate by highlighting the significance of time and human temporality in different discourses and practical contexts, and developing concrete, empirically informed, and culturally sensitive perspectives. The collection is structured (...) around three main foci: the beginning of life, the middle of life, and later life. This structure facilitates an in-depth examination of specific technological and biographical contexts and at the same time allows an overarching comparison of relevant similarities and differences between life phases and fields of application. (shrink)

Can empathy be a tool for obtaining scientific knowledge or is it incompatible with the detached objectivity that is often seen as the ideal in scientific inquiry? This paper examines the views of Austrian ethologist Konrad Lorenz and American comparative psychologist Daniel Lehrman on the role of intuition and empathy in the study of animal behavior. It situates those views within the larger project of establishing ethology as an objective science. Lehrman challenged Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, the main founders of (...) this field, to clarify their epistemological positions regarding how to deal with the subjectivity of the animals they studied as well as the scientist’s own subjectivity. I argue that there was a tension between their desire to eliminate the subjectivities of ethological researchers (and of their subjects) and the public perception that Lorenz had a remarkable ability to enter into the lives of the animals he studied. I explain why Lorenz rejected empathy as valid in scientific inquiry, showing that his epistemological position was grounded in his ideal of science and his proposed ontology for ethology. Yet, Lehrman insisted that full detachment was neither possible nor desirable. (shrink)